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How do entrepreneurs’ social inclinations compare to those of non-
entrepreneurs? Does the social preference structure of entrepreneurs provide us 
with information regarding the business type they choose to operate (i.e., whether 
they choose to run a social business versus a commercial business)? Do social 
preferences relate to (un)productive entrepreneurial motives? Does personality 
play a role in this context? This dissertation addresses these research questions by 
conducting four experimental studies with actual entrepreneurs, business and 
economics students, farmers, and start-up employees, collaborators and investors. 
Thereby, different methods are applied in laboratory, online, and lab-in-the-field 
experiments. The findings suggest entrepreneurs to hold generally stronger social 
tendencies, in particular in relation to cooperation. No link between social 






Unterscheidet sich die Ausprägung sozialer Präferenzen zwischen 
Unternehmern und Nicht-Unternehmern? Beeinflussen die sozialen Präferenzen 
von Unternehmern welchen Geschäftstyp (soziales vs. kommerzielles 
Unternehmen) sie gründen? Haben soziale Präferenzen einen Einfluss auf 
produktive und/oder unproduktive unternehmerische Motive? Spielt die 
Persönlichkeitsstruktur in diesem Kontext eine Rolle? Die vorliegende 
Dissertation behandelt diese Fragen anhand von vier experimentellen Studien mit 
Unternehmern, Landwirten, Studierenden der Betriebs- und 
Volkswirtschaftslehre, sowie Mitarbeitern, Kollaboratoren und Investoren von 
Start-up-Unternehmen. Dabei werden unterschiedliche Methoden in Labor, 
Online, sowie „Lab-in-the field“ Experimenten angewendet. Die Ergebnisse 
zeigen, dass Unternehmer im Vergleich zu den anderen Testgruppen, generell 
stärker ausgeprägte soziale Präferenzen besitzen, insbesondere bezüglich 
kooperativer Eigenschaften. Darüber hinaus wird kein Zusammenhang zwischen 
den sozialen Präferenzen von Unternehmern und ihrer Entscheidung ein soziales 
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1. Introduction  
How do entrepreneurs’ social dispositions compare to those of non-entrepreneurs? 
Does the social preference structure of entrepreneurs provide us with information 
regarding the business type they choose to operate (i.e., whether they choose to run a 
social business versus a commercial business)? Do social preferences relate to 
(un)productive entrepreneurial motives? Does personality play a role in this context?  
 
In the following, I will outline the research questions of my dissertation and the 
underlying motivations for addressing these questions. As the articles are interconnected, 
I will in some detail outline their relationships to each other and the motivations they 
share, while also summarizing the main contributions of the articles.  
 
1.1. Motivation 
The study of entrepreneurial decision-making has made considerable advances over 
the last decades, and has thus provided entrepreneurial researchers, practitioners, as well 
as policy makers with valuable insights. Researchers have for example analyzed how 
entrepreneurs’ choices differ to those of non-entrepreneurs (e.g., Busenitz and Barney, 
1997; Mitchell et al., 2002; Burmeister and Schade, 2007; Schade and Köllinger, 2007), 
how they exploit business opportunities (e.g., Shepherd, Patzelt, Baron, 2013), and make 
exit decisions (e.g., Sandri et al., 2010; Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014). Other studies 
have focused on investigating individual differences of entrepreneurs based on the role 
of personality (Rauch and Frese, 2007; Brandstätter, 2011), cognition (Mitchell et al., 
2002), and emotions (Klaukien et al., 2013).  
 
I argue that an important aspect within this field of research is presented by studying 
entrepreneurs’ social preferences and social tendencies. In the following, I present three 
different motivations for studying the social preferences of entrepreneurs: 
 
(1) The entrepreneurial environment is unique, characterized by considerable 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921), high asset specificity (Williamson, 1995), and by a 
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generally complex, very fast and innovative nature (Schumpeter, 1987). 
Dispositions of social preferences could play an important role as to how 
entrepreneurs deal with the challenges of the entrepreneurial environment. For 
example, social or other regarding preferences might affect entrepreneurs’ 
relationships with capital providers and/or other important stakeholders (Cable 
and Shane, 1997). Being able to establish and maintain cooperative, long-term, 
and trusting relationships could offer entrepreneurs an element of risk reduction, 
thus providing a potential comparative advantage. Also, past studies have exposed 
a positive link between pro-sociality and certain business-related factors, such as 
earnings (Bowles et al., 2001) and productivity (Barr and Serneels, 2009; 
Carpenter and Seki, 2011), which hold also outside the laboratory (lab-in-the-field 
experiments). For example, Leibbrandt (2012) shows that sellers, who act more 
pro-social in laboratory experiments, realize higher returns for their products than 
their more selfish counterparts. It hence appears that pro-social preferences 
positively impact certain business performance measures. Thereby, different 
suggestions regarding the mechanism by which this occurs have been offered. 
One suggestion is that individuals with more pronounced social preferences are 
less inclined to behave opportunistically, for example with their stakeholders, and 
consequently realize reputational benefits (Bowles et al., 2001). Others suggest 
that pro-social individuals are generally better at interacting and can consequently 
more strongly benefit from certain network effects (Barr and Serneels, 2009). 
 
(2) However, the aforementioned characteristics of the entrepreneurial environment 
also open up possibilities for unproductive rent seeking and destructive venturing 
(Baumol, 1990). Given the ever-increasing environmental as well as social issues 
on our planet, its limited natural resources in combination with an increasing 
world population, and soaring wealth inequality problems (Zucman, 2019), the 
way entrepreneurs act with regards to these aspects determines to a large extent 
how our future business, but also societal, and environmental landscapes will look 
like. I believe entrepreneurs, with their creative and innovative decision-making, 
play a crucial role for the implementations towards a more sustainable paradigm 
shift. Markman et al. (2016) proclaim how, given the severity of our ecological 
issues, it is not sufficient anymore to merely balance the triple bottom line of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). The authors propose that in order to be a 
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sustainable and ethical entrepreneurial enterprise, ventures need to balance 
environmental goals first, followed by societal goals and lastly focus on economic 
goals. Yet, the Global Entrepreneurship Report of 2019/20 reports that the main 
motivation for starting up a new venture is still predominantly driven by economic 
concerns (i.e., “to build great wealth or high income”) (Bosma et al., 2020). The 
balancing of entrepreneurs’ business goals (i.e., monetary vs. ecological and 
sustainable goals) will in particular be addressed in Article 1 and Article 2 of this 
dissertation, in which conjoint experiments are conducted with farmers (Article 
1) and other entrepreneurs (Article 2). These studies offer us a better 
understanding as to how certain trade-offs are made on these domains (i.e., profit 
vs. ecological aspects) and consider potential implications.  
 
Ostrom (2010) discusses how many of our current environmental issues resemble 
the situation of a social dilemma. Findings of studies investigating this link in 
more detail, suggest social preferences to indeed play a role in the 
conservation/exploitation of resources. Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) for example 
study how other-regarding preferences affect the exploitation of common pool 
resources. The authors find fishermen, who demonstrate stronger cooperative 
tendencies in the laboratory (measured via a public good game) to be less likely 
to exploit their fishing grounds (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011). Riedl and Smeets 
(2017) find social preferences to have a significantly positive impact on socially 
responsible investment decisions, even if that decision leads to lower financial 
returns. Knez (2016) reports altruistic individuals to show a greater willingness to 
make sacrifices in order to protect the environment. Hence, social preferences 
appear to play a determinant role for responsible and sustainable economic 
decision-making. In Article 3 and Article 4 of this dissertation, other-regarding 
preferences (of actual entrepreneurs, economics and business students, as well as 
start-up employees, collaborators and investors (ECI)) are elicited via incentive 
compatible methods, making partial use of the same dataset. The focus is thereby 
on the preferences of altruism and (strategic) cooperation. Implications of the 
results are discussed, in relation to the motivation of this paragraph as well as the 




(3) Some of the aspects raised in the second motivation (2) have been addressed by 
the social entrepreneurship literature. Social entrepreneurship has, given the dire 
environmental and wealth equality situation on our planet, received accelerated 
attention in the past two decades. Thereby, there is still no agreed upon definition 
as to what social entrepreneurship really means or entails (Mair and Marti, 2006; 
Choi and Majumdar, 2014, Saebi et al., 2019). Understanding how social and 
ecological preferences are related to the concept of social entrepreneurship (or 
not) should thereby offer valuable insights. This aspect is addressed in particular 
in Article 2 and Article 3 of this dissertation. The data collected in these two 
independent experimental studies allows us to investigate whether pro-social 
attitudes systematically differ between social and commercial entrepreneurs.  
 
While pro-sociality has been considered in a range of labor economic contexts (see 
e.g., Charness and Villeval, 2009; Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Gneezy et al., 2016), there 
is surprisingly little empirical research investigating social preferences in the context of 
entrepreneurship. Notable exceptions present the studies by Weitzel et al. (2010) and 
Urbig et al. (2012), whose designs are partially replicated in Article 3 and Article 4. 
 
Based on the uncertainty prevailing in entrepreneurial environments, social norms are 
likely to play a central role in this field of work (see e.g., Meek et al., 2010). Social norms 
present “normative standards of behavior that are enforced by informal social sanctions” 
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004, p.63). Ultimately, social norms can cause a lasting change 
in an individual’s motivation to act pro-social or not (Fehr and Gächter, 2002), making 
entrepreneurship a particularly interesting field of application for the study of social 
dispositions. 
 
1.1.1. Overview, core results, and contributions: Article 2 
Article 2 (“Do social entrepreneurs operate social businesses?) contributes to the 
(social) entrepreneurship literature by experimentally investigating preference structures 
of actual entrepreneurs using conjoint analysis. The entrepreneurship literature, when 
distinguishing between social and commercial entrepreneurs, does so mainly on the basis 
of the company’s mission, also termed the mission-based approach (i.e., Dees, 1998; 
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Bacq and Janssen, 2011). Thereby, if the mission of a business follows a social objective, 
the founder is consequently classified as a social entrepreneur. In Article 2, this 
perspective is shifted and a new criterion of distinction is introduced, namely the 
entrepreneur’s weighing of the attributes as described by the triple bottom line (Elkington, 
1998). A social entrepreneur in Article 2 is consequently characterized by a stronger 
weighing of environmental and social attributes relative to economic ones. Analogously, 
a commercial entrepreneur is characterized by strong monetary preferences in relation to 
environmental and social ones. The article’s definition of a social entrepreneur is thereby 
completely independent of the venture’s pursued mission. This means, based on the 
definition, also the founder of a business with a commercial mission, can be defined as a 
social entrepreneur - if his operational preferences are dominated by ecological and social 
concerns, rather than monetary ones. This new approach offers some valuable insights 
towards the discussion as to what in today’s society constitutes social and sustainable 
entrepreneurship; and whether exclusively defining social entrepreneurship based on the 
venture’s mission or profit structure offers the most informative concept or definition. 
Article 2 experimentally analyzes this research question by running a conjoint experiment 
with N=45 entrepreneurs, who run either commercial or social businesses: In our 
experimental design, the type of business the entrepreneur operates is thereby strictly 
defined by the venture’s mission. This allows us to investigate whether social/commercial 
businesses are exclusively operated by social/commercial entrepreneurs, or whether 
there is a mixture across these two domains.  
 
Interestingly, results show that social and commercial business owners do not differ 
systematically in their preference structures (a finding confirmed in Article 3). Via cluster 
analysis two types of entrepreneurs are identified: one type is thereby characterized by 
strong monetary preferences, the other by strong social and ecological preferences, in line 
with the article’s definition of a social entrepreneur. In each cluster type social as well as 
commercial business owners are observed.   
 
This implies that social business owners do not necessarily prefer social and ecological 
outcomes to monetary ones. And not all commercial business owners are predominantly 
driven by monetary preferences.  
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Since social business owners do not differ in their preferences to commercial 
business owners, there must be other reasons why they choose to operate such a business. 
Researchers suggest that there might be a “warm glow” they receive in their work, for 
example, in the form of recognition by others (Baron, 2007). Therefore, it is tested 
whether the perception of their responsible behavior is more important for social than for 
commercial business owners. The results do not support this hypothesis.  
 
The findings consequently raise the question, whether the theoretical definitions of 
social entrepreneurship in the literature offer the best understandings as to what this type 
of entrepreneurship entails, and what not. It is argued that the mission-based approach 
fails to account for the way the venture is operated (how that mission is pursued), while 
the article’s findings suggest that this aspect plays an integral part in the discussion. Given 
our global environmental and societal problems, it is proposed that the aspect of “how” 
should not be ignored when defining the concept of social entrepreneurship. Rather, in 
line with the argument by Markman et al. (2016), it should comprise a central aspect 
within this discussion.  
1.1.2. Overview, core results, and contributions: Article 1 
Article 1 of my dissertation uses the same methodology as Article 2, namely 
conjoint analysis. However, for this article the experiment was not conducted online but 
via a mobile laboratory. While still focusing on entrepreneurs as subjects, exclusively 
farmers were recruited and their trade-off decisions analyzed, for example in relation to 
economic and ecological aspects. The chosen subject pool offers important insights in 
particular in relation to the second motivation for studying entrepreneurs’ preferences 
(namely understanding the potential for unproductive rent seeking and destructive 
venturing).  
 
Farmers have become increasingly under pressure by society, as well as by the 
government, to run their farms in an ecological and sustainable way. Industrial farming 
is still on the rise, despite its potential negative effects on consumer health, food safety, 
sustainability of the ecosystem (e.g., fertility of the soil), and community well-being 
(Schlosser, 2001; Lyson et al., 2004; Labao and Stofferahn, 2008). Farming operations 
are highly dependent on political implications, as subsidies and legal requirements to a 
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large extent determine their decision-making (e.g., Guyomard et al., 1996; Hennessy, 
1998; Sckokai and Moro, 2009). This makes farmers a particular interesting subject pool, 
as it allows us to investigate what is, at least to some extent, driving the current structural 
change of agriculture – i.e., are farmers’ preferences strictly dominated by profit 
maximizing considerations and/or a disregard for the fertility and sustainability of their 
soil? Should this not be the case, then other reasons need to be considered as to why we 
observe this structural trend. Do governmental policies lead agriculture into the right 
direction? Are farmers acting in line with their preferences when operating their farms? 
 
This paper sheds some light onto the preferences of farmers, providing also valuable 
information for a refined discussion regarding the structural trends currently observed 
within agriculture, and which policies based on these findings could be most effective. 
 
The findings show most farmers to consider the long-term goal of “maintaining the 
fertility of the land” as the most important goal, more important than income and risk. 
Preferences are heterogeneous. Three distinct clusters are identified. One of those, for 
instance, is quite concerned with the impact of farming on the environment, while another 
cluster is characterized by a much stronger tendency towards short-term, monetary and 
selfish goals.  
 
The results of this study are also valuable from another important perspective: They 
show that not only consumers, but also producers are better understood when taking into 
account utility dimensions beyond those of profit maximization. 
1.1.3. Overview, core results, and contributions: Article 3 
Article 3 (“Cooperation and altruism in incentive compatible experiments with 
entrepreneurs, professionals, and business students“) contributes to the academic and 
applied field of entrepreneurship by empirically investigating sharing (altruistic) and 
cooperating tendencies of actual entrepreneurs using game theoretic concepts. 
Entrepreneurs’ game behavior is experimentally analyzed using a standard dictator game 
(Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994) as well as an iterated two player public 
good game (Ledyard, 1995). Entrepreneurs’ behavior is compared to that of business and 
economic students, as well as start-up employees, collaborators and investors (ECI). 
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Comparing the behaviors of these three groups allows for testing the results’ 
generalizability. 
 
Results show entrepreneurs to be indeed more willing to share in the dictator game, 
in particular in comparison to the business and economic students. They also exhibit, in 
relation to economic and business students and start-up ECIs, a significantly higher 
willingness to cooperate in the public good game.  
 
This finding is independent of social entrepreneurship, i.e., entrepreneurs who run 
a more social business do not behave significantly differently in the games’ allocation 
choices. This finding is in line with the results of Article 2, which found social and 
commercial business owners to not systematically differ in their preference structures. 
 
Article 3 further investigates the role of beliefs regarding one’s own 
entrepreneurial talent (self-efficacy) onto game behavior. Following the approach by 
Weitzel et al. (2010) and Urbig et al. (2012), principal factor analysis is applied to 
separate the variable further into business and creative talent. Depending on game type 
and sample group different influences of these two variables onto pro-social behaviors 
are observed. 
 
For the sample of entrepreneurs, we find business talent to negatively influence 
allocation choices in the dictator game, while creative talent bears a marginally positive 
impact in this context. In the cooperation game, we find entrepreneurs to not be 
significantly influenced by either of these self-assessed variables. However, start-up 
employees, investors and collaborators display a significantly negative association 
between business talent and distributive choices in the public good game.  
1.1.4. Overview, core results, and contributions: Article 4 
Article 4 (“The dark triad and its relations to social preferences and (un)productive 
motives in an entrepreneurial context”) makes partial use of the data analyzed in Article 
3. The article offers four different contributions (see Figure 1 below for an overview of 
contributions and associations). Some of them build on previous contributions of this 
dissertation, by utilizing different approaches or new methods. For example, in previous 
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articles it was discussed how social preferences of entrepreneurs might manifest into their 
entrepreneurial decision-making process. This article investigates productive (i.e., is the 
motivation to start a business characterized by “developing a culture in which its 
employees value their work”) and unproductive entrepreneurial motives (i.e. “achieving 
financial success, even if it is a little destructive to society”) (Hmieleski and Lerner, 2016) 
and analyzes if and how these motives are related to the social preferences of cooperation 
and altruism (see contribution 4 in Figure 1). Understanding this link, or the lack thereof, 
certainly enriches our understanding and discussion of the context of entrepreneurial 
social preferences.  
 
Figure 1: Summary of contributions for Article 4 
 
 
Other contributions of this article consist in the analysis of relationships between 
personality traits and (i) social preferences (contribution 1, in Figure 1), (ii) 
entrepreneurial intentions (contribution 2), and (iii) (un)productive entrepreneurial 
motives (contribution 3).  
 
The article discusses in detail, in particular for an entrepreneurial context, the value 
of understanding whether dark personality traits are really more prominent in individuals 
intending to start an entrepreneurial venture, as has been suggested in the 
entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Miller 2014; Akhtar et al., 2013; Wales et al., 2013; 
Mathieu and St. Jean, 2013).  
 
Starting with the findings in relation to the first contribution, a rather weak 
relationship between dark personality traits and the social preferences of altruism and 
cooperation is found. In relation to the second contribution, the results indicate potential 
future entrepreneurs to be less likely to hold psychopathic tendencies and to be no more, 
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but also no less, inclined to hold narcissistic tendencies than other individuals. This 
finding is in particular relevant for the direct stakeholders of the entrepreneurial firm, 
such as its employees, suppliers, and venture capitalists (or other credit providers), as they 
do not have to manage these personalities in order to secure their own (financial) well-
being. Moving to the third contribution of the paper, the data shows a significant positive 
relationship between unproductive entrepreneurial motives and the dark traits of 
narcissism as well as psychopathy. These findings, in combination with those in relation 
to entrepreneurial intentions and the dark triad, suggest individuals with higher 
entrepreneurial intentions to not be characterized by personality traits, which can be 
systematically linked to unproductive entrepreneurial motives. 
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1.2. Conclusion  
This dissertation explores in four different experimental studies social preferences 
of commercial and social entrepreneurs, start-up employees, collaborators, and investors, 
as well as business and economic students. The core results suggest social preferences to 
not systematically differ between commercial and social business owners. Comparing the 
social preferences of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, the data indicates 
entrepreneurs to generally exhibit stronger social inclinations, this holds in particular in 
the context of cooperation. Future research should investigate in more detail, how social 
preferences transform into entrepreneurs’ daily, i.e., operational decision-making. While 
the results suggest that certain socially undesirable personality traits can systematically 
be linked to unproductive entrepreneurial motives, the data shows individuals with high 
entrepreneurial intentions to not be characterized by these personality traits. This means, 
ceteris paribus, that for the likelihood of making social and sustainable decisions, better 
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2. ESSAY NO. I 
It’s not only money that makes their world go round: Results of a 
conjoint analysis on the utility dimensions of farmers1 
Christine Lauritzen, Christian D. Schade, Wei-Shiun Chang 
 
This paper extends the previous multidimensional preference literature from the 
consumer’s to the producer’s point of view using the context of farming. We apply 
conjoint analysis to test farmers’ preferences regarding four different attributes. 
Two: profit and risk, are reflecting short-term monetary and self-regarding aspects, 
two: long-term fertility of the land and environmental externalities, are 
representing other-regarding as well as long-term goals. N=68 respondents, 49 
agricultural students and 19 farmers from Germany were confronted with eight 
different farming situations, which were constructed using the aforementioned 
attributes. Subjects had to rank these situations according to their preference on 
how to ideally operate a farm. We find most farmers to consider the long-term goal 
of “maintaining the fertility of the land” as the most important goal, more 
important than income and risk. Preferences are heterogeneous, and we are able 
to identify three distinct clusters. One of those, for instance, is quite concerned with 
the impact of farming on the environment. Our findings are important since they 
show that not only consumers, but also producers might better be described when 
taking into account utility dimensions beyond profit maximization. We discuss 
explanations and extensions of our thoughts, i.e., cluster membership might be 
related to theories on motivation crowding, and gender differences turn out to be 
important to better understand environmental concerns. 
 
 




Standard economic theory has a tendency to ignore the influence of an agent’s norms, 
values and multidimensional preferences on decisions. For the most part, this negligence 
is caused by the seemingly persistent argumentation that the maximization of profits (or 
at least some uni-dimensional utility) is the main – if not sole – driver of economic 
decisions. However, this view has been progressively criticized, as it fails to explain real-
life behavior. For example, the fact that individuals donate money, or display other 
altruistic motives, demonstrates that other preferences, besides selfish monetary ones, 
must play a role for decision-making. The field of behavioral economics addresses these 
inconsistencies found between standard economic theory and actual behavior. Game 
theoretic experiments, i.e., those employing dictatorship and ultimatum games, have 
shown that the game theoretic solution, a prediction based on standard economic theory, 
is generally not supported: In the dictatorship game, the majority of proposers allocates 
some portion of their monetary endowment to the recipient, who has no decision to make 
but can only accept the proposal (consequently there is no strategic or risk component in 
this game, making it more of an allocation task than a game). Concepts used to explain 
this or similar behaviors have been the notions of fairness and reciprocity in the ultimatum 
game (e.g., Güth et al., 1982; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), and altruism or inequity 
aversion in the dictatorship game (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1986; Rabin, 1993; Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999).  
 
While the results of various studies, applying all kinds of different treatments (i.e., 
changing the context, playing one-shot vs. multiple rounds, anonymity of dictator etc.), 
have produced valuable insights, the trade-offs subjects had to face in these experiments 
are essentially always based on the notion of a two-dimensional preference: the allocation 
of money to the decision-maker (i.e., selfish preference) versus the allocation of money 
to someone else (i.e., fairness, altruistic, reciprocal or inequity-averse motives). We 
would like to extend this line of research as in real-life situations individual’s decisions 
are often based on the trade-offs between multiple preference (i.e., greater than two) 
dimensions. Krantz and Kunreuther (2007) describe, for example, the multiple goals 
individuals consider when making decisions on insurance and other protective measures, 
in particular focusing on the impact of financial and emotional goals.  
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Within the field of consumer (marketing) research the quantitative modeling of multi-
dimensional preferences is common. Thereby, in particular the method of conjoint 
analysis (Green and Rao, 1971) has found widespread application. This technique faces 
the subject with a number of stimuli, defined by a selection of attributes which can take 
on different levels. The subject’s ranking of the proposed stimuli statistically allows for 
deriving the individual’s preference order of the presented attributes. In recent times 
however, this method has found application in various new and different contexts, 
including the context of environmental concerns. These studies aim at measuring the 
public’s preferences for environmental goods, i.e., landscape, surface and water quality 
(Alriksson and Öberg, 2008). Columbo et al. (2006), for example, analyzed the social 
benefits of soil conservation and found the public to be placing a higher value on water 
quality and landscape benefits than on wildlife and employment benefits. However, 
generally the adoption of multidimensional modeling via the method of conjoint analysis 
is rare outside consumer research. In particular for choices related to production decisions 
this approach has been neglected.2 It is likely that this is due to the fact that especially 
producers’ decisions are assumed (by economists) to be derived from purely selfish and 
monetary goals (i.e., profit maximization).  
 
Our study contributes to the scarce knowledge of producers’ multidimensional 
preferences. We run an experiment, employing the method of conjoint analysis, with 
N=68 farmers and agricultural science students. This subject pool and area of application 
was chosen, as there is ample evidence that farmers’ production decisions are particularly 
heterogeneous, based on the multiple and often conflicting goals farmers have to manage 
(Gasson, 1973; Fairweather and Keating, 1994). To the best of our knowledge, there is 
only one other study that concerns itself with a similar context and method. Bond et al. 
(2011) analyze the extent of environmental considerations of Colorado corn producers in 
their farm management decisions, by asking subjects to trade-off between irrigation 
systems with different profit, risk, nitrate leaching and soil erosion levels. Via panel 
mixed logit estimation techniques, the authors find a willingness to reduce soil erosion 
and nitrate leaching and, as a consequence, accept irrigation systems associated with 
lower profit and higher risk levels. Our study in some critical points differs from the 
 
2 Interesting research via conjoint analysis on financing decisions in the field of entrepreneurship has been 
conducted by Shepherd and Zacharakis (1999) and Franke et al. (2006). 
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aforementioned research: While Bond et al. (2011) employ exclusively corn producers 
from Colorado, our study does not limit itself to a particular style of farming or location, 
which should increase the generalizability of our study, especially as the chosen 
attributes, which the subjects had to base their trade-offs on, did not refer to any particular 
farming style but were kept as general as possible. A further noteworthy methodological 
difference in the experimental design is that the subjects in the study by Bond et al. (2011) 
had to make their decisions relative to their current farming situation, whereas our study 
constructed agricultural situations which were framed neutrally and entirely independent 
of the farmers’ current situation. We believe a neutral and generally independent framing 
avoids the potential risk of cognitive biases when deciding on the trade-offs of the 
attributes, in particular the status-quo bias (Samelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Burmeister 
and Schade, 2007), and hence leads to more reliant findings on the relative importance of 
the attributes.  
 
Although the data used by Bond et al. (2011) was originally collected via the method 
of conjoint analysis in 1997 (Page, 1997), the authors in their paper use panel mixed logit 
estimations (and other fixed parameter specifications) to derive their results. Our data was 
collected in the winter period of 2012 and 2013 in Germany and was analyzed by the 
standard conjoint method. Our study further uses the conjoint results to cluster farmers 
into three distinguished groups, which allows us to further analyze their heterogeneity.  
 
The implications of the resulting cluster formations, in particular for agricultural 
policy, are also discussed against the background of motivation crowding theory (Frey, 
1997), which posits that the introduction of monetary incentives may partially or even 
entirely undermine voluntary contribution, leading to (at least partially) undesirable 
effects (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Gneezy, 2003). Finally, this paper examines the role of 
gender differences for other regarding preferences (ORP), as past experimental research 
has indicated, despite some contradictory results, females to be exhibiting stronger 
altruistic preferences (or ORP in general). 
 
We find that for most farmers, keeping their land fertile gets the strongest part-worth 
utility, whereas monetary aspects such as profit and volatility of profit are somewhat less 
important. Many farmers also care for externalities, i.e., for the environmental impact of 
their farm. Those preference orderings turn out to be largely dependent on cluster 
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membership. In one of the clusters, the monetary values are very important, in another, 
environmental concerns are.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review on 
the existing literature regarding multidimensional preferences of farmers, motivation 
crowding, and gender effects in the domain of altruism/other-regarding preferences, as 
well as the theoretical background for the applied method of conjoint analysis. Section 3 
outlines the experimental design. Section 4 describes the process of sample collection and 
the generated data. Section 5 presents the study’s findings. Section 6 contains a 
discussion, section 7 concerns itself with potential limitations of the study and concludes. 
2.2. Theoretical Background 
2.2.1. Multiple preferences of entrepreneurs 
Farmers were chosen as subjects of this study as past studies have shown that this 
occupational group, for several reasons, appears to be ideally suited for its objectives. 
One of the reasons is that farmers, who operate in very homogenous conditions, display 
heterogeneous characteristics in regards to their farming operations (Gómez-Limón and 
Riesgo, 2004). Findings like this support the criticism of the standard economic 
assumption, and demonstrate that farmers’ production decisions cannot be solely based 
on profit maximizing motives or any other one-dimensional utility function as otherwise 
homogeneous operations should be observed in homogeneous environments (see also 
Gasson, 1973; Ilbery, 1983; Dent, Edwards-Jones and McGregor, 1995; Austin et al., 
1996 on a detailed discussion of the insufficiency of predicting farmers decision-making/ 
behavior based on any uni-dimensional criterion). Based on these results, it appears 
plausible why the few studies employing a conjoint analysis to analyze producers’ 
multiple preferences have focused on the agricultural industry.  
 
Indeed, farmers have been shown to be motivated by multiple and often conflicting 
goals or objectives (Fairweather and Keating, 1994), which essentially influences how 
farmers arrive at their decisions regarding the allocation of resources as well as their 
operation style. This conflict is certainly also based on the fact that many farms comprise 
family businesses, which have to balance lifestyle choices with management choices, so 
that these two objectives are expected to be highly interrelated and contradictory (Gasson, 
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1973; Willock et al, 1999). Past literature has generally categorized farmers’ goals and 
values as being either economic, conservation, and/or lifestyle based (Austin et al., 1996; 
Beus and Dunlap, 1990; Petzelka et al., 1996; Maybery et al., 2005). While farmers with 
a strong emphasis on economic values prioritize capital returns, farmers with strong 
values in the domain of conservation reveal higher considerations for environmental 
issues and nature conservation (Maybery et al, 2005). Farmers exhibiting strong 
environmental values, for example, should place more emphasis on the impact that their 
farming style has on the environment and, based on their evaluation, might decide for a 
farming practice that has a low environmental impact but also potentially generates less 
profit.  
 
Based on previous literature and a number of thorough qualitative interviews 
regarding farmers’ values and goals, which were carried out by one of the authors of this 
article in the North-German region Angeln in preparation for this study3, we identified 
the following four attributes as most relevant for our study: (1) average level of income, 
(2) volatility surrounding that average, (3) concern of the farmer for her environment 
(externalities), and (4) the concern of the famer for the long-term fertility of the land 
(long-term goals).  
2.2.2. Motivation crowding theory 
As the aim of this paper is to unravel the importance of certain preference 
dimensions of farmers, a somewhat natural and important extension of this research is to 
develop some kind of policy recommendations based on the generated findings, so that 
in particular environmentally sound practices (often the key aim of agricultural policies) 
are adopted successfully. We believe that motivation crowding theory (Frey 1997; Frey 
and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001) plays a critical role within this context. 
While we cannot explicitly test for this theory within our experimental design, we 
consider it an essential aspect for the interpretation of the results and consequent policy 
recommendations and hence outline the theoretical background here in more detail. The 
theory posits that by offering an intrinsically motivated individual (where the motive to 
perform a certain action arises from within the person (Frey and Jegen, 2001)) monetary 
 
3 The master thesis and the full transcripts of the respective interviews are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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or other external incentives, in order to increase or maintain the supply of some desirable 
action, could actually lead to decreasing supply levels. A classic example of this 
phenomenon is by Titmuss (1970), who argued that monetary compensation for donating 
blood might crowd out the supply of blood donors. Such a reaction is contrary to the one 
predicted under standard economic assumptions, such as in principal-agent theory, where 
monetary compensation for certain levels of performance is always expected to lead to 
an increase in the desired action (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983). Standard economic theory 
however completely ignores the different possible sources of motivation (i.e., extrinsic 
and intrinsic motivation) and the potential consequences but only focuses on the relative 
price effect. In motivation crowding theory, the introduction of monetary incentives can 
lead to different results, depending on the way internal and external motivation may 
interact (Frey and Jegen, 2001). If external intervention does not affect intrinsic 
motivation, or if external intervention even increases intrinsic motivation (“crowding-in 
effect”), then monetary incentives will definitely increase the supply of some action (raise 
performance). However, should the external intervention impair the intrinsic motivation 
then the opposite may result, namely that supply will decrease (“crowding-out effect”). 
As Frey and Jegen (2001, p.593) point out:  
 
“In general, both the relative price effect and the crowding-out effect are active, so 
that external intervention has two opposite effects on the agent’s performance. Whether 
intervening is beneficial from the principal’s point of view depends on the relative size of 
the two countervailing effects.” 
 
For this research, it would be particularly interesting to recognize those farmers 
who are intrinsically motivated to minimize the environmental externalities that are 
caused by their farming style and to be able to distinguish these from farmers who would 
care to adopt such a low impact farming style only when monetarily incentivized to do so 
(who are considered to be extrinsically motivated). While it might be difficult to 
determine whether a farmer is extrinsically or intrinsically motivated to engage in 
environmentally friendly farming operations (in particular when some environmental 
factors are not completely independent from monetary considerations), by being able to 
observe how farmers trade-off certain attributes (i.e.., profit vs. externality) one should 
be able to derive indications regarding the farmer’s source of motivation. We suggest that 
a person who demonstrates a high level of priority (and thus a higher level of utility) for 
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certain non-monetary actions - like a high concern for externalities in combination with 
a low level of priority for monetarily linked actions, such as profits, can be assumed to be 
intrinsically motivated. On the other hand, a person who derives a high utility from profits 
or similar is easier to be motivated to perform certain non-monetary actions when she 
will be compensated with monetary incentives for doing so. Consequently, depending on 
the motivation sources of the farmer and the effect external incentives have on those, 
external interventions, such as agricultural policy, which might introduce, e.g., positive 
monetary rewards for performing certain environmental practices, may actually crowd 
out the intrinsic motivation of certain farmers leading to an unsuccessful policy adoption 
(at least partially).  
2.2.3. Other-regarding preferences and gender effects 
Two of our chosen attributes (the attributes will be described in more detail in the 
next section), namely the concern of the farmer for her environment (“externalities”), and 
the concern for the long-term fertility of her land (“fertility”), present other-regarding 
and/or long-term preferences. With respect to the other-regarding aspects of those 
attributes (externalities affecting nature and others; ruining the fertility of the land 
affecting future generations), gender might play a decisive role, as past experimental 
research has shown that males and females exhibit significant differences in their social 
or other-regarding preferences (ORP). While the results of these studies are somewhat 
mixed (for a very comprehensive overview on studies dealing with differences in social 
preferences, including ultimatum games, dictatorship games, trust games, prisoner’s 
dilemma games and public good games see Croson and Gneezy, 2009), there remains a 
tendency of women to display higher ORP, in particular in the absence of any strategic 
components and risk concerns. Croson and Gneezy (2009) conclude that the mixed results 
from previous studies might be due to the fact that women are more sensitive to the 
environmental variables in an experiment, as the authors find a higher variability in the 
behavior of women in relation to men in such experimental games (this higher variability 
holds for between-subjects studies as well as within-subjects studies). Also, Eckel and 
Grossman (1998) argue that the failure to control for environmental variables such as risk 
factors, strategic components, and the so called “experimenter effect” might confound 
gender differences in this research arena, as women have been shown to be more risk 
averse, to react more sensitive towards who is their counterpart in the experiment, and to 
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care more about the judgment of other people. The authors consequently control for these 
factors by designing a double-anonymous dictatorship game experiment and find that 
women on average donate twice as much to their anonymous partners than men. Croson 
and Buchan (1999) find, using a trust game, that while there is no gender difference in 
the proposer’s amount send to the responder (where a risky strategic component exists, 
as the proposer’s payoff is dependent on the responder’s decision), female responders 
send significantly more money back to the proposers than men (this part of the trust game 
basically resembles a dictatorship game, where no strategic or risky component is 
present). Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) introduce various “prices of altruism” and find 
women to be more generous than men when the price of giving is relatively high. 
However, as the price of giving decreases men demonstrate larger altruistic tendencies 
(and for values in-between men and women give equally much). They conclude based on 
their findings that the “price of altruism” might be another factor why there have been 
conflicting results in studies concerning themselves with gender differences in ORP. In 
our experiment, in particular the externality attribute reflects ORP, most likely to be 
defined via the concept of altruism. The fertility attribute, as will be explained in more 
detail in section 2.3., is a mixed motive attribute. It is also strongly linked to long-term 
monetary goals and family values. We nevertheless expect, especially since the design of 
our experiment controls for the aforementioned critical environmental variables (no 
counterparty effect, no strategic component, anonymous treatment) and since the cost of 
caring for externalities (altruism) can be argued to be sufficiently high, female subjects 
to be placing a larger importance on both those attributes than male subjects. 
2.2.4. Conjoint analysis as a method to analyze multi-dimensional preferences  
In conjoint analysis, especially when using the full profile method (see below), 
individuals are asked to bring stimuli or scenarios – that are each characterized by a 
certain combination of attributes and which can be seen as simplified alternatives, e.g., 
choices, actions, products etc. – in an individual preference order. The method makes 
some assumptions (Phillips et al., 2002) that are largely consistent with the model of 
reasoned action by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975): each scenario is a bundle of potential 
attributes, each individual holds a set of utility weights for attribute levels, and the 
individual assesses the overall utility for each scenario. Conjoint analysis then calculates 
the individuals’ part worth utilities of the attributes from the preference ordering of the 
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presented stimuli. This method appears to be ideally suited to analyze the preference 
structure of farmers who might trade off several attributes in their production decisions.  
 
Hence in our study, an individual’s decision to develop a certain rank-order of farming 
scenarios is assumed to implicitly reflect the relative importance of economic, social, and 
other values of that farmer. Conjoint analysis reports those relative weights in the form 
of the individual’s part worth utilities of specific farming attributes. Implementing 
conjoint analysis is considered a multistep procedure (Green and Srinivasan, 1978) 
starting with the selection of the number of attributes, their levels, the questioning method 
etc. We first define four attributes that we feel are most important to many farmers’ 
production decisions (see below) and assign plausible levels to each attribute. The full 
profile method is selected for the construction of the alternatives as this approach is often 
considered to be the most “realistic”. However, since a full profile of all possible attribute 
level combinations would have led to a too large number of stimuli to be appropriately 
sorted by the respondents, we make use of a reduced number of stimuli, implementing an 
orthogonal design (Green and Srinivasan, 1978). Hence, each stimulus will consist of a 
full combination of all four attributes (with one specific level in each). In general, the 








Where $$ represents the importance (part worth utility) of the attribute i, and %$( 
represents the desirability of level j of attribute i.  
2.3. Experimental Design 
The experiment, which consisted of four tasks, was designed using the experimental 
software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Before commencing with the actual parts of the 
experiment, subjects were provided with detailed instructions, which were readable on 
the computer screen as well as read out aloud, so that it could be ensured, that all subjects 
thoroughly understood the structure of the experiment as well as the tasks that they were 
required to complete in each section. The experiment consists in addition to a fixed 
remuneration also of a variable component, which was determined by the lottery choice 
the subject made in the first part of the experiment. The fixed remuneration was set at 8 
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Euros for students and 32 Euros for farmers. The variable component consisted of a 
maximum payout of about 4 Euros for students and 12 Euros for farmers (for both 
remuneration components a factor of 4 was employed for the farmers due to their higher 
opportunity cost when participating in experiments). Once it was ensured that all subjects 
understood the instructions the experiment commenced.4 
 
In the first part of the experiment subjects played a Holt and Laury lottery, whereby 
ten paired lottery choices (lottery “A” and lottery “B”) were presented. This method 
allows eliciting an individual’s level of risk propensity by observing at which lottery pair 
an individual makes the crossover from lottery “A” (the less risky lottery) to lottery “B” 
(Holt and Laury, 2002). A participant consistent with standard expected utility theory can 
only have one crossover point; however, some of our participants had more than one, 
hence exhibiting inconsistent risk attitudes. Those individuals are eliminated from the 
analysis whenever risk attitudes are addressed.  
 
In the second part of the experiment, subjects were instructed to imagine being the 
respective farmer in the eight agricultural situations which would be presented to them 
shortly. They were told to consider how much they would like to be that farmer in each 
of the presented situations. Next, the ranking system was outlined. The situation subjects 
would most prefer to find themselves in as a farmer should be assigned rank 1, the second 
most attractive situation rank 2, and so on, with the least favorable situation receiving 
rank 8. Then the four attributes, which made up the agricultural situations (and in the later 
analysis reflect the individual’s part-worth utilities), were outlined in detail. Their 
selection was sketched in the theory section on farmers’ multidimensional utility. For 
each attribute, two levels were specified. The first two attributes described to the subjects 
pertained to income and risk, namely (1) level of income from agricultural activity and 
 
4 It should be noted that slight changes were made to the instructions after the experimental sessions with 
the farmers (after session 3). While we could ensure that the vast majority of farmers understood the 
incentive structure of the experiment (by sending them an e-mail after their participation in the experiment 
containing comprehension questions regarding its monetary ‘incentive structure’), we felt that by making 
it even more explicit in the instructions that subjects were compensated for the thoroughness and time spend 
on their answers in part 3 and 4, as well as their lottery choice in part 1, the risks of potential 
misunderstandings (e.g., assuming that the actual ordering of the situations was relevant for the payoff) 
could be reduced. Despite these changes the full dataset is jointly analyzed as we do not expect the 
reformulations to have much if any behavioral consequences. The changes to the instructions have been 
documented and are available from the authors upon request. 
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(2) income volatility. Both represent short-term, monetary and self-regarding aspects. The 
level of income from farming could either be high (60,000 Euros after taxes) or low 
(20,000 Euros after taxes). Income volatility in the described agricultural situation could 
also either be high (30 percent) or low (10 percent).5 Subjects were provided with 
calculation examples for all possible combinations in order to ensure they understand the 
consequences of their situation choices (e.g., “when you have a high income of 60,000 
Euros and a high volatility level, then your income level would either be 78,000 Euros or 
42,000 Euros”). The next two attributes reflect other-regarding and long-term goals, 
respectively. The third attribute was termed (3) Extent of the external effects produced by 
the farm on the eco-system. We defined the term “external effects” (please refer to the 
Appendix for a detailed description) and explained that in the upcoming situations a 
farmer could either demonstrate a high concern regarding the externalities produced by 
the farm or a low concern. The last attribute which would complete the presented 
agricultural situations was labeled (4) Preservation of the fertility of the soil. Subjects 
were instructed what this would involve. Again, a farmer could either display a high or 
low concern for this attribute. The fertility attribute is, unlike the externality attribute, 
characterized not only by ORP, but also partially includes self-regarding aspects, as the 
consequences regarding the level of concern towards this attribute affect the farmer and 
her operations directly (the attribute description stated: “the farmer already has to bear 
the consequences of his/her respective activities during his/her lifetime…”). 
 
It should be noted, that the attributes were chosen on the basis of being relevant to the 
farmer, as well as influential, and that the attributes should be as independent from each 
other as possible (Green and Tull, 1978; Green and Srinivasan, 1978; Gustafasson et al., 
2000). Based on the special characteristics surrounding in particular the farming 
environment the assumption of complete independence might to some degree not hold, 
which is something we are aware of and consider to be reasonable. The potential degree 
of interdependence was additionally minimized via the experimental design, as for 
example the description of the externality and fertility attributes were formulated in a way 
 
5 According to the report of the European Commission Agriculture (ECA)-FADN (2011) the average total 
income from farming was between 15,000 Euros to 25,000 per annual work unit in Germany for the years 
2005-2007. We selected 20,000 Euros as the lower level of the income attribute and tripled this level (to 
60,000 Euros) to present a high level of income. Income fluctuated within the range of -30 % to 30% for 
EU-27 between the years 2000-2010. We selected -10% to 10% as the lower rate of fluctuation and -30% 
to 30% as the higher level. 
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that stressed their independence (i.e., the externality attribute was described as follows: 
“please be aware that external effects do not entail the fertility of your land, as those 
consequences apply to the farmers and will be entirely covered in the attribute described 
to you next.”). We also decided not to use the attribute “type of farming” (with the levels 
organic and conventional farming) as we consider this type of attribute to be too highly 
correlated with other attributes (e.g., level of profit per hectare, as well as fertility). 
However, the possibility that not all subjects regard the concern of “maintaining the 
fertility of the land” independent from profit considerations became apparent throughout 
the discussion sessions which took place after some experimental sessions with the 
agricultural science students (this will be described in more detail in section 2.4): While 
several students considered this attribute exclusively from a long-term environmental 
perspective, a large share also related it to the future profitability of the farm, which we 
will take into account when interpreting and discussing the results. It should be stressed, 
however, that the profit considerations linked with the fertility attribute are long-term 
considerations, whereas the “net income” attribute reflects immediate, short term 
monetary considerations. A detailed description of all the attributes was additionally 
provided to the subjects at their desk, allowing the subjects to refresh their memory when 
needed. Table 1 below summarizes the attributes and their respective levels.  
 












Based on the amount and levels of attributes, 16 (2x2x2x2) different agricultural 
situations could have been presented to the subjects. However, as mentioned above, we 
decided to use a reduced stimuli set of full profile alternatives (presenting eight 
 
Attribute  Level 
Net income (NI) 20,000 Euros 
60,000 Euros  
Volatility Income ~U(NI-10%, NI+10%) 
Income ~U(NI-30%, NI+30%) 
Externality Low concern for environmental externality imposed by 
farming operation 




Low concern for maintaining the land’s fertility in the future  
High concern for maintaining the land’s fertility in the future  
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situations), based on the principle of orthogonal design, as we believe even the task of 
ranking eight situations based on four attributes to be reasonably challenging. Finally, in 
this section of the experiment, the eight stimuli that had been determined via the 
application of the orthogonal design procedure in SPSS were presented to the subjects on 
the computer screen. In the third part of the experiment, subjects were then asked to rank 
those stimuli/farming situations according to their preferences. When this stage was 
entered, each subject was handed eight cards by the experimenter, each card representing 
one farming situation. We believe physical cards to be helpful for the subjects in the 
sorting process (e.g., by shuffling the cards according to their preference). However, the 
final ranking was then entered in the z-Tree program by the respondents. Once the ranking 
part was completed, subjects entered the fourth and last part of the experiment, which 
consisted of demographic questions. This part to some extent differed between farmers 
and students. While the questions in the farmer session focused on variables related to 
their farm (owned or as an employee), such as, i.e., the size of the farm, successor status, 
type of farm; for students the questions concentrated on the topics of their own’ (or their 
families’) farming background as well as their future plans to be working in agriculture 
and their preferences regarding conventional versus organic farming.  
 
In order to get a feel for the subjects’ perception of the experiment as well as their 
decision processes, verbal discussions (consisting of three to eight subjects) took place 
after each of the three sessions that were run with the agricultural science students from 
a German university with a large agricultural school. Subjects were informed after they 
had completed the experiment, but before they received their compensation, that they had 
the opportunity to discuss their experience regarding the experiment and that they would 
receive an additional fixed compensation fee of 3 Euros for their short participation. They 
were ensured that all information provided would be treated confidentially and 
anonymously. The duration of the discussions lasted between 10 to 20 minutes. The 
results of our conversations with the subjects will be used to reflect upon our findings in 
the discussion section. Transcripts of the discussions are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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2.4. Sample, Data Collection, and Descriptives 
2.4.1. Sample and data collection  
Due to the challenging task of recruiting farmers, also agricultural science students 
were employed as subjects. We considered them to be good surrogates for farmers as they 
are expected, based on their study choice, to work in the agricultural industry after 
completing their university degree. Additionally, many agricultural science students are 
known to have either grown up in an agricultural environment themselves or at least have 
been physically exposed to such an environment based on the compulsory internships 
required by the German university curriculum. For this study, the most important factor 
was that all subjects would be able to understand the agricultural attributes outlined to 
them as well as the consequences of choosing a particular level of the attribute. In other 
words, it was critical that all subjects were able to identify themselves with the situations 
presented to them. This also meant that they were aware of the implications of their 
choice, so that an accurate personal weighing of the attributes/preferences could be 
assured. Supported by the descriptive statistics, we are confident that our subject pool 
meets these criteria.  
 
The experiment was conducted at three different locations in Germany between the 
winter of 2012 and January 2013. This time period was chosen as farmers’ availability 
throughout the winter months is generally more likely as the amount of work (in particular 
for crop farmers) is considerably reduced. The first two experimental sessions were run 
at the experimental laboratory of a major university in Germany with N=14 agricultural 
students in November 2012. The next session, conducted in early December 2012, was 
run with N=19 farmers via a lab in the field experiment (making use of a mobile 
experimental laboratory). The chosen location was Uelzen, a medium-sized town in 
Lower Saxony. The farmers who participated in the experiment were participants of a 
work group, meeting regularly during the winter months. The farmers were invited via e-
mail. The information provided to them included that the experiment was run as part of a 
study examining the decision-making behavior of farmers, the range of compensation and 
the length of the experiment (45 minutes). Anonymity and confidentiality were assured. 
The last three experimental sessions were also conducted via a mobile laboratory in 
January 2013 with N=35 agricultural students at a German university with a large 
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agricultural school. All students were invited to participate in the experiment by 
announcements in lectures. Thereby, the same information was provided as to the 
farmers. 
2.4.2. General descriptive statistics 
Table 2 summarizes the general descriptive statistics of our data. The average age 
of our participants is 26 years. One quarter of our subjects are female (28 percent for 
students; 16 percent for farmers). As expected, the agricultural science students appear to 
be good proxies for farmers: 60 percent of our student subjects grew up directly in an 
agricultural environment as their parents were or still are working within this industry. 
Furthermore, 94 percent of the students in our sample consider working within the 
agricultural sector upon completion of their degree, which makes them potential 
producers of agricultural goods in the near future. While about 70 percent of the students 
prefer conventional farming, 30 percent prefer an organic farming approach. 85 percent 
of the farmer subjects possess their own farm. The average farm (land) size consists of 
272 hectares, whereby it should be noted that there is a large variability in this regard. 
The smallest farm in our sample operates on 70 hectares, while the largest farm works on 
750 hectares. On average 4.5 employees are employed per farm. The results from the Holt 
and Laury lottery show that our subjects are on average risk averse, with the average 
crossover point at lottery pair number six, which is a frequently observed tendency (Holt 
and Laury, 2002) 
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Table 2: General statistics of participants 
 
 Student Farmer Pooled 
Age 24.06 (3.886) 30.68 (7.853) 25.91 (6.029) 
Female ratio 0.286 0.156 0.250 
Parents in farming 0.592 (0.497)   
Farming as career 0.939 (0.242)   
Organic-favored 0.305   
Farm ownership ratio  0.842  
Years of possession 
(farm) 
 5.684 (7.111)  
# of employee  4.579 (2.341)  
Farm size (land)  272.6 (220.0)  
Risk aversion (turning 
point) 
6.182 (1.646)a 6.000 (1.732) 6.140 (1.652) 
# of obs 49 19 68 
Standard deviations in parentheses. a: sample size=44 for students, 13 for farmers, 57 for pooled. Variable 
“Farming as career” represents students’ inclination to choose farming as their occupation in the future. The 
variable “Organic-favored” represents what type of farming (organic vs. conventional) agricultural science 
students prefer.  
2.4.3. Average rankings of situations 
This section reports on the average ranks that our subjects assigned to the eight 
presented farming scenarios. Again, the most preferred situation received rank 1 and the 
least favorable situation received rank 8. Table 3 summarizes the average rankings for 
each presented farming scenario. The second column presents the actual levels of the 
attributes for the respective situation. Column three presents the average ranking of each 
scenario. Based on the described ranking criterion, situations E, H and A present the top 
three ranked and thus most favorably perceived situations. Within those scenarios, high 
income, low volatility, and high concerns with respect to environmental externality and 
land fertility appear at least twice whereas, not surprisingly, the other (not preferred) 
attribute levels appear at least twice in farming scenarios C, B, and D, which mark the 
bottom according to the average rankings by our respondents. This result gives a strong 
indication that our selection of attributes and attribute levels leads to appropriate 
responses and that (at least) the majority of our respondents were able to digest the 
numerous trade-offs they had to make. It is particularly interesting to observe that the 
most favorably ranked situation E is characterized by low income (all other goals being 
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“optimal”, with low volatility and high concerns for fertility and externality), already 
indicating that profit does not necessarily have to present a superior role in the decision 
making process of producers as standard economy theory would suggest. 
 
Table 3: Average ranking of situation 
 
Situation Description Ave. ranking Std. dev. 
A I60,000, V10, EH, FL 3.176 (1.050) 
B I20,000, V30, EH, FL 6.750 (1.164) 
C I20,000, V10, EL, FL 7.265 (0.971) 
D I20,000, V30, EL, FH 5.750 (1.250) 
E I20,000, V10, EH, FH 1.676 (1.112) 
F I60,000, V30, EH, FH 4.117 (1.399) 
G I60,000, V30, EL, FL 5.162 (1.532) 
H I60,000, V10, EL, FH 2.103 (1.161) 
I: net income; V: volatility; E: negative externality; F: fertility 
2.5. Findings  
In this section the preferences of farmers over the four presented attributes (i.e., 
those attributes’ part worth utilities) are analyzed within multivariate statistics, i.e., 
conjoint analysis and cluster analysis. The latter is an important addition to running 
conjoint analysis on the full sample as farmers are considered to be quite heterogeneous 
in their goals as well as in their decision making, so that by clustering farmers according 
to their goals or preferences might lead to some interesting insights. We finally try to 
relate cluster membership to the specific characteristics of the sub-samples (farmers and 
students). Please note that we are going to discuss some of the straightforward findings 
in this section. Some will be revisited in the discussion section, mainly from the 
perspective of motivation crowding theory.  
2.5.1. Preferences of farmers 
Possessing each respondent’s rankings of all eight farming scenarios, we are able 
to compute the importance of each attribute (part-worth utility) for each individual using 
conjoint analysis. The average results are reported in Table 4. Column two to four present 
the average relative importance of attributes to individuals when facing farming operation 
decisions. We report those results for students, farmers, and both groups pooled together 
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and also by gender. Students largely share their preferences with farmers as expected 
based on their study background and future career plans. Interestingly, there is a notable 
(but not statistically significant) difference with respect to the fertility attribute: With 
farmers, this attribute turns out to be more important than with students. Still, fertility 
proves to be on average the most important attribute across all subjects (30.79) followed 
by volatility (27.43), income (25.25) and externality (16.52), respectively. While 
externality is the lowest ranked attribute in terms of relative importance, its value of 16.52 
nonetheless highlights that subjects still regard this attribute as critical within their 
decision-making process.  
 
Table 4: Part-worth utilities for all subjects 
 
















































The part-worth utilities in the last column confirm the relative importance results: 
Subjects gain the highest positive part-worth utility from a high concern with respect to 
fertility of their land (1.088), followed by low volatility (0.945), high income (0.860) and 
a high concern for externalities (0.570). As expected, we find a statistically significant 
difference between men and women with the externality attribute in the hypothesized 
direction (p=0.033 one-tailed). Females place significantly more weight on the externality 
attribute (which could be interpreted as an altruistically characterized preference) as their 
male counterparts. 
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2.5.2. Cluster analysis on farmers’ preferences 
As past studies have shown that farmers display very heterogeneous production 
choices, it would be insightful for agricultural policy if we are able to identify subgroups 
of farmers with different preference-structures. The method of cluster analysis might 
additionally allow us to analyze the motivation sources (extrinsic vs. intrinsic) of farmers 
as it splits subjects of a dataset into groups or clusters in a way that objects within one 
cluster are very similar based on the variables used as distinguishing criterion (in our case 
the four attributes/part-worth utilities), while at the same time the differences between the 
clusters should be as large as possible. Table 5 presents the results of this procedure. 
Column two to four presents the average relative importance of each attribute for each of 
the clusters. Column five and six summarize the statistics of the ANOVA test, which 
shows whether the average relative importance between the clusters differs significantly.  
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Table 5: Clusters of preference 
 
  
 Cluster ANOVA 
 1 2 3 F Sig. 
Income 12.50 32.05 13.96 65.929 .000 
Volatility 18.75 32.79 18.01 23.519 .000 
Externality 44.35 11.07 18.72 48.349 .000 
Fertility 24.40 24.08 49.32 61.797 .000 
# of farmers (% of farmers)  1 (5.3%) 12 (63.2%) 6 (31.6%)   
# of Agri Students (% of st) 6 (12.2%) 31 (63.3%) 12 (24.5%)   
Farmer ratio in cluster 14.3% 27.9% 33.3%   
*: parentheses are numbers for student and farmer respectively. 
 
Participants were clustered into three groups.6 Cluster 1, which contains N=7 
subjects (10 percent of our sample) demonstrates a high level of concern regarding the 
external effects produced by the farm on the eco-system (44.35), as well as a considerable 
concern to preserve the fertility of the soil (24.40). In comparison, the concerns for 
volatility (18.50) and income (12.50) are rather low.  Like cluster 1, also cluster 3, which 
contains N=18 subjects (27 percent of our sample) is characterized by strong preferences 
for long term goals, reflected by the high average importance for the fourth attribute 
“preserving the fertility of the soil” (49.32). Interestingly, the preference for reducing 
environmental externalities is somewhat lower than in cluster 1 (18.71). However, also 
for this cluster the volatility (18.01) and income (13.96) attributes receive a rather low 
importance weighting. Cluster 2 demonstrates, on the contrary to cluster 1 and cluster 3, 
a much stronger tendency towards short-term, monetary and selfish goals reflected by the 
strong preference for the income (32.05) and volatility (32.79) attributes, whereas the 
externality attribute (11.07) is the least preferred. 
2.5.3. Characteristics of individuals in the clusters  
We separately report on some descriptive characteristics for all three clusters in 
Table 6. While we report on age, female ratio, and risk propensity jointly for all subjects, 
 
6 The optimal number of three clusters was selected based on the screen plot (elbow diagram) run by Wald’s 
hierarchical clustering method applying squared Euclidean Distance as the distance or similarity measure.  
 38 
based on the fact that some questions partially differed for students and farmers, some 
results will be reported by occupation.  
 
Overall, the average age is quite similar across all clusters as is the level of risk 
propensity. Cluster 1 contains slightly more females in comparison to the other two 
clusters. When analyzing the clusters by occupational group, for the students the 
descriptive variables age, female ratio, risk propensity and farming as career ratio are 
close in all three clusters. However, in cluster 1 fewer students report having parents who 
work or used to work within the agricultural industry. Also, more students within this 
cluster prefer to work on an organic farm in comparison to the other two clusters.  
 
Table 6 shows farmers in cluster 3 to be in the possession of their farm for longer 
time periods (displaying a possibly longer work experience within the agricultural sector 
for farmers not owning the farm) and to be operating on average on larger farms (land) 
than the farmers in cluster 1 and cluster 2. 
2.6. Discussion of Findings 
This section will in particular discuss the findings from section 2.5.2., making use 
of motivation crowding theory. Recall that we assume a person exhibiting a high level of 
priority (and thus a high level of utility) for certain non-monetary actions, like a high 
concern for externalities, in combination with a low level of priority for monetary 
consequences, such as profits, to be intrinsically motivated. On the other hand, we assume 
a person who derives a high utility from profits to be easier motivated to perform actions 
that have no direct positive effect on profits, if she is somehow compensated (i.e., by 
policy) via monetary incentives for doing so. 
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Table 6: Statistics of clusters 
 
  Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
All Age 25 (5.66) 25.95 (5.26) 26.17 (7.95) 
 Female ratio 0.429 0.209 0.278 
 Risk aversiona 6 (1.095) 6.075 (1.639) 6.154 (2.075) 
 # of obs 7 43 18 
Students Age 23 (2.19) 24.81 (4.11) 22.67 (3.65) 
Female ratio 0.333 (0.516) 0.258 (0.445) 0.333 (0.492) 
Risk aversionb  6 (1.095) 6.172 (1.670) 6.33 (2.0) 
Parents in farming 0.333 (0.516) 0.613 (0.495) 0.667 (0.492) 
Farming as career 1 (0) 0.903 (0.301) 1 (0) 
organic-favored 0.667 0.290 0.167 (0.389) 
# of obs 6 31 12 
Farmers Age 37 (0) 28.92 (6.8) 33.17 (9.87) 
Female ratio 1 (0) 0.08 (0.289) 0.167 (0.408) 
Risk aversionc / 6.111 (1.453) 5.75 (2.5) 
Ownership ratio 1 (0) 0.75 (0.452) 1 (0) 
Years of possession 1 (0) 4.58 (4.89) 8.67 (10.56) 
# of employee 3 (0) 4.92 (2.71) 4.17 (1.60) 
Farm size (land) 110 (0) 258.8 (205.3) 327.3 (268.5) 
# of obs 1 12 6 
 Standard deviations in parentheses. a: sample size=6 for Cluster 1, 40 for Cluster 2, 13 for Cluster 3. b: sample size=6 
for Cluster 1, 29 for Cluster 2, 9 for Cluster 3. c: sample size=0 for Cluster 1, 9 for Cluster 2, 4 for Cluster 3 
 
Cluster 1 is characterized by a high level of concern regarding externalities as well 
as, albeit to a somewhat lower degree, the preservation of the land’s fertility, while 
volatility and income play a subordinated role. Based on our assumption, this finding 
suggests that for cluster 1 no monetary incentives to perform environmentally sound 
practices are required or actually even desirable, as these farmers are likely to be 
intrinsically motivated to do so and that, in fact, external interventions could perhaps have 
a negative impact on the extent to which the farmer will engage in future environmental 
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practices (the size of the effect would depend on the exact impact of the external 
intervention onto the intrinsic motivation, something we are unable to analyze). A 
possible reaction to the introduction of extrinsic interventions could be that farmers from 
this cluster might demand higher monetary compensation in order to perform the same 
extent of environmentally friendly operations as prior. This argument is based on the 
findings of Frey and Götte (1999) who found, when studying how financial rewards affect 
the intrinsic motivation of voluntarily workers in Switzerland, that at least CHF 75 per 
month would be required as compensation fee in order to obtain the same working hours 
as when no rewards were offered (a similar finding is presented by Gneezy and Rustichini 
(2000) who also find a non-monotonic relationship between monetary compensation and 
performance). Consequently, a successful policy would need to be very sensitive towards 
such factors, and providing purely monetary incentives might not present the ideal 
compensation strategy, as they could potentially cause detrimental effects or become 
extremely expensive. Research has studied the effect of other, potentially more effective 
reward structures for intrinsically motivated individuals, e.g., verbal rewards or positive 
feedback have been shown to enhance intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971; Deci et al. 1999; 
Frey and Jegen, 2001). We will outline policy suggestions, which in our opinion might 
be potentially more effective for this cluster in section 2.7. (future research). 
 
The findings generated for cluster 2, on the other hand, (recall that this cluster was 
characterized by a much stronger tendency towards short-term, monetary and selfish 
goals) suggest that these types of farmers could respond positively to financial incentives 
(policy subsidies) as their intrinsic motivation is likely to be increased by external 
incentives, based on our assumptions. Note, that while profit plays the most important 
role when trading-off farming situations, this cluster still places such a considerable value 
on the attribute of fertility (24.08) in comparison to the externality attribute (11.07). 
Consequently, for this cluster fertility could predominantly be considered a (long-term) 
monetary attribute. The argument regarding their motivation source however is not 
affected by this.  
 
More difficult is the interpretation for cluster 3, which displays a very high concern 
for fertility but a comparatively low one for externalities, income and volatility. This 
cluster could be described as particular responsible, as their interest to maintain the 
quality and sustainability of the land by far outweighs all other attributes: Cluster 3 
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allocates as little weight to the income and volatility attribute as cluster 1, while 
externalities obtain twice as much average relative importance in comparison to cluster 
2. The fact that fertility receives such a predominant level of importance could be due to 
the fact that farmers within this cluster are strongly motivated to hand over fertile 
operations to future generations. Family is recognized to play a big influence on farmers, 
especially the desire to pass the farm on to future generations of the family (Barclay et 
al., 2007). This desire could be reflected by the results of cluster 3. An additional 
explanation could stem from the social distance literature where people persistently show 
more generosity to those that are relatively close to them or who are mentally perceived 
as being closer (Hoffman et al., 1996; Charness and Gneezy, 2008). This could also 
explain why externalities play an important but not primary role, as this attribute is much 
more linked to the general public than family. However, as mentioned in section 2.3., 
based on the fact that fertility considerations might not always be entirely independent of 
monetary considerations (as they affect the future productivity of the farm) other 
interpretations are possible. Do farmers in this cluster hold an intrinsic motivation to 
perform environmentally beneficial practices? This is particularly difficult to establish as 
the income and externality preferences are relatively low in comparison to the fertility 
attribute. Based on the possibility that fertility concerns might bear extrinsic motivations 
(long-term profits) as much as intrinsic motivations (environmental concerns), we cannot 
derive a distinguishable motivation source. We believe however, that cluster 3 is at risk 
of being crowded out (this applies at least for a portion of this cluster), as indicated by 
the considerably low average weighting of the income attribute. From an agricultural 
policy perspective this cluster is of high importance, as the farmers within this cluster 
own on average the largest farms (327 ha), so that in particular their contribution towards 
environmentally sound practices is especially desirable. Consequently, future research 
which manages to disentangle the combined forces present here is highly desirable.  
 
Note, that despite the fact that the majority of subjects (63 percent of our sample) 
are grouped in cluster 2, we still have encouraging news for environmental and long-term 
concerns. First of all, even in cluster 2, where income and volatility were strongly 
preferred, the two goals of maintaining the fertility of the land and reducing externalities 
play a non-negligible role. Secondly, around 37 percent of subjects do not belong to 
cluster 2 and those demonstrate even more pronounced preferences to bear environmental 
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responsibility and to focus on the long-term fertility of their land rather than focusing on 
financial returns. 
 
Our findings also indicate females to be placing a significantly larger weight on the 
externality attribute in comparison to their male counterparts. Being concerned about 
externalities is related to altruistic tendencies, as it is for the most part the general public 
rather than the farmer herself who is affected by the consequences of produced 
externalities. Consequently, our study is supportive of previous studies indicating women 
to be more prosocial than men. While farming in Germany is still dominated by male 
farmers (68.3 percent in 2010)7 given our results, a trend towards a more balanced gender 
occupation seems to be highly desirable, as female farmers might offer a distinct, socially 
perhaps more balanced farming approach. In our assumption regarding an individual’s 
level of intrinsic motivation, which consequently affects the possibility of a crowding out 
effect, the externality attribute played a central role. Mellström and Johanneson (2008) 
found, conducting an experiment on blood donation with three treatments (donating blood 
without any form of compensation, receiving compensation for the donation, and the 
choice whether to keep the compensation or donate it to charity), a significant crowding 
out effect for women, while the supply by male subjects did not significantly change 
across the three treatments. Given that crowding out might in particular affect females, 
and given that it is in particular the female farmer, who is concerned about externalities 
(demonstrates a high level of intrinsic motivation) suggests that specifically this sub-
group is at a considerably higher risk of being crowded out once the wrong incentive 
schemes are introduced.  
2.7. Limitations, Future Research, and Conclusions 
There are few limitations to our study. The situations presented in our experiments 
are specifically tailored to agricultural operation decisions. Moreover, the subject pool 
consisted of the natural groups of farmers and agricultural science students. 
Consequently, the results are somewhat limited to the application for this specific domain. 
Thus, future research may extend the analysis to other domains such as utility dimensions 
of non-farming entrepreneurs or managers.  
 
7 Statistisches Bundesamt (2012)  
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Future research would also need to establish whether our assumption holds that (a) a 
person demonstrating high priority levels for certain non-monetary actions - like a high 
concern for externalities  in combination with a low level of priority for monetarily linked 
actions, such as profits, is in fact intrinsically motivated; and (b) whether a person who 
derives a high utility from the profit attribute in our experiment is easier motivated to 
perform certain actions when compensated with monetary incentives for doing so. 
However, to us the assumption seems plausible and is ultimately based on theory as well 
as empirical findings. Once this has been confirmed for the individual clusters, it would 
be important to analyze whether one can establish acceptable and equitable criteria, which 
would allow for the detection of farmers’ cluster membership, as such “real-life” 
segmentation would be essential in order to be able to discriminate the incentives for each 
cluster effectively. The selection of segmentation criteria is so important since, perhaps, 
part of the farmers would get direct monetary compensation for environmental actions 
and others would not.  
 
We are hence aware of the fact that such a segmentation is neither trivial nor 
straightforward and that the selected distinguishing criteria have to be valid and justifiable 
(e.g., future research could check whether the criterion of organic vs. conventional 
farming has something to offer in this regard). How could effective incentives for such 
farmers be designed? While verbal rewards (or positive feedback) might work, we do not 
consider them to be the ultimate solution. We believe one solution could be to offer task-
non-contingent rewards for farmers represented by cluster 1 (and probably for part of 
farmers represented by cluster 3). Studies have shown that intrinsic motivation decreases 
(crowding-out occurs) when a reward is contingent on performance. However, if the 
compensation is set independent of the performance of the task intrinsic motivation levels 
are not affected (e.g., Deci et al., 1999 provide a meta study on the topic). A practical 
implementation of this could be via the creation of cooperatives for farmers displaying 
high intrinsic motivations for reducing externalities and to offer these cooperatives a fixed 
amount of compensation independent of their task performance. We know that this policy 
suggestion is provocative and in need of a lot more refinements and adjustments, 
something future research projects should focus on. We believe however, that innovative, 
effective policy instruments are required in order to get farmers to participate more 
efficiently and actively in environmental programs.  
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Our paper extends the previous multidimensional preference literature from the 
consumer’s to the producer’s sphere via the example of farming. We tested farmers’ 
preferences over four attributes, of which two are short-term monetary and self-regarding 
aspects whereas the remaining two present other-regarding and long-term goals. We find 
that most farmers consider the long-term goal of maintaining the fertility of their farm 
land to be more important than any of the other goals, for example income and risk. 
Although fertility is a mixed-motive attribute, this finding is important since it provides 
evidence that not only consumers but also producers do not always solely engage in profit 
maximization as standard economic theory suggests. Finally, externalities play a non-
negligible role with most farmers.  
 
Applying cluster analysis, we could identify considerable preference heterogeneity 
among farmers, however, and related these findings to policy implications, thereby 
discussing in particular the role of motivational sources (extrinsic vs. intrinsic). Three 
clusters were found: Cluster 1 exhibiting a great interest in keeping negative externalities 
low and perhaps being very intrinsically motivated; cluster 3 strongly tending to maintain 
land fertility, probably with mixed intrinsic and extrinsic motives; and cluster 2 focusing 
on profit maximization and risk minimization, perhaps being most extrinsically motivated 
of the three. 
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3. ESSAY NO. II 
Do social entrepreneurs operate social businesses? 
Tanja Jänicke & Christine Lauritzen 
 
The concept of social entrepreneurship is not entirely new but has increasingly 
attracted the interest of researchers since the beginning of the new millennium 
(Short et al., 2009). However, there is still no clear, agreed-upon definition of what 
social entrepreneurship really means or entails (Mair and Martí, 2006; Choi and 
Majumdar, 2014; Saebi et al., 2019). In this paper, we define a social entrepreneur 
by their preferences, not by the type of business they operate. To measure 
preferences, entrepreneurs from social and commercial businesses participated in 
a conjoint experiment. The results show that social and commercial business 
owners do not differ systematically in their preferences. Two types of entrepreneurs 
are identified – one with strong monetary preferences, the other with strong social 
and ecological preferences, our definition of a social entrepreneur. Both monetary-
driven and social entrepreneurs can be found to operate social as well as 
commercial businesses. Since social business owners do not differ in their 
preferences from commercial business owners, there must be other reasons why 
they choose to operate such a business. Researchers suggest that there might be a 
“warm glow” they receive in their work, for example, in the form of recognition by 
others (Baron, 2007). Therefore, it is tested whether the perception of their 
responsible behavior is more important for social than for commercial business 
owners. Our results do not support this hypothesis. Due to the scarcity of 
quantitative research in the domain of social entrepreneurship, especially in the 
distinction between social and commercial businesses, this paper closes a research 
gap by providing important insights into the preference structure of entrepreneurs. 
The paper further offers a new view on the term social entrepreneurship. 
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3.1. Introduction 
“The social responsibility of business is to increase its profit” – this popular and much-
cited claim by Milton Friedman summarizes pretty well the basic idea dominating 
economic theory for a long time (Friedman, 1970). In this theory, the firm is a profit-
maximizing entity and the consumer a homo economicus who wants to maximize his 
utility, usually based on monetary preferences. In his book “Social responsibilities of the 
business man”, Howard R. Bowen was one of the first to discuss the responsibilities of 
business owners and managers to not exclusively serve their company in terms of 
profitability, but to also serve society by contributing to the overall public welfare 
(Bowen, 1953). Building up on this, the literature about corporate social responsibility 
(CSR)8, expanded significantly (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). In the 1980s, for the first 
time the notion developed that some enterprises might not hold any profit-seeking 
motives but rather focus on social goals in an innovative way (Bacq and Janssen, 2011). 
The term social entrepreneurship then emerged in the late 1990s in the scientific literature 
(Bacq and Janssen, 2011). Thereby, the classification as to what exactly defines a social 
entrepreneur is still an open debate in the scientific literature (Mair and Martí, 2006; Choi 
and Majumdar, 2014, Saebi et al., 2019). Something this paper investigates in detail. To 
be more precise, the development of a social entrepreneurship definition has been mainly 
elaborated from a theoretical perspective, we offer an empirical assessment in this regard.  
 
Since the first debates, the sentiments about the responsibilities of companies have 
made a notable shift. Generally, due to the pressing environmental issues our planet is 
currently facing a larger share of consumers, and society in general, have become 
increasingly interested and informed about issues, such as resource scarcity and global 
warming. Events such as “Fridays for future” have put our global ecological problem on 
the map. Sustainability is one of the biggest challenges for our society, in particular given 
our ever-increasing demand for resources. In a similar manner do increasing wealth 
inequalities place pressing concerns on our societies (Aghion et al., 2019; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000). 
 
8 The Business Dictionary defines CSR as "a company's sense of responsibility towards the community and 
environment (both ecological and social) in which it operates. Companies express this citizenship (1) 
through their waste and pollution reduction processes, (2) by contributing educational and social programs 
and (3) by earning adequate returns on the employed resources." For a great review regarding the 
development of the construct of CSR and its resulting definitions see Carroll (1999). 
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Given the elevated importance of environmental as well as social concerns, we 
believe that entrepreneurs with their creative and innovative decision-making play a 
crucial role for the implementations towards a more sustainable paradigm shift. Markman 
et al. (2016) proclaim how, given the severity of our ecological issues, it is not sufficient 
anymore to merely balance the triple bottom line of CSR. The authors propose that in 
order to be a sustainable and ethical entrepreneurial enterprise, ventures need to balance 
environmental goals first, followed by societal goals and lastly focus on economic goals. 
Yet, the Global Entrepreneurship Report of 2019/20 reports that the main motivation for 
starting up a new venture is still predominantly driven by economic concerns (i.e., “to 
build great wealth or high income”) (Bosma et al., 2020). 
 
Based on the just described elevated need towards more environmental and societal 
decision-making in the business context, this paper aims to investigate how entrepreneurs 
operate their ventures from this perspective. More specifically, we intend to investigate 
whether social entrepreneurs operate social businesses. This may seem tautological, as 
these two terms are often used synonymously. However, in line with Markman’s et al. 
(2016) proposition, we define social entrepreneurs in a way, which will offer a distinctive 
view on the phenomenon of social entrepreneurship. 
 
The entrepreneurship literature, when distinguishing between social and commercial 
entrepreneurs does so mainly on the basis of the company’s mission, also termed the 
mission-based approach (i.e., Dees, 1998; Bacq and Janssen, 2011). Thereby, if the 
mission of a business follows a social objective, the founder is consequently classified as 
a social entrepreneur. In this paper, we shift this perspective and introduce a new criterion 
of distinction, namely the entrepreneur’s weighing of the attributes as described by the 
triple bottom line (Elkington, 1998). A social entrepreneur in this paper is consequently 
characterized by a stronger weighing of environmental and social attributes relative to 
economic ones. Analogously, a commercial entrepreneur is characterized by strong 
monetary preferences in relation to environmental and social ones. Our definition of a 
social entrepreneur is thereby completely independent of the venture’s pursued mission. 
This means, based on our definition, also the founder of a business with a commercial 
mission, can be defined as a social entrepreneur - if his operational preferences are 
dominated by ecological and social concerns, rather than monetary ones. We believe this 
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new approach offers some very valuable insights towards the discussion as to what in 
today’s society constitutes social and sustainable entrepreneurship; and whether 
exclusively defining social entrepreneurship based on the venture’s mission or profit 
structure offers the most informative concept or definition. 
 
We experimentally analyze this research question by running a conjoint experiment 
with N=45 entrepreneurs, who run either commercial or social businesses: In our 
experimental design, the type of business these entrepreneurs operate is thereby strictly 
defined by the venture’s mission. This allows us to investigate whether social/commercial 
businesses are exclusively operated by social/commercial entrepreneurs, or whether 
there is a mixture across these two domains.  
 
Our findings show that social entrepreneurs, defined by their preferences, operate 
social businesses, but not exclusively. Social entrepreneurs also operate commercial 
businesses. Analogous, we find monetarily driven entrepreneurs to not exclusively 
operate commercial businesses. They also run social businesses.  
 
The paper is structured as follows, in the next section, we review literature dealing 
with the definitions of social entrepreneurship and social business from an array of 
perspectives. We conclude the section by deriving our own working definitions as well 
as our hypotheses. Based on these working definitions, we outline our resulting 
experimental design in section 3. Section 4 presents the data as well as its analysis. This 
is accompanied by a discussion of the results and its implications. As with most studies, 
our study has some limitations, which are discussed in section 5. The paper concludes in 
section 6.   
3.2. Theoretical Background 
3.2.1. Social entrepreneurship in the literature 
While social entrepreneurship is nothing new within the field of entrepreneurship 
research, it has in particular for the past 20 years received attention at an increasing rate 
(Short et al., 2009; Bacq and Janssen, 2011). Thereby, the definition as to what exactly 
social entrepreneurship entails, and who can be classified as a social entrepreneur, based 
on which criteria, is still an open debate (Mair and Martí, 2006; Choi and Majumdar, 
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2014). In the words of Martin and Osberg (2007, p. 29): “Social entrepreneurship is 
attracting growing amounts of talent, money and attention. But along with its increasing 
popularity has come less certainty about what exactly a social entrepreneur is and does”. 
Very little empirical research, especially quantitative work, has been done in this field 
(Mair and Martí 2006; Short et al., 2009; Hoogendoorn et al., 2010). Rather, the attempt 
to define social entrepreneurship has focused on a theoretical discussion. Despite – or 
maybe even due to – a growing body of theoretical literature, there is still no consensus 
about the exact meaning of the term. Researchers face numerous, often even conflicting, 
definitions and concepts of social entrepreneurs, also due to the fact that various 
disciplines study this phenomenon9 (Roberts and Woods, 2005; Weerawardena and Mort, 
2006; Short et al., 2009). Mair and Martí (2006, p. 36) describe the concept of social 
entrepreneurship as “[…] poorly defined and its boundaries to other fields of study remain 
fuzzy”. Our paper contributes here by offering new understandings on this topic via an 
empirical approach.  
 
Despite the empirical lack of research in this domain (Hoogendoorn et al., 2010; 
Bacq et al., 2011), several authors argue that commercial entrepreneurship systematically 
differs to social entrepreneurship10 (Mair and Martí, 200611; Austin et al., 2006; Martin 
and Osberg, 2007). The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate these potentially 
systematic differences between social and commercial entrepreneurs. Thereby, the 
criterion of distinction proposed is based on the entrepreneur’s weighing of the CSR’s 
triple bottom line attributes namely economic, social and environmental aspects 
(Elkington, 1998). We review and discuss the status of definitions from this field, as this 
will be relevant for our experimental design, outlined in section 3.  
 
9 Social entrepreneurship is for example being studied in management, entrepreneurship, political sciences, 
economics, law and education.  
10 Please note that due to the lack of literature concerning only social businesses and commercial businesses 
in this chapter papers are cited that mostly use a broad definition of social enterprises – not only including 
businesses but also social or community initiatives both from the for-profit and non-profit sector.  
11 On the other hand, Mair and Martí (2006) emphasize that commercial and social entrepreneurs also have 
some characteristics in common: they both follow a vision and gain satisfaction from realizing their idea. 
This is supported by Bacq and Janssen (2011), who find that both groups share some traits like an 




Table 7 and Table 8 on the following two pages provide an overview of social 
entrepreneurship definitions in the literature: for the concept of social entrepreneurship 
in general (Table 7) and for the social entrepreneur (Table 8). Definitions stem mostly 
from academia, but partially also from practical applications as they find application in 
our experimental design (specifically the ones from Ashoka and Social Impact).  
 
The presented definitions vary with regard to some factors, which we discuss in 
more detail in the next sub-sections. While some definitions focus on the mission of social 
value creation (e.g., Dees, 1998; Austin et al., 2006; Peredo and McLean, 2006; 
Weerawardena and Mort, 2006; Zahra et al., 2009), others make their distinction based 





Table 7: Definitions of social entrepreneurship in the academic literature 
 
Publication Definition of social entrepreneurship 
Dees (1998) “Social entrepreneurship combines the passion of a social mission with an image of business-like discipline, innovation, and determination commonly associated with, for instance, the high-tech pioneers of Silicon Valley” (p.1.) 
Tan et al. (2005) = an altruistic form of entrepreneurship 
Roberts and Woods (2005) “Social entrepreneurship is the construction, evaluation and pursuit of opportunities for transformative social change carried out by visionary, passionately dedicated individuals.” (p.49) 
Austin et al. (2006) “We define social entrepreneurship as innovative, social value creating activity that can occur within or across the nonprofit, business, or government sectors.” (p.2) 
Mair and Martí (2006) “A process of creating value by combining resources to pursue opportunities to catalyze social change and/or address social needs.” (p.37) 
Peredo and McLean (2006) 
“social entrepreneurship is exercised where some person or group: 
(1) aim[s] at creating social value, either exclusively or at least in some prominent way; 
(2) show[s] a capacity to recognize and take advantage of opportunities to create that value (“envision”); 
(3) employ[s] innovation, ranging from outright invention to adapting someone else’s novelty, in creating and/or distributing social value; 
(4) is/are willing to accept an above-average degree of risk in creating and disseminating social value; and 
(5) is/are unusually resourceful in being relatively undaunted by scarce assets in pursuing their social venture.” 
Robinson (2006) 
“I define social entrepreneurship as a process that includes: the identification of a specific social problem and a specific solution…to 
address it; the evaluation of the social impact, the business model and the sustainability of the venture; and the creation of a social mission-
oriented for-profit or a business-oriented nonprofit entity that pursues the double (or triple) bottom line. 
Weerawardena and Mort (2006) “We define social entrepreneurship as a behavioral phenomenon expressed in a NFP organization context aimed at delivering social value through the exploitation of perceived opportunities.” (p. 25) 
Martin and Osberg (2007) 
Social entrepreneurship has three components: 
“1) identifying a stable but inherently unjust equilibrium that causes the exclusion, marginalization, or suffering of a segment of humanity 
that lacks the financial means or political clout to achieve any transformative benefit on its own 
2) identifying an opportunity in this unjust equilibrium, developing a social value proposition, and bringing to bear inspiration, creativity, 
direct action, courage, and fortitude, thereby challenging the stable state’s fortitude 
3) forging a new, stable equilibrium that releases trapped potential or alleviates the suffering of the targeted group, and through imitation 
and the creation of a stable ecosystem around the new equilibrium ensuring a better future for the targeted group and even society at 
large.” (p. 35) 
Zahra et al. (2009) “encompasses the activities and processes undertaken to discover, define, and exploit opportunities in order to enhance social wealth by creating new ventures or managing existing organizations in an innovative manner.” (p. 519) 
Bacq and Janssen (2011) “We define social entrepreneurship as the process of identifying, evaluating and exploiting opportunities aiming at social value creation by means of commercial, market-based activities and of the use of a wide range of resources.” (p. 376) 
Grove and Berg (2014) “is generally defined as an activity or organization with social values and aims employing business concepts and tools in some form.” (p.11) 
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Table 8: Definitions of the social entrepreneur in the academic literature and from practical applications 
 
 
Publication Definitions of social entrepreneur 
Dees (1998) 
“Social entrepreneurs are change agents who adopt a mission to create and sustain social value by “recognizing and relentlessly pursuing 
new opportunities to serve that mission, engaging in a process of continuous innovation, adaptation and learning and acting boldly without 
being limited by resources currently in hand, and constituencies served and for the outcomes created” (p. 4) 
Tan et al. (2005) “A legal person engaged in the process of entrepreneurship that involves a segment of society with the altruistic objective that benefits 
accrue to that segment of society” (p. 360) 
Baron (2007) = entrepreneur “who is willing to form a CSR (firm) at a financial loss” (p. 697) 
Martin and Osberg (2007) 
“Someone who targets an unfortunate but stable equilibrium that causes the neglect, marginalization, or suffering of a segment of 
humanity; who brings to bear on this situation his or her inspiration, direct action, creativity, courage and fortitude; and who aims for and 
ultimately affects the establishment of a new stable equilibrium that secures permanent benefit for the targeted group and society at large” 
(p.39) 
Bacq and Janssen (2011) 
“The social entrepreneur is a visionary individual, whose main objective is to create social value, able at one and the same time to detect 
and exploit opportunities, to leverage resources necessary to his/her social mission and to find innovative solutions to social problems of 
his/her community that are not properly met by the local system. This will make him/her adopt an entrepreneurial behaviour.” 
Ashoka (2014) 
“Social entrepreneurs are individuals with innovative solutions to society’s most pressing social problems. They are ambitious and 
persistent, tackling major social issues and offering new ideas for wide-scale change. Rather than leaving societal needs to the government 
or business sectors, social entrepreneurs find what is not working and solve the problem by changing the system, spreading the solution, 
and persuading entire societies to move in different directions. Social entrepreneurs often seem to be possessed by their ideas, committing 
their lives to changing the direction of their field. They are visionaries, but also realists, and are ultimately concerned with the practical 
implementation of their vision above all else. Social entrepreneurs present user-friendly, understandable, and ethical ideas that engage 
widespread support in order to maximize the number of citizens that will stand up, seize their idea, and implement it. Leading social 
entrepreneurs are mass recruiters of local changemakers— role models proving that citizens who channel their ideas into action can do 
almost anything” 
Social Impact (2014b) 
” Entrepreneur who tries to solve a social problem, who does not pursue financial profits but rather success for society, whose values are 
based on democracy, human dignity and sustainability, who is able to recruit interested stakeholders and acquire the necessary human and 
material resources to pursue his idea” 
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3.2.1.1. Social entrepreneurship: The mission-based approach  
Austin et al. (2006) define the most fundamental difference between social 
entrepreneurs and their commercial counterparts in their differing missions.12 Other 
researchers also make the distinction between social and commercial entrepreneurs based 
on a mission perspective, albeit to varying degrees. Taking a more flexible approach, Tan 
et al. (2005) regard social entrepreneurship as an altruistic form of entrepreneurship that 
“may be aimed to benefit society rather than merely maximizing individual profit” (p. 
353). Hence, based on the definition by Tan et al. (2005) a social entrepreneur’s mission 
can be driven by a combination of monetary and altruistic motivations. In contrast, Dees 
(1998) as well as Mair and Martí (2006) make more stringent distinctions and do not 
allow for mixed motive missions. In their perspective, the mission of commercial 
entrepreneurs is purely driven by monetary concerns, while social entrepreneurs are 
defined according to their regard for altruism. Dees (1998) constitutes the difference in 
the way entrepreneurs measure their value creation. For commercial entrepreneurs, the 
value of their work is determined by the monetary wealth they create, while social 
entrepreneurs measure it based on the created social impact (Dees, 1998). In line with 
this, Mair and Martí (2006) point out that “rather than profit versus not-for profit […] the 
main difference between entrepreneurship in the business sector and social 
entrepreneurship lies in the relative priority given to social wealth creation versus 
economic wealth creation” (Mair and Martí, 2006, p.39). While for social entrepreneurs, 
economic wealth creation may also present an important aspect, this is due to rather 
necessary means to an end (Dees, 1998; Mair and Martí, 2006; Dorado, 2006). While 
almost all authors see the pursuit of a social mission and the creation of social value at 
the core of social entrepreneurship (i.e., Peredo and McLean, 2006; Weerawardena and 
Mort, 2006), some authors propose that this social value should additionally be created in 
an innovative way (Dees, 1998; Austin et al., 2006; Zahra et al., 2009). To determine the 
 
12 Austin et al. (2006) theoretically derive four propositions concerning differences between social and 
commercial entrepreneurship. These propositions are based on the dimensions of (i.) markets, (ii.) mission, 
(iii.) performance measurement and (iv.) resources, whereby some interdependencies between these 
dimensions exist. With regards to (i.) markets, the authors claim commercial entrepreneurs to be 
continuously looking for new needs and break-troughs, while social entrepreneurs aim to serve existing, 
undersupplied needs (Austin et al., 2006). This could be the reason why social entrepreneurs often face a 
higher demand than they can serve, but, on the other hand, serve customers who do not have a high 
willingness or ability to pay (Mair, 2010).  
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meaning of the term social mission, several definitions of social entrepreneurship refer to 
a double bottom line (Dorado, 2006; Zahra et al., 2009) or a triple bottom line (Robinson, 
2006) approach. This goes back to the work of Elkington (1994), who claims that 
businesses will not be successful unless they succeed to manage their triple bottom line 
consisting of economic prosperity, social justice and environmental quality. The double 
bottom line refers to the pursuit of both economic and social goals.  
3.2.1.2. Social entrepreneurship: The profit vs. non-for-profit approach 
Another interesting argument in the discussion of what distinguishes commercial 
to social entrepreneurship refers to whether social entrepreneurs can and should assume 
a for-profit business form or not. Thereby, many authors describe social entrepreneurship 
as a non-for-profit endeavor (see i.e., Peredo and McLean, 2006). Weerawardena and 
Mort (2006, p. 25) define social entrepreneurship as a “behavioral phenomenon expressed 
in a Not-for-Profit-Organization”. Other researchers disagree and point out: “Whether 
social entrepreneurs choose a not-for-profit or a for-profit vehicle often depends on the 
particular business model and the specific social needs addressed” (Mair and Martí, 
2006, p. 39). Others again allow for both types of business forms (Austin et al., 2006; 
Robinson, 2006).  
 
Peredo and McLean (2006) discuss the difficulty of distinguishing between for-
profit and non-for-profit companies by presenting prominent examples of for-profit social 
enterprises. Based on these observations, they identify five different stages of social 
entrepreneurship, depending on the relation between the social and commercial goals of 
a business (see Table A I, Appendix 6.2.). In their spectrum, social entrepreneurship 
reaches from the connection of primarily profit-making with some sub-ordinated social 
goals (termed “Cause Branding”, e.g., the Avon breast cancer initiative) to the other 
extreme of exclusively pursuing social goals, without following any form of profit-
making (e.g., NGOs). Dorado (2006) describes a similar, albeit narrower spectrum of 
social enterprises, distinguishing between three different forms namely (i.) non-profit 
social entrepreneurial ventures (SEVs), (ii.) for-profit SEVs and (iii.) cross-sector SEVs. 
Non-profit SEVs are defined as non-profit organizations pursuing social goals and 
adopting business models (Dorado, 2006). They differ from other entrepreneurial 
ventures by their governance structures because they do not pay taxes, have no owners 
and do not pay out dividends. These aspects also distinguish social non-profit SEVs from 
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for-profit SEVs which are “initiatives for whom social goals are central to their business 
model” (Dorado, 2006, p.324) and that share the same governance structures as traditional 
enterprises. The third form, (iii.) cross-sector SEVs are initiatives created only for a 
relatively short time period in order to serve a social cause. It is thereby not relevant 
whether this initiative makes a profit or not. A prominent example is the Live Aid concert, 
organized by Bob Geldof, with the purpose to raise donations for fighting the famine in 
Africa. Dorado (2006) critically discusses in particular the form of for-profit SEVs, 
referring to examples like Ben & Jerry’s13 and The Body Shop as “organizations that 
initially were for-profit SEVs but have increasingly deemphasized the centrality of their 
social goals” (Dorado, 2006, p. 325) and are therefore losing the status of a social 
enterprise. She points out that it would be important to delineate social entrepreneurship 
from socially corporate behavior. This raises the important question whether social 
entrepreneurship should be defined on the basis of what the business does or how the 
business does it?  
 
Our paper follows the second approach, using CSR as the underlying criterion. 
However, in line with Dorado’s (2006) argument, we do not allow for greenwashing in 
our experimental design, as we strictly analyze trade-offs (e.g., as soon as your monetary 
preferences dominate your social or ecological ones, you cannot classify as a social 
entrepreneur).  
3.2.1.3. Social entrepreneurship based on the triple bottom line approach 
Opposed to this view, Baron (2007) defines a social entrepreneur as someone who 
is prepared to form a CSR14 venture even if this choice results in potential financial losses, 
hence sacrificing economic profitability for social purpose. In a similar manner, the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) asked business owners, in the survey version of 
2009, containing a special report on social entrepreneurship15, to allocate a total of 100 
points between the three categories of the triple bottom line, according to the goals of the 
 
13 In the model of Peredo and McLean (2006) Ben and Jerry’s are classified in the fourth stage of the model. 
14 Definition of CSR in Baron (2007, p. 2): „practices that improve the workplace and benefit society in 
ways that go above and beyond what companies are legally required to do” 
15 In the GEM report itself “[…] social entrepreneurship is defined as individuals engaged in entrepreneurial 
activities with a social goal.” (GEM report 2009, p. 7) 
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venture.16 The report uses this measure in conjunction with two other measures, namely 
income strategy and innovativeness, in order to categorize social entrepreneurs into four 
different categories (i.) traditional NGOs, (ii.) not-for-profit social enterprises, (iii.) 
hybrid social enterprises, and (iv.) for-profit social enterprises (GEM Report, 2009).  
 
In this paper, we follow a similar approach for defining commercial and social 
entrepreneurs. Instead of using the businesses’ mission statements as a basis for 
distinction, it is the way in which entrepreneurs weigh off the three attributes of the triple 
bottom line, which defines our classification as a social or commercial entrepreneur:  
 
Entrepreneurs whose preferences for leading their business in a social and 
ecological way dominate their monetary preferences, are classified as social 
entrepreneurs. Commercial entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are characterized by their 
dominating preference for monetary goals.  
 
As in the definition of Baron (2007), in our definition it is consequently not about 
the core activity of the business but rather about the way in which the business is operated. 
The definition of this paper thus includes all five stages of the social-entrepreneurship-
spectrum (see Table A I, Appendix 6.2.) of Peredo and McLean (2006). It is also in line 
with Tan et al. (2005, p. 364) who state:  
 
“[…] we should not limit social entrepreneurship to organizations the sole 
objective of which is to benefit society. […] [T]here are instances of 
entrepreneurship that combine self-seeking enterprise with the social that a 
definition of social entrepreneurship limited to social purpose organizations 
would omit.”  
 
As our research aims to answer the question whether social entrepreneurs operate 
social businesses, the next section carefully outlines literature deliberating the term social 
 
16 The exact wording is thereby as follows: „Organizations may have goals according to the ability to 
generate economic value, societal value and environmental value. Please allocate a total of 100 points 
across these three categories as it pertains to your goals.”(GEM, 2009) This question is planned to be used 
again in the tier of the 2021 survey. 
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business and discusses as to how/whether the term can be distinguished from social 
entrepreneurship.   
3.2.2. Social business as a special form of business 
Like the concept of social entrepreneurship, the term social business is not clearly 
defined and both ideas tend to overlap (Beckmann et al., 2014). Muhammad Yunus 
coined and promoted the theory of social business, especially after he had won the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 2006 (Kreutzer and Mauksch, 2014). Yunus (2007, p. 22) defines a social 
business as:  
 
“[…] a company that is cause-driven rather than profit-driven, with the potential 
to act as a change agent for the world. A social business is not charity. It is a 
business in every sense. It has to recover its full costs while achieving its social 
objective.”  
 
Based on this definition, Grove and Berg (2014, p. 3) describe it as a business that 
“[…] promote[s] social objectives as primary, while also making a profit”. According to 
Yunus, the core difference to a commercial business is that management and investors do 
not receive a share of the profit. Social businesses reinvest their profits in order to expand 
the company as well as the firm’s social impact (Yunus, 2007).17  
 
The question of how the concept of social business differs to the one of social 
entrepreneurship is intensively discussed in scientific literature (Beckmann et al., 2014). 
Most scholars agree that social entrepreneurship is an umbrella term which includes social 
businesses (Grove and Berg, 2014) or like Yunus formulates it: “Social business is a 
subset of social entrepreneurship. All those who design and run a social business are 
social entrepreneurs.” (Yunus, 2007, p. 32). Beckmann et al. (2014) do not fully agree 
with Yunus’ statement. They develop a framework to distinguish between a social 
business and social entrepreneurship based on three criteria: (i.) the company’s mission, 
(ii.) the origin of finance and (iii.) the degree of innovation (Beckmann et al., 2014). 
 
17 The author makes one exemption for the case in which the owners belong to a socially disadvantaged 
group, because then the social benefit is created by the dividends and equity growth distributed to this group 
(Yunus, 2007). 
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According to their model, social businesses and social entrepreneurship have in common 
that they focus on a social mission but differ in the way this mission is achieved 
(Beckmann et al., 2014). Figure A I, Appendix 6.2., displays a matrix visualizing their 
idea.  
 
The framework shows that social entrepreneurship is characterized by a high 
degree of innovation that in the sense of Schumpeter (1987) will lead to a new equilibrium 
(Beckmann et al., 2014). Social businesses, on the other hand, are not necessarily 
innovative, but operate in the private sector and generate their income on their own. 
According to the model by Beckman et al. (2014), companies which are innovative and 
fund themselves by market income belong in the domains of both social business and 
social entrepreneurship. If enterprises connect a social mission with financial self-
sustainability but lack the innovative aspect (e.g., kindergartens) they classify as a social 
business, but not a form of social entrepreneurship. Companies pursuing a social mission 
and funding it by donations and public funds (not having financial self-sustainability) 
operate in the domain of social entrepreneurship, but are no social businesses. The authors 
emphasize that this matrix represents ideal types but that “empirical reality […] is rarely 
populated with ideal types of organizations” (Beckmann et al., 2014, p.32). Especially 
with regards to financial funds one can find hybrid forms, combining market income with 
funds from donations, or public sources, or use new forms like crowdfunding campaigns 
(Jansen et al., 2013).  
3.2.3. Derivation of hypotheses based on literature 
In this paper, social business owners are defined as those who pursue a social mission 
in an innovative way and finance their business predominantly by market income. Based 
on Beckmann et al. (2014) that addresses those entrepreneurs who are both a social 
business owner and a social entrepreneur. However, in this paper, we will exclusively use 
this definition in regards to defining social businesses as social entrepreneurs are 
exclusively defined via their preferences for operating a business, independent of their 
mission. Making the social mission of a venture the major underlying criterion for the 
definition of a social business (this holds also for the definition in this paper) as well as 
for the term social entrepreneurship (again, our definition removes this aspect, and 
exclusively considers the entrepreneur’s preferences), suggests that commercial and 
 63 
social business owners differ in regards to how they favor social value creation. Hence, 
we posit that commercial and social business owners differ in their preferences. To be 
more precise, we hypothesize that: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Social business owners prefer social and ecological outcomes 
over economic outcomes, while commercial business owners prefer economic 
outcomes over social and ecological outcomes. 
 
In other words, this translates into social entrepreneurs, based on this paper’s 
definition, operating social businesses and vice versa for commercial entrepreneurs.  
 
In his paper, Baron (2007) suggests that in addition to social value creation, the 
potential for feelings of warm glow may be a significant motivational driver for social 
entrepreneurs as they “sacrifice financial return but gain social satisfaction” (Baron, 2007, 
p.483). However, to the best of our knowledge, this has never been tested empirically. 
We will experimentally address the aspect of warm glow theory, which suggests that there 
is no pure form of altruism, since people receive a good feeling, a “warm glow”, when 
they behave in an altruistic way (Andreoni, 1989; 1990), by evaluating how entrepreneurs 
value their reputation by others (which presents an important component of warm glow 
theory) and whether this systematically differs between social and commercial 
entrepreneurs. To be more precise, in addition to the attributes in relation to the triple 
bottom line, we create a fourth attribute in our experimental design, measuring the 
importance for being noticed by external parties in relation to their social behavior. Based 
on Baron (2007), we hypothesize that:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Social business owners have stronger preferences for being 
perceived by others for their sustainable behavior than commercial business 
owners. 
3.3. Methodology and Experimental Design 
3.3.1. The method of conjoint analysis 
To answer our research question and test the presented hypotheses we use the 
method of conjoint analysis. This approach was firstly proposed by Luce and Tukey 
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(1964) and has primarily found application in marketing and market research (Gustafsson 
et al., 2003), but has also been applied within entrepreneurship research (Lohrke et al., 
2010) in order to analyze preferences of entrepreneurs (DeTienne et al., 2008), venture 
capitalists (Franke et al., 2006), and other stakeholders of new ventures (Choi and 
Shepherd, 2005).  
 
Even if the name “conjoint analysis” suggests a specific method, the term actually 
stands for several different approaches to measure preferences for different attributes 
based on individual decisions concerning various profiles, so-called stimuli, consisting of 
different attribute levels (Gustafsson et al., 2003). The individuals are confronted with 
different attribute combinations and consider them jointly. From their judgment about the 
presented profiles, one can derive how much each attribute contributes to the individual’s 
utility (Green and Tull, 1978). Green and Srinivasan (1978) describe six necessary steps 
to design, conduct, and evaluate a conjoint experiment. Thereby, the researcher has to 
choose relevant attributes and their respective levels. Besides relevance it is important 
that the attributes are influenceable, realizable and independent of each other. They 
should stand in a compensatory relation, and none of them should represent an exclusion 
criterion. Furthermore, the number of attributes need to be limited, so as not to 
overwhelm subjects with the range of potential choices. In this paper, we apply the full 
profile method, meaning that each stimulus represents a combination of all chosen 
attributes (Green and Tull, 1978; Green and Srinivasan, 1978). There are two ways for 
subjects to evaluate the presented stimuli – either by ranking or rating. In this experiment, 
the ranking approach was chosen, as this approach has been shown to reveal more clearly 
the differences in levels (Sayadi et al., 2005) and also in order to avoid inconsistencies in 
the evaluation. Based on the collected rank data, the part-worth utility values of each 
attribute level can then be estimated for each individual. The range of those values 
determines the relative importance of each attribute. The utility y of stimulus k can be 
calculated by the following formula:  








Formula 1 Additive model of conjoint analysis 
Thereby, yk represents the estimated utility value of stimulus k, bjm denotes the part-
worth utilities for level m of attribute j, and xjmk is a binary variable, which assumes the 
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value of 1, if stimulus k involves the level m of attribute j, and the value of 0, if it does 
not. Before calculating the part-worth utilities it can be useful to make assumptions about 
the relationship between attribute levels and the rank data. There are three possible forms: 
linear relation, negatively squared relation, and positively squared relation (Green and 
Srinivasan, 1978).18 For the attributes chosen in our experiment only the linear relation 
will be relevant. 
 
The following section outlines in detail the exact design of the conjoint experiment 
3.3.2. Research design 
With the aim to elicit and analyze preferences of social and commercial business 
owners, we created a decision scenario, in which subjects were asked to rank eight 
different business models. The models were thereby characterized by four different 
attributes, which will be outlined in more detail below. The experiment was conducted 
via an online-questionnaire using the online-platform e-questionnaire (the exact 
experimental design can be obtained from Figure A III to Figure A IX, Appendix 6.2.). 
Given entrepreneurs’ busy lifestyle and their general lack of time regarding business 
unrelated matters, the online-questionnaire was deemed ideal, as it provided them with 
the opportunity to participate in the experiment at a time convenient for them. Before 
starting with the actual decision experiment, subjects were provided with a short 
introduction. Thereby, they were told to imagine founding a new business characterized 
by four different attributes. Next, they were familiarized with the task of ranking eight 
different business models according to their preferences. Thereby, the first rank 
represented the most preferred business model, while rank eight translated into the least 
preferred one. It was emphasized that there was no right or wrong answer.  
 
On the following screen, the four relevant attributes were presented, namely (1) 
income, (2) sourcing, (3) distribution, and (4) perception of the entrepreneur by the 
public. 
 
18 A linear relation is the case if the preference increases (positive linear relation) or decreases (negative 
linear relation) with an increasing attribute level. A squared relation is assumed, if there is an optimal point 
for an attribute. The relation is negatively squared if a deviation from this point will result in lower 
preferences. In case of a positively squared relation a deviation from the optimal point will result in higher 
preferences. 
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1. Income represents the variable with the strongest economic focus. It was 
described to subjects as “the profit of the business which could be used by the 
entrepreneur privately - after all necessary deductions for investment and taxes 
have been made. Thereby, three different income levels were created: (i.) 1500 
€/month, (ii.) 3000 €/month, and (iii.) 4500 €/month. These levels were derived 
from the income distribution of start-up founders given in the “KfW 
Gründungsmonitor 2013” (Metzger and Ullrich, 2013).  
2. Sourcing presents the second attribute type and is characterized by two levels, 
namely social and conventional sourcing. It was described to subjects that the 
portrayed business has suppliers in foreign countries, in which the home 
country’s social standards are not necessarily enforced. Therefore, the attribute 
level social comprised the formulation of a code of conduct, its enforcement and 
controlling among suppliers. In the case of conventional sourcing none of these 
steps would be taken. The description was based on the Compass for 
Sustainability for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Gesellschaft für 
internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2014).19  
3. The third attribute refers to the context of distribution and is characterized by two 
attribute levels, namely ecological and conventional distribution. Ecological 
distribution is described by measures like environment-friendly packaging, the 
delivery via trains rather than trucks, and business trips via trains rather than cars. 
These measures were derived from activity profiles provided by the members of 
the Wirtschaft pro Klima initiative, a group of 138 German companies taking and 
promoting measures to reduce CO2 emissions and protecting the environment 
(B.A.U.M. e.V., 2014). In the conventional case none of these measures would 
be taken.  
 
The first three attributes represent the goals of a business according to the concept 
of the triple bottom line, namely (1) economic, (2) social, and (3) environmental goals.  
4. The last attribute, perception was chosen to test warm-glow theory (Andreoni, 
1989; 1990), as proposed by Baron (2007). It describes whether or not the 
entrepreneur’s responsible behavior is perceived by society. The levels are 
 
19 This organization provides advice for SMEs concerning the implementation of sustainable supply chain. 
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binary: either the entrepreneur is recognized by society for her responsible doing 
(yes) or not (no).  
 
In the experiment, it was emphasized that perception occurs independently of the 
fact, whether the business operates sustainable or not, in order to fulfill the attributes’ 
independence assumption outlined in the previous section. Table 9 below summarizes the 
chosen attributes and their respective levels. 
 
Table 9: Overview of attributes and attribute levels 
Attributes Attribute Levels 
Income 1500 €/month (I1500) 
3000 €/month (I3000) 
4500 €/month (I4500) 
Sourcing Social (SS) 
Conventional (SC) 
Distribution Ecological (DE) 
Conventional (DC) 
Perception Yes (PY) 
No (PN) 
 
Based on the number of attributes and attribute levels, the creation of 24 (3x2x2x2) 
different business models would have been possible. To lower the decision complexity 
for subjects, the form of a reduced design with eight different business models was 
chosen. Those were designed by the orthogonal design procedure in the statistical 




Table 10: Overview of eight business models used as stimuli 
Business 
Model 
Income Sourcing Distribution Perception 
A 3000 €/month Conventional Ecological Yes 
B 4500 €/month Social Ecological No 
C 1500 €/month Social Ecological Yes 
D 3000 €/month Social Conventional No 
E 1500 €/month Conventional Conventional No 
F 4500 €/month Conventional Conventional Yes 
G 1500 €/month Social Conventional Yes 
H 1500 €/month Conventional Ecological No 
 
After presenting all attributes and their respective levels, respondents were 
confronted with the eight stimuli (or business models) and given the task to rank them 
from 1 (most preferred) to 8 (least preferred). In order to facilitate a potentially easier 
ranking procedure, subjects had, prior to taking the actual online experiment, received 
hardcopy cards via mail and e-mail (for printing)20, whereby each card presented one 
business model (stimuli). These cards were intended to enhance the visualization of the 
business models and to facilitate an easier ordering experience, by providing the 
opportunity to sort the models physically first.  
 
Upon completing the conjoint decision task, subjects were asked to give some 
information about facts concerning their own business such as industry, legal form and 
number of employees with permanent working contracts. Furthermore, they were asked 
whether they consider their business a social business and if so, why. We also examined 
the motivation behind their decision to found a business – whether it was the aspiration 
to be an entrepreneur followed by the search for an idea/opportunity, or whether they had 




20 The cards were sent out during the recruitment process. This will be described in more detail in the 
following section. 
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In the last part of the questionnaire, demographic data was requested. Subjects were 
assured that all provided data would be treated anonymously and in a confidential manner. 
The completion of the questionnaire required on average seventeen minutes. 
3.3.3 Sample and data collection  
The link to the questionnaire and the hardcopy cards were distributed to social and 
commercial business owners. For the group of social business owners, exclusively 
participants from the networks of Ashoka Germany and Social Impact were chosen for 
recruitment.21 As outlined in the literature review, since there is no agreed-upon definition 
of the term social business, we decided to rely on the definitions of these two 
organizations, as a careful, rather conservative approach in this context was deemed 
crucial given our research question. Since Ashoka and Social Impact have been active 
exclusively in the domain of social entrepreneurship22/ business for several years, we 
could assure a clear delineation from social businesses to commercial ones. Both 
organizations support solely social, entrepreneurial ventures, based on their mission and 
its innovative character. From the potential sample we excluded organizations with the 
legal form of “eingetragener Verein” (e.V.), the German form of a registered association 
or foundation. This type of legal form is not allowed to pursue economic/for-profit 
activities (Weidmann and Kohlhepp, 2011), something we deemed essential as it ensured 
that only social businesses that primarily found themselves by market income were 
included, an essential component of a social business according to Beckmann et al. 
(2014). These criteria resulted in a potential sample size of 94 ventures (33 from the 
Ashoka database and 61 from Social Impact).  
 
For each venture, one of the founders was contacted after having confirmed that 
she/he still manages the business. This process consisted of four steps: (1) First of all, the 
entrepreneurs received a personalized letter via mail that contained an invitation to 
 
21 Ashoka is the largest global association supporting social entrepreneurs by providing stipends, consulting 
and access to a global network of social entrepreneurs (Ashoka, 2013). It was founded in 1980 and operates 
offices in 36 countries. The German network was established in 2003 and has by now more than 50 fellows 
(Ashoka Germany, 2014). One of these fellows is Norbert Kunz – the founder of the Social Impact network 
that supports social businesses in their start-up phase (Ashoka Germany, 2014). Social Impact has offices 
in 7 cities in Germany, Austria and Switzerland and has assisted to realize numerous business formations 
(Social Impact, 2014a).  
22 Again, not necessarily in the sense of the social entrepreneurship definition of this paper. 
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participate in the experiment (including the link to the online questionnaire) as well as 
the eight hardcopy cards described in the previous section. (2) Several days later an e-
mail followed with a similar invitation, the link and the cards in a digital version (again, 
each card summarized one stimuli or business model), with the aim to facilitate the way 
to the online-questionnaire. (3) The identical e-mail was also sent out separately by the 
organizations Ashoka and Social Impact, so as to increase the credibility of our 
experiment and consequently make potential subjects more likely to participate. (4) The 
last step was a reminding e-mail, send out two weeks later, containing again the link and 
a digital version of the stimuli cards. The exact four step procedure was applied for the 
group of commercial business owners.  
 
Our goal was to construct the commercial business sample as comparable as 
possible to our social business sample concerning criteria like education, legal form, 
gender, company age and size. We decided to cooperate with university-based incubators 
for the recruitment of commercial business owners. Therefore, founders of firms from the 
incubators of Humboldt-University Berlin (Humboldt Innovation), Freie Universität 
Berlin (profund), and Martin-Luther-Universität Halle (univations Institute) were 
contacted. This resulted in a potential subject pool of 111 commercial, entrepreneurial 
business owners (51 of profund, 26 of Humboldt Innovation, and 34 of univations 
Institute). Ensuring that there were no social business owners among the commercial 
ones23, we asked subjects in the questionnaire, whether they consider their company a 
social business. In case the answer was “yes”, they were requested to give reasons for 
their assessment. While some commercial business owners classified their company as a 
social business, none of their reasons referred to the definition applied in this thesis (i.e., 
social mission or similar). Most of them indicated their use of social media, which 
illustrates once more how unclear the definition of a social business is. 
 
The data was collected between the beginning of March and the middle of May 
2014. In total 205 entrepreneurs were contacted of whom N=48 participated in the 
experiment (n=26 social business owners and n=22 commercial business owners). Three 
subjects had to be eliminated from the analysis, as they assigned the same rank number 
 
23 We additionally performed some screening of the commercial businesses, ensuring they do not classify 
as a social business, based on our working definitions.  
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twice, making an analysis via the conjoint method impossible. The data was evaluated 
using the statistical software SPSS. The results of our analysis are presented in the next 
section. 
3.4. Empirical Analysis and Discussion of Findings  
In this chapter, the results of the study will be presented. First, we describe the 
sample by using the demographic data of the subjects and data related to their businesses. 
In the second section, we present the results of the conjoint experiment, investigating 
whether commercial business owners differ from social business owners in relation to 
their preferences. In the following steps, a cluster analysis is applied to the data to find 
out whether entrepreneurs can be distinguished beyond the type of business they operate. 
Based on those results, the research question – Do social entrepreneurs operate social 
businesses? – will be answered. In the last section, an analysis of differences between 
social business owners and social entrepreneurs will follow. To avoid redundancies and 
to support the flow of reading the statistical results will be interpreted and discussed right 
away. 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
The task of this paper is to compare our two groups of business owners in relation 
to their preferences in a quasi-experiment. To reduce disturbance variables and errors, we 
deemed it desirable to select these two groups as similar as possible concerning their 
owner and business characteristics. Consequently, we discuss in the following certain 
demographic variables in more detail to address this point. Table 11 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the respondents, accounting for owner type.   
 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics of subjects  








Female Ratio 35% 27% 31% 
Mean Age 38 years 37 years 38 years 
Religious 30%* 9%* 20% 
Above-average social person 
 (self-estimation) 
83% 36% 60% 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Overall, there are fewer female subjects (31 percent) in the sample, which is not 
surprising given the underrepresentation of females in the vocation of entrepreneurship 
(i.e., the GEM female/male TEA ration for the year of 2014 was 0.61 (GEM 2014)). In 
the social business sample, slightly more women are represented, with a share of 35 
percent compared to 27 percent in the commercial business group. This corresponds to 
the results of the GEM special issue report concerning social entrepreneurship from 2009 
(Bosma and Levie, 2010), where the authors report a lower gender gap in the domain of 
social enterprises. The mean age of the sample is M=38 years, with an equal distribution 
across both samples. We also observe in relation to education similar levels for both 
business owner types. This can be obtained from Appendix 6.2., Graph A II. Finally, we 
observe a higher rate of social business owners being religious (M=30 percent) than their 
commercial counterparts (M=9 percent). A chi-squared test of difference reports this 
difference to be marginally significant (χ²=3.202; p=0.074). Summarizing, the goal of 
similar group samples was realized for all described owner characteristics except for 
religion, implying that this variable could potentially be a driver for the decision to found 
a social business. 
 
Next, we look at the business characteristics. The mean age of the pooled 
businesses is M=3 years, M=3.6 years for the commercial businesses, and M=2.2 years 
for the social ventures, hence both fulfilling the characteristics of an entrepreneurial firm 
in a fairly similar manner. Further, both social and commercial businesses have on 
average M=5 employees with permanent working contracts. Looking at the industry 
sectors the two venture groups operate in, we find the majority of ventures, both social 
and commercial, to operate in the service sector (M=65.22 percent commercial 
businesses; M=45.4 percent for social businesses). Further, while we see a very similar 
distribution within the IT sector (M»20 percent), the proportion of social enterprises is 
nearly twice as high in the product sector (M=31.82 percent vs. M=17.39 percent). Also, 
in terms of the businesses’ legal forms, we see a comparable distribution across both 
business types (see Graph A I, Appendix 6.2.). 
 
The last question in the survey asked the entrepreneurs about their motivation for 
founding their businesses. The data in Table 12 shows that most business owners (pooled) 
first had a good idea and then decided to found a business (M=73 percent). Even if there 
are slightly more social than commercial business owners following that motivation, the 
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difference is not significant. We hence find on the majority of business characteristics 
very similar group samples. 
 











I had a good business idea - so I 
decided to found a business. 78% 68% 73% 
I wanted to found a business -so I 
started looking for an idea. 22% 32% 27% 
 
In the next section, we analyze any potential differences concerning the preferences 
of the two types of business owners.  
 
3.4.2. Conjoint analysis: Average rankings of business scenarios 
As described, conjoint analysis will be used to elicit entrepreneurs’ preferences. 
Table 13 shows the average ranks of the eight companies (again, a ranking of 1 presents 
the most preferred business scenario and a rank of 8 the least preferred). The second 
column summarizes the description of the actual attribute levels for the respective 
business model. In the following columns, the average rank and their respective standard 
deviations are displayed for the social business owners, the commercial business owners, 
and the pooled sample. 
 
Table 13: Ranking data of social and commercial business owners and the pooled sample 
Business 
 Model Description 

















A I3000,SC,DE,PY 4,09 1,62 4 3,86 1,39 4 3,98 1,50 
B I4500,SS,DE,PN 1,61 1,08 1 1,68 0,84 1 1,64 0,96 
C I1500,SS,DE,PY 2,65 1,50 2 3,45 1,90 3 3,04 1,73 
D I3000,SS,DC,PN 3,83 1,70 3 3,36 -1,18 2 3,60 1,47 
E I1500,SC,DC,PN 7,78 0,42 8 7,68 0,89 8 7,73 0,69 
F I4500,SC,DC,PY 5,74 1,60 6 4,77 2,53 5 5,27 2,14 
G I1500,SS,DC,PY 4,35 1,37 5 4,86 1,67 6 4,60 1,53 
H I1500,SC,DE,PN 5,96 1,52 7 6,32 0,95 7 6,13 1,27 
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In both groups, company model B received on average the highest rank (M=1.64), 
followed by company C (M=3.04), and D (M=3.60). The only attribute level these three 
business scenarios have in common is social sourcing ('(). The least preferred business 
model is company E (M=7.73), representing a combination of low income	(*)), both 
conventional sourcing ('*) and distribution (,*), and no perception of sustainable 
behavior by the public (-+).24 Ranking values are generally very similar for social and 
commercial business owners. The only ranking difference (by one rank) exists between 
company C and D, as well as between F and G.  
The conjoint analysis produces two different data outputs relevant for data 
description: part-worth utilities and attribute importance values.  
 
Table 14: Part-worth utilities of social and commercial business owners 
Attribute Attribute Levels 
Part-worth utilities t-test 
Social Commercial p-value 
(n=23) (n=22)   
Income 
1.500 € 0.798 1.248 0.159 
3.000 € 1.597 2.496 0.159 
4.500 € 2.395 3.744 0.158 
Sourcing 
Social 1.391 1.159 0.240 
Conventional -1.391 -1.159 0.240 
Distribution 
Ecological 0.924 0.670 0.091 
Conventional -0.924 -0.670 0.091 
Perception 
Yes 0.293 0.261 0.839 
No -0.293 -0.261 0.839 
 
Table 14 displays the part-worth utilities of social and commercial business owners 
for all attributes and their respective levels. Part-worth utilities present the preference for 
each specific attribute level included in a conjoint profile. Thereby, larger utility scores 
present a greater preference. Given the research question of the essay, we present the 
results for each sub-group of business owners separately, as this gives us an indication as 
to whether the preferences of social and commercial business owner differ in regards to 
business relevant characteristics. For commercial business owners, the income attribute 
(I) contributes (for all income levels), in relation to the social business owners, to higher 
utility levels. However, as can be obtained from the last column in Table 14, applying 
 
24 The low ranking of company profile E make sense as it represents a combination of low profits and rather 
unethical business practices.  
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independent sample t-tests this difference is statistically not significant (p=0.16). As 
became already apparent from the ranking of the business scenarios, both groups prefer 
social sourcing ('() to conventional sourcing ('*). Social business owners attain only 
marginally (+ 0.232) more utility from this attribute than commercial business owners 
(p=0.24). The same holds for the attribute of distribution (D). Both groups prefer the 
ecological way (,,) to the conventional (,*)	one, albeit this is more pronounced in the 
sample of social business owners. The different levels of part-worth utilities regarding 
this attribute are marginally significant (p=0.091). Finally, both groups prefer, to a very 
similar extent, situations in which others perceive their sustainable behavior (--), to a 
situation in which this is not perceived (-+). However, overall this attribute is 
characterized by a low part-worth utility level (<0.3) for both groups. These results are 
not surprising, but show that entrepreneurs in general care for the topic of sustainable 
behavior and wish to be perceived as social.  
 
The second output variable generated via conjoint analysis are attribute importance 
values, which measure the importance of each attribute to the overall preference.  
 




Graph 1 displays the average relative importance values of social and commercial 
business owners respectively.25 The values are calculated based on the range of the 
 
25 Note, the average relative importance values add up to 100 percent. However, there are clearly other 
factors which drive entrepreneurs’ utility which are not accounted for in our design.  
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respective part-worth utilities.26 The higher the value, the more the attribute contributes 
to the individual’s overall utility. Values are calculated for each individual and based on 
this an average value can be inferred for each group. The results show that commercial 
business owners have a higher preference for income than their social counterparts. For 
social business owners (social) sourcing (M=37.7 percent) is on average the most 
important attribute followed by income (M=26.3 percent) and distribution (M=25.5 
percent). For commercial business owners it is the other way around: Income (M=34.2 
percent) is on average slightly more important than sourcing (M=33.6 percent). 
Distribution also ranks third (M=19.4 percent) for the commercial business owners. For 
both groups, perception is the least important attribute, while interestingly commercial 
business owners (M=12.8 percent) assign on average slightly more importance to it than 
social business owners (M=10.5 percent). Ecological distribution and social sourcing are 
on average slightly more important for social than for commercial business owners. 
However, as can be obtained from the shapes in Graph 1, overall, the composition of the 
average importance values does not vary strongly27.  
 
These findings imply that social business owners are, based on their preferences, 
not significantly more social than commercial business owners. Analogous, commercial 
business owners appear to be not significantly more monetarily-driven than social 
business owners. Accordingly, our data does not support hypothesis 1. 
 
This raises the question what else might drive people into founding a social 
business. Baron (2007) proposes that social entrepreneurs might be motivated by a “warm 
glow” (Andreoni, 1990). Therefore, we hypothesized that social business owners hold a 
higher preference for being perceived by others for their sustainable behavior than 
commercial business owners (hypothesis 2). However, our results (while not significant, 
p=0.51) actually show the opposite. The relative importance values for the attribute of 
perception are on average higher for commercial (M=12.8 percent) than for social 
business owners (M=10.5 percent). Consequently, our data does not support our second 
 
 
27 Applying independent sample t-tests to the relative importance values of each attribute, we find 
no significant differences for three of the four attributes (see Table A II, Appendix 6.2.). Exclusively for 
the attribute of ecological distribution do we find social business owners to hold a marginally significantly 
higher preference in relation to the commercial business owners (p=0.098). These findings, are 
(unsurprisingly) in line with the findings of the part-worth utilities (Table 14).  
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hypothesis. One has to keep in mind that our sample size is rather small. The insignificant 
differences in the part-worth utilities of commercial and social business owners could be 
due to missing statistical power. However, another possibility could be that social and 
commercial business owners cannot be distinguished based on their preferences. We 
investigate this aspect further in the next section by analyzing the preference structures 
within both groups of business owners using cluster analysis. 
3.4.3. Cluster analysis: Do social entrepreneurs operate social businesses? 
In the previous section, it was shown that commercial and social business owners 
do not differ systematically in their preferences. Next, we take a closer look at the 
preferences within both groups. Figure 2 below displays a boxplot of the relative 
importance values for each attribute and each group of business owners.  
 
Figure 2: Boxplot of the relative importance values of commercial and social business owners 
 
 
For both types of owners, we can observe a wide range of values for the attributes 
of income and sourcing, implying that while some entrepreneurs highly value these 
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variables others do not at all.28 This indicates that even if there are no significant 
differences between both groups, there may still be different preferences within the 
groups. Therefore, the method of cluster analysis29 is used to assign subjects to different 
groups based on their preferences, rather than the definition of business type.  
 
To cluster the data, we use the Ward-Algorithm (Ward, 1963), a hierarchical 
clustering method (i.e., Revelle, 1979) based on squared Euclidean distance. A 
hierarchical rather than non-hierarchical method (e.g. k-means) was chosen, as 
hierarchical cluster analysis assists in determining the optimal number of clusters 
(Jurowski and Reich, 2000). As relevant variables the part-worth utilities per individual 
were chosen. The dendrogram, presenting the results of the cluster analysis can be 
obtained in Figure A II, Appendix 6.2..30  
 
The results of the cluster analysis are presented in Table 15 below. Two clusters of 
entrepreneurs are identified based on the part-worth utilities generated by the conjoint 
analysis – one consisting of 26 entrepreneurs, the other of 19 entrepreneurs. The last 
column displays the results of t-tests, conducted in order to analyze whether individual 
part-worth utilities differed significantly across the clusters. The results show that for all 
attributes, except for perception (p = 0.491), part-worth utilities differ significantly (p < 
0.001) between cluster 1 and 2.31 Graph 2 below displays the attribute importance values 
for each cluster respectively.  
  
 
28 The same argument can be observed when looking at the standard deviations of the relative importance 
values (see  Table A III, Appendix 6.2.).  
29 The goal of this kind of analysis is to divide a sample into a certain number of sub-groups, which are 
very homogenous based on the chosen variables, but very heterogeneous when comparing them to each 
other (i.e., Revelle, 1979, Rokach and Maimon, 2005). 
30 Each number stands for one individual. On the vertical axis, it is specified whether the individual is a 
social or a commercial business owner. 
31 Independent samples t-test show that the two clusters also differ significantly for the relative importance 




Table 15: Part-worth utilities for cluster 1 and cluster 2 
Attribute Attribute Levels 
Part-worth utilities  
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 t-tests 
(social) (monetary) p-value 
(n=26) (n=19)   
Income 
1.500 € 0.217 2.115 0.000 
3.000 € 0.434 4.230 0.000 
4.500 € 0.650 6.344 0.000 
Sourcing 
Social 1.635 0.789 0.000 
Conventional -1.635 -0.798 0.000 
Distribution 
Ecological 1.038 0.474 0.000 
Conventional -1.038 -0.474 0.000 
Perception 
Yes 0.327 0.211 0.491 
No -0.327 -0.211 0.491 
 




The results show cluster 1 to be strongly socially oriented: social sourcing '( 
(M=46.8 percent) as well as ecological distribution ,, (M=29.6 percent) represent the 
most important attributes. For subjects in cluster 1, income presents the least important 
attribute (M=11.5 percent). Cluster 2, on the other hand, displays strong monetary 
orientations. Income (M=55.6 percent) in this group of entrepreneurs represents by far 
the most important attribute. This is followed by social sourcing '( (M=20.6 percent). 
Ecological distribution, ,, (M=12.8 percent) and a positive perception (M=11 percent) 
display rather low relative importance values. Results of the part-worth utilities and 
importance attributes for cluster 1 show that social entrepreneurs, according to the 
working definition of this paper exist, as their social and ecological preferences clearly 
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dominate their monetary ones. In cluster 2, on the other hand, entrepreneurs with a strong 
focus on monetary preferences can be observed.  
 
Table 16 below depicts additional information about the two clusters: Via t- tests and 
Chi-squared tests (depending on data type) further analyses were conducted in order to 
assess whether any significant differences existed between these two clusters in terms of 
the type of businesses they operate, and their demographic variables.  
 
Table 16:Cluster membership, business type, and demographic characteristics 
  
Entrepreneur (Cluster)   
Social 
(Cluster 1) 
   Money-driven      
    (Cluster 2)   !" p value 
# of entrepreneurs 26 19       
commercial business owner 11 (42%) 11 (58%)   
1.067 0.302 social business owner 15 (58%) 8 (42%)   
            
      t-value !" p value 
Demographics 
(entrepreneur & business 
based)            
Mean Age Entrepreneur 
(yrs.) 39 36 1.054   0.298 
Female ratio 42% 16%   3.602 0.058* 
Religiosity 15% 26%   0.820 0.365 
Mean Age Business (yrs.) 3 3 0.355   0.725 
Employees  6 5 0.448   0.657 
I wanted to found a business 
so I looked for a good 




Starting with the research question of this paper: namely whether social 
entrepreneurs operate social businesses, we explore what kind of business owners we 
observe in the respective cluster. In cluster 1, there are n=15 social business owners (58 
percent) and n=11 commercial business owners (42 percent). Cluster 2 consists of n=8 
social business owners (42 percent) and n=11 commercial business owners (58 
percent).32As can be observed from Table 16, the results show no significant differences 
between social business and commercial business owners regarding their cluster 
 
32 See Table A IV, Appendix 6.2. for a summary of the results- for the two clusters (column 2 and 3) and 
presenting the characteristics of social business and commercial business owners (column 4 and 5).  
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allocation (..= 1.067, p = 0.302). That is, we do not find significantly more social / 
commercial business owners in the socially / monetary driven cluster respectively.  
 
Based on those results, the answer to the research question is: yes, social 
entrepreneurs do operate social businesses, but so do monetary-driven entrepreneurs, as 
we clearly observe monetary driven entrepreneurs (from cluster 2) to operate social 
businesses. On the other hand, there are also social entrepreneurs (from cluster 1) who 
operate commercial businesses. 
 
Social business owners do not necessarily prefer social and ecological outcomes to 
monetary ones. And not all commercial business owners are predominantly driven 
by monetary preferences.  
 
We next discuss the results of the demographic variables: We assessed whether 
entrepreneur or business specific variables determine cluster membership. We find a 
marginally significant higher ratio of females in the social cluster relative to the 
commercial cluster (p = 0.058). Past research has argued females to be more ecologically 
and sustainably conscious than males (e.g., Shauki, 2011; Laroche et al., 2001), this could 
be a factor reflecting this finding.  
 
Interestingly, we also observe a different motivation for founding a business across the 
social and commercial cluster. We find monetarily driven entrepreneurs to be 
significantly more likely to be motivated by the idea to found a business, and only as a 
consequence of that to be looking for a suitable business idea.33.For the majority of 
entrepreneurs in the socially oriented cluster, on the other hand, the business idea came 
before there was necessarily a motivation to start a business (“I had a good business idea 
so I decided to found a business.”). Given this finding, it could well be that in particular 
the entrepreneurs in the monetarily driven cluster found a social business, however not 
due to social preferences/motives, but rather due to an increasing market demand for 




33 Looking at the sample of business owners (pre-clustering) no significant differences across groups 
on this variable was observed (see also Table 12) 
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Our findings consequently raise the question, whether the theoretical definitions of 
social entrepreneurship in the literature offer the best understandings as to what this type 
of entrepreneurship entails, and what not. We argue that the mission-based approach fails 
to account how the venture is operated (how that mission is pursued), while our findings 
suggest that this aspect might play an integral part in this discussion. Given our global 
environmental and societal problems, we propose that this aspect of “how” should not be 
ignored when defining the concept of social entrepreneurship. Rather, in line with the 
argument by Markman et al. (2016), it should comprise a central aspect within this 
discussion. Running a venture with a social mission, while at the same time producing a 
large ecological footprint (or similar), is insufficient and should not be classified as social 
entrepreneurship.  
 
We are aware that deriving a justifiable delineation between social and commercial 
entrepreneurship is a complex and daunting task, but believe that our empirical findings 
in relation to the preferences of entrepreneurs might offer valuable insights for 
discussions and progress towards a viable methodology in this manner. Our experimental 
design did not collect variables that allow us to make statements, as to how business 
owners actually operate their business (i.e., whether in particular the commercial business 
owners in cluster 1 operate their business in an ecological, sustainable, and/or social way). 
Given our findings, this would have been valuable information, something future research 
should keep in mind.  
 
In this context, we would like to raise the theory of moral disengagement 
(Bandura, 1991; Bandura et al.,1996). According to this theory, individuals cognitively 
disengage from their moral values when acting.34 Hence, for our framework it would be 
interesting to observe, whether the commercial business owners observed in cluster 1 
(characterized by strong environmental and social preferences) potentially disengage 
from their values when making business choices or evaluating business opportunities 
 
34 Interesting research in the field of entrepreneurship has been done by Shepherd, Patzelt and Baron (2013). 
The authors investigate conditions which might influence entrepreneurs to engage in moral disengagement 
during their decision-making, i.e., entrepreneurs who hold pro-environmental values but who pursue 
opportunities that will lead to outcomes inconsistent with these values. Their findings highlight the 
mediating role of entrepreneurial self-efficacy and industry munificence (Shepherd et al. 2013).  
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(i.e., by cognitively changing outcomes or actions so that they seem less inconsistent with 
their moral values, or by i.e., making others accountable for the negative 
social/environmental impact their actions cause). Again, we cannot, based on our data, 
make any inferences in this regard. However, moral disengagement certainly fails to 
explain why we observe social business owners in cluster 2 (described by monetary 
preferences). We invite future research to investigate this context further, as it is 
important to gain a better understanding regarding the different implications of our 
findings.  
 
Having outlined and discussed our findings, we next outline potential limitations 
of this study, before we conclude. 
3.5. Limitations 
As with most empirical studies, ours also succumbs to certain limitations. First of 
all, the sample size of n=23 and n=22 for each business type is rather small, limiting 
generalizability. However, one needs to keep in mind that in particular in relation to the 
classification criteria for our social business sample (based solely on Ashoka and Social 
Impact firms), we ran a very conservative, clear-cut approach, highlighting the quality of 
our data. Our results are somewhat limited to very young companies, since for both 
groups the average business age is M=3 years. For future research, it would hence be 
desirable to conduct this experiment with a larger sample and an extended geographical 
and firm maturity focus in order to increase the study’s external validity.  
 
Also, this study might potentially have a short-coming relating to internal validity, 
arising from a self-selection bias. Possibly subjects willing to participate in an experiment 
like ours are generally more social than those who do not. A further concern could stem 
from demand effects. One might argue that subjects did not rank the presented business 
scenarios according to their preference structure but rather responded in a way they 
believed to be socially desirable (i.e., falsely stating to hold social and ecological 
preferences) – in particular as the experiment was not designed in an incentive compatible 
way. However, both Lohrke et al. (2010) and Shepherd and Zacharakis (1997) report the 
advantage of using conjoint analysis in order to reduce not only social desirability bias 
but also retrospective reporting biases. 
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The method of conjoint analysis itself however raises some limitations. One has 
to be aware that it is a static, steady-state measurement method (Green and Krieger, 
1991). Therefore, the preferences measured in this experiment may be valid for the time 
being but may change over time, for instance, during different phases of the 
entrepreneurial process. It hence seems valuable to extend this cross-sectional data by a 
time-series analysis. The resulting panel data could provide new insights concerning 
entrepreneurial preferences over time. Also, critics of this method may put forward that 
experiments such as conjoint analysis fail to reflect “real life” situations and consequently 
do not elicit “real” responses. We would like to stress the advantages of using 
experimentally generated data, based on the controlled environment in which this data is 
generated, allowing for the establishment of causal relationships while minimizing the 
risk of confounding factors (Schade and Burmeister-Lamp, 2009).   
 
Nevertheless, the results of this paper contribute in various ways to social 
entrepreneurship research. It is shown that the purely mission-based definition does not 
provide a complete picture of the phenomenon, as it fails to include entrepreneurs who 
are characterized by social preferences. It might be reasonable to shift the perspective and 
integrate the preferences of an entrepreneur when describing the concept.  
3.6. Conclusion 
We empirically investigated whether social entrepreneurs operate social businesses. 
Thereby, we defined a social entrepreneur purely based on her or his preferences – which 
we experimentally elicited via a conjoint design – and independently of the business type 
(social or commercial) she or he operates. Thereby, a social entrepreneur was defined as 
someone whose preferences for leading their businesses in a social and ecological way 
dominate their monetary preferences. 
 
That means, based on our design a social entrepreneur can also operate a 
commercial business, and vice versa a commercial or monetary-driven entrepreneur can 
operate a social business. Our data revealed that these two different kinds of 
entrepreneurs, based on our definition actually exist.  
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Table 17: Sample distribution according to business & entrepreneurial type 
    Preferences of the entrepreneur 
    







Business 33% 18% 
Commercial 
Business 24% 24% 
 
The matrix in Table 17 displays the distribution of the sample according to business 
and entrepreneurial types. Based on the presented data, the answer to the research 
question is ambiguous: yes, social entrepreneurs do operate social businesses, but not 
exclusively. They also operate commercial businesses. Furthermore, there are also 
monetary-driven entrepreneurs who operate social businesses. Since both types of 
entrepreneurs run both types of businesses, no systematic difference between social and 
commercial business owners could be found. Based on former social entrepreneurship 
theory, which almost exclusively assumes the mission-based definition, it was 
hypothesized that there is a systematic difference between social and commercial 
business owners concerning their preferences. The academic literature suggests that 
commercial business owners have stronger preferences for monetary outcomes, while 
social business owners prefer social and ecological outcomes. Therefore, the empirical 
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4. ESSAY NO. III 
Cooperation and altruism in incentive compatible experiments 
with entrepreneurs, professionals, and business students.  
Christine Lauritzen, Mark W.J.L. Sanders, Christian D. Schade 
 
A central question in entrepreneurship research is: Who is the entrepreneur? In the 
past, the field has focused on the role of environmental conditions (Gartner, 1988), 
psychological traits (e.g., Rauch and Freese, 2006; Koellinger et al., 2007; 2013) 
and behavioral aspects (e.g, Busenitz and Barney, 1997). However, studies 
measuring entrepreneurs’ social preferences (Weitzel et al., 2010; Urbig et al., 
2012) and/or their willingness to cooperate are scarce, despite the fact that these 
two aspects are likely to considerably impact entrepreneurs’ decision-making. 
Moreover, the manifestations of these factors are likely to have implications not 
only for the internal and external stakeholders of ventures but ultimately for our 
society in general. We empirically investigate altruistic and cooperative tendencies 
of actual entrepreneurs using game-theoretic concepts and analyze whether the 
behavior of entrepreneurs in these games significantly differs from the behavior of 
other professionals, as well as business and economic students. We find 
entrepreneurs to be more altruistic than business and economics students. We 
further find entrepreneurs to show stronger cooperative tendencies than other 
professionals working within the start-up industry, as well as business and 
economics students. We discuss the resulting implications for an entrepreneurial 
context as well as for society. Our findings also offer some interesting 




This paper is about actual cooperative and altruistic tendencies of entrepreneurs. 
Both tendencies are under-researched and yet very important for both the academic and 
applied field of entrepreneurship. We address this gap in the literature via established 
economic experiments: dictator (Kahneman, 1985; Forsythe et al., 1994) and public 
goods games (Ledyard, 1995) with real payoffs, run with entrepreneurs, non-entrepreneur 
professionals and economic and business students.  
 
In general, the entrepreneurial environment is characterized by substantial 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921), high asset specificity, and a rather underdeveloped level of 
infrastructure, often due to the fact that new ventures are innovative (Williamson, 1995; 
Schumpeter, 1987). The complexity of this environment makes it important to cooperate 
with other team members of the venture, capital providers, suppliers, regulators, 
customers, employers and perhaps even competitors. At the same time, such an 
environment opens possibilities for unproductive rent seeking and destructive venturing 
(Baumol, 1990). In the literature, we find some theory development on cooperative 
behavior of entrepreneurs for an entrepreneurial context. Cable and Shane (1997) describe 
and theoretically model, using the framework of a social dilemma, the importance of 
cooperation between entrepreneurs and venture finance providers. Maintaining a 
cooperative climate with capital providers or any of the other aforementioned 
stakeholders involves a willingness to share and cooperate, even at the potential cost of 
personal short run gains. While research has established networks to play an essential role 
for entrepreneurial success (Witt, 2004; Greve et al., 2003), to the best of our knowledge, 
there is no study empirically investigating cooperative tendencies of entrepreneurs, using 
game theoretic concepts.  
 
An even more pronounced form of other-regarding preference is altruism. It can be 




The reason goes way back to Adam Smith’s ([1776] 1910, p.13) famous analysis:  
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that 
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of 
our own necessities but of their advantages.”  
 
In this respect, Baumol (1990) stresses the importance of institutions to constrain 
potentially unproductive or even destructive behavior of selfish entrepreneurs. This 
would suggest altruism to be irrelevant for generating a positive effect of entrepreneurship 
for society. However, we believe there might be a plethora of social business 
opportunities that are beneficial for society but can only be run by altruistic entrepreneurs 
because they derive additional utility from helping others (Leadbeater, 1997). 
 
This study contributes to the literature by empirically investigating sharing and 
cooperative tendencies of actual entrepreneurs using game-theoretic concepts and 
discussing the resulting implications for an entrepreneurial context. This is done by 
comparing the game-behavior of entrepreneurs to that of non-entrepreneurs. As about 50 
percent of our subject pool is drawn from a non-student population, we achieve a better 
representation of the general population (in particular relevant for a business context).  
 
Our results show that entrepreneurs, with several nuances that can be made, are 
indeed more willing to share and cooperate than professionals and, importantly, than 
economics and business students. Our finding is independent of social entrepreneurship, 
suggesting that entrepreneurship is not only about doing well for oneself, but also about 
doing well for society.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section describes briefly the theoretical 
background of other-regarding preferences and outlines our motivation for eliciting these 
types of preferences in the context of entrepreneurship. Thereby, the games applied are 
portrayed in more detail. Section 3 describes our sample and our recruitment procedure 
for all three groups. In section 4, we outline the experimental design. Section 5 presents 
and analyses the results, which are then discussed in section 6. Section 7 considers the 
study’s limitations, before we briefly conclude in section 8.  
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4.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
4.2.1. Other-regarding preferences 
In order to investigate entrepreneurs’ positive35 other-regarding preferences (ORP), 
we make use of game theoretic concepts, which allow us to closely study altruistic and 
cooperative tendencies, by contrasting actual behavior to the predictions of behavior 
under the assumption of narrowly self-interested preferences and unboundedly rational 
behavior (Simon, 1955). The theory of ORP assumes utility functions to incorporate the 
outcomes or consequences of other people (generally their monetary payoff) to some 
dimension. Past research has made extensive use of experiments in this regard (e.g., Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Andreoni and Miller, 2002), and 
findings clearly demonstrate that people generally do care about the outcome of others. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show how actual entrepreneurs compare 
in this regard.  
 
Thereby, most of the models developed in this context are based to some extent on 
the concept of fairness.36 As will be outlined in more detail in the following sections, we 
make use of two classic games for capturing the preferences of interest to us: In order to 
assess altruistic vs. self-interested behavior, we let subjects play a simple, one shot (static) 
dictator game. This type of game is often also referred to as a measure of unconditional 
kindness (Ben-Ner and Halldorsson, 2010). For measuring cooperative tendencies, we 
apply a dynamic voluntary contribution game. Dynamic or iterated games are played over 
time (i.e., over several rounds or periods) and allow players to develop ongoing 
relationships (Aumann and Hart, 1992), as choices made in each period, do not only affect 
the payoff of the current period, but also influence future interactions of the players. 
Further, by providing feedback or information to the players during an iterated game, i.e., 
about the behavior of the counterparty, subjects may learn and potentially adjust their 
strategies (Fudenberg et al., 1998). The rational, game-theoretic equilibria in repeated 
games are determined by backward induction. This implies anticipating the behavior of 
 
35 That is, weighing the welfare of others positively within their own utility. 
36 The literature distinguishes between different types of ORP: (1) distributive ORP (Bolten, 1991; Bolton 
and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), (2) reciprocal ORP (Fehr et al., 1993; Berg et al., 1995), 
(3) both distributive and reciprocal ORP (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). 
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the counterparty based on their behavior in the last round of the game and to adjust one’s 
own behavior according to this expectation. This process is repeated iteratively for the 
second to last round and so on, until the first round of the game is reached (Camerer, 
1997).37  
 
The voluntary contribution game in this paper presents a social dilemma. Social 
dilemma games are characterized by a Pareto deficient equilibrium, and off-equilibrium 
behavior within these games is generally interpreted as cooperative behavior, as 
cooperation within the context of these games increases efficiency as well as overall 
welfare (Camerer, 2011). Hence, immediate self-interest in these games conflicts with 
social efficiency, as is the case in many real-world situations, including business contexts. 
While both parties benefit from cooperation, defecting cooperation (also termed free-
riding) remains the dominant strategy for every individual in these games.  
4.2.2. Social preferences in an entrepreneurial context 
We argue that understanding how fair entrepreneurs are, or to what degree they 
behave altruistic and cooperative, offers valuable information, for at least two reasons: 
 
First, past studies have shown that there is a positive link between pro-sociality and 
certain business-related factors, such as earnings (Bowles et al., 2001) and productivity 
(Barr and Serneels, 2009; Carpenter and Seki, 2011), which hold also outside the 
laboratory (lab-in-the-field experiments). For example, Leibbrandt (2012) shows that 
sellers, who act more pro-social in laboratory experiments, also realize higher returns for 
their products than their more selfish counterparts. It hence appears that pro-social 
preferences positively impact certain business performance measures. Thereby, different 
suggestions regarding the mechanism by which this occurs have been offered. One 
suggestion is that individuals with more pronounced social preferences are less inclined 
to behave opportunistically, for example with their stakeholders, and consequently realize 
reputational benefits (Bowles et al., 2001). Others suggest that pro-social individuals are 
generally better at interacting and can consequently more strongly benefit from certain 
network effects (Barr and Serneels, 2009).  
 
37 Strategies that take into account the whole sequence of periods are termed ‘super game’, while each 
period and its adjunct previous/following period is termed a sub-game.  
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While pro-sociality has been considered in a range of labor economic contexts 
(see i.e., Charness and Villeval, 2009; Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Gneezy et al., 2016), 
there is surprisingly little empirical research investigating pro-sociality in the context of 
entrepreneurship. However, we argue that the role of social preferences might play in 
particular in the uncertain, volatile, and often asset specific environment of entrepreneurs 
a central role, as these environmental characteristics might create social norms, fostering 
higher levels of cooperation. We will outline this in more detail in section 4.2.2.2.. 
 
The second reason for studying social preferences of entrepreneurs relates to the 
produced insights in relation to their direct impact on society in general. Entrepreneurship 
is generally regarded as something which positively impacts our civilization, in particular 
by generating economic growth via i.e., employment generation and innovation (Van 
Praag and Versloot, 2007). However, Baumol (1990) critically discusses the potential for 
entrepreneurs to engage in unproductive or even destructive activities. We argue that this 
potential has even increased given the great levels of wealth inequality (Zucman, 2019), 
as well as the environmental and sustainability problems on our planet. 
 
Ostrom (2010) discusses how many of our current environmental issues resemble 
the situation of a social dilemma. The findings of studies investigating this link in more 
detail, suggest social preferences to indeed play a role in the conservation/exploitation of 
resources. Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) for example study how other-regarding 
preferences effect the exploitation of common pool resources. The authors find 
fishermen, who demonstrate stronger cooperative tendencies in the laboratory (measured 
via a public good game game) to be less likely to exploit their fishing grounds (Fehr and 
Leibbrandt, 2011). Riedl and Smeets (2017) find that social preferences have a 
significantly positive impact on socially responsible investment decisions, even if that 
decision leads to lower financial returns. Knez (2016) reports altruistic individuals to 
show a greater willingness to make sacrifices in order to protect the environment. Hence, 
ORP appear to play a role for responsible and sustainable economic decision-making.  
 
In the following section, we review studies which have empirically studied altruistic 
tendencies in an entrepreneurial context and describe the theoretical background of the 
methods used in this context.  
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4.2.2.1. Altruism in an entrepreneurial context 
Incentivized experiments concerning entrepreneurs’ social preferences appear 
scarce in the literature. Notable exceptions present thereby the studies by Weitzel et al. 
(2010) and Urbig et al. (2012).  
 
Weitzel et al. (2010) experimentally investigate selfish behaviors of 
entrepreneurially talented38 students by analyzing allocation choices across various forms 
of dictator games. The authors find subjects’ beliefs regarding their own creative and 
business skills (relative to their peers) to play a significant moderating role in this context, 
leading to systematic differences in their findings. Subjects who demonstrate a 
combination of high business-related skills and low creative skills, donate significantly 
less money in the dictator game. Taking their finding into account, we control for 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy in our experimental design. Moreover, we partially 
reproduce their design, and expand it with a standard public good game, in order to be 
able to test for the importance of strategic interactions (see section 4.2.2.2.) using actual 
entrepreneurs, professionals, as well as students as subjects. Urbig et al. (2012) 
complement the study by Weitzel et al. (2010). The authors investigate how student 
subjects with entrepreneurial intent exploit risky investment opportunities with positive 
and negative externalities. They find subjects with high levels of entrepreneurial intent to 
invest significantly less into destructive scenarios, suggesting that students who intend to 
become an entrepreneur exhibit higher levels of ORP than others. In their experimental 
design, Urbig et al. (2012) control also for entrepreneurial talent (self-efficacy) and find, 
in line with Weitzel et al. (2010), individuals with high business-related skills to invest 
significantly more into the destructive scenarios. 
 
Taking these results together, it appears that entrepreneurial intentions as well as 
creative talent positively impact social preferences, while (self-reported) business talent 
appears to drive rather less socially oriented choices.  
 
 
38 Entrepreneurial talent in their study is measured by the scale of entrepreneurial self-efficacy, which the 
authors further differentiate into the sub-scales of (1) business and (2) creative talent. 
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Our first contribution to this emerging literature consists in implementing a similar 
experimental game set-up, with a subject pool of actual entrepreneurs and to investigate 
whether their preference structure differs from those of non-entrepreneurs. 
 
To test for the preferences of altruism and fairness, we follow the approach by 
Weitzel et al. (2010), making use of the standard dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986; 
Forsythe et al., 1994) in our experimental design. In the classic dictator game, originally 
invented to test the income maximization assumption, there are two players: the dictator 
and the recipient. The dictator, endowed with a sum of money, decides how much of her 
endowment she is willing to allocate to the recipient, who simply has to accept the offer.39 
Standard behavioral assumptions in economic theory would predict the dictator to make 
zero allocations, as this strategy maximizes her private returns. However, past research, 
and there is a lot of it, has shown that most dictators deviate from this strategy and do 
allocate some of their endowment to the recipient. A review of the empirical evidence 
shows that average endowment transfers to the recipient range between around 27 percent 
and 38 percent in Western and indigenous cultures and to further vary significantly over 
time and space within these groups (Engel, 2010).  
 
Cultural and societal characteristics have been shown to play a critical role for 
contribution levels (see e.g., Henrich et al., 2000). Thereby, it has been suggested that 
these observed differences in ORP across countries and cultures might, at least partially, 
be driven by different social norms. This might play a role when studying the context of 
entrepreneurship. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004, p. 63) define social norms as “[…] 
normative standards of behavior that are enforced by informal social sanctions.” These 
sanctions might be in the form of, e.g., shame or punishment and are generally adopted 
via social learning mechanisms. Ultimately, they can cause a lasting change in an 
individual’s motivation to act pro-social or not (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004). Empirical studies further indicate a link between social norms and 
societal conditions, whereby the latter is said to influence the former (Gächter and 
 
39 It is important to note that the recipient’s role in this game is completely passive, i.e., she cannot object 
the allocation decision of the dictator (as in the ultimatum game). Moreover, both the dictator and the 
recipient are anonymous and randomly assigned to the respective roles. Consequently, strictly speaking, 
since any strategic component or risk is missing, the dictator game does not really qualify as a game but an 
allocation task. 
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Herrmann, 2011; Henrich et al., 2005). The workplace constitutes such a societal 
condition (Gneezy et al., 2016), and hence the social norms prevailing in an 
entrepreneurial work environment might lead to certain social norms in regards to 
altruistic and cooperative behaviors.  
 
Concepts used to explain the behavior in the dictator game range from the notion 
of fairness and altruism to inequity aversion (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1986; Rabin, 1993; 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; List, 2007). For a discussion on this, see for example Fehr and 
Schmidt (2010). For our research, it is mainly important to note that the caring behavior, 
measured in this game, is a form of unconditional kindness and hence unrelated to the 
concept of reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter, 1999) or strategic interaction, which we 
investigate separately in our experiment, and outline in more detail in the next section 
(4.2.2.2).  
 
Based on the results by Urbig et al. (2012), namely that students with higher levels 
of entrepreneurial intent demonstrate stronger social concerns, we formulate our 
hypotheses in relation to altruism as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: When playing in the role of the dictator, we expect entrepreneurs 
to allocate more funds to the recipient than the other two natural groups in our 
sample (students and start-up employees, collaborators, and investors).  
 
However, we treat this part of our study rather exploratively, in particular as the 
current state of research provides somewhat contradictory findings in relation to 
entrepreneurial intent and self-efficacy. We control for self-efficacy within our sample so 
as to gain more insights in this regard. The main goal of studying altruism in our 
experiment is to gain a better understanding as to whether and how this social preference 
differs between entrepreneurs and others.  
 
In our experiment, we asked entrepreneurs to indicate how social they would 
describe one or more of their businesses (see section 4.7. for more details on this). Based 
on the previously described findings in relation to social preferences, sustainable, as well 
as responsible behaviors (i.e., Urbig et al., 2012; Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Riedl and 
Smeets, 2017; Knez, 2016), we posit our second hypothesis:  
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HYPOTHESIS 2: Within the group of entrepreneurs, we expect a positive 
association between the venture’s level of social operations and the 
entrepreneur’s own altruistic tendencies.  
 
Next, we outline the second social preference measure elicited in our experimental 
design, the willingness to cooperate. Thereby, we describe its importance within the 
entrepreneurial context and consequently derive our resulting hypothesis. 
4.2.2.2. Cooperation in an entrepreneurial context 
We know the importance for firms to build strong and trusting relationships with 
relevant stakeholders from stakeholder theory (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). These 
types of relationships are especially important in the context of entrepreneurship: Faced 
with major resource constraints, entrepreneurs need to develop strategic relationships to 
successfully found and grow their ventures (Maxwell and Levesque, 2014; Pollack and 
Bosse, 2014; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001). Moreover, entrepreneurs generally need 
to initiate and build most of these relationships themselves and from the ground up. New 
ventures, by definition, lack a record of accomplishment, while at the same time engaging 
in innovative and risky activities. Pollack et al. (2017) suggest that this might induce 
behaviors and decision-making processes not captured by general stakeholder theory. For 
example, research in the field of entrepreneurial finance has shown the reliance on 
reciprocal, cooperative relations and social control mechanisms, like trust, to be 
potentially more important than standard formal control mechanisms, such as instigating 
the investors on the board of directors (Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996; De Clercq and 
Sapienza, 2001, 2006).  
 
Entrepreneurial environments are characterized by high risk and uncertainty 
(Knight, 1921), information asymmetries (Dutta and Folta, 2015) and oftentimes 
misaligned interests (Cable and Shane, 1997). All circumstances, which offer a viable 
environment for opportunistic behavior, even more so as the given context does not allow 
for the design of complete and enforceable contracts (Williamson, 1985; Cable and 
Shane, 1997; Hellman, 2007). As a result, social norms, on which cooperation is mainly 
based (Fehr, 2004), appear to be particularly relevant in the entrepreneurial environment, 
as they might help the actors to overcome fear of opportunistic behavior, and even 
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facilitate the possibility of inaugurating qualitative and long-term relationships, so 
important for risk reduction40 and venture success (Mayer et al., 1995; Howorth and Moro, 
2006; Schoorman et al., 2007; Welter and Smallbone, 2006; Larson, 1991; Parkhe, 1993).  
 
As described in section 4.2.2., the social norms of an environment, such as the 
workplace, play a decisive role for different manifestations of pro-social behaviors. 
Gneezy et al. (2016) for example find significantly different cooperative behaviors 
between fishermen on lakes and fisherman on the sea, based on the different norms of 
cooperation in these two environments. Suarez-Villa (1998) shows that entrepreneurial 
firms engage in significantly more cooperative strategies than their larger, more mature 
counterparts. Also, based on the positive link between pro-sociality and certain business-
related factors, i.e., earnings (Bowles et al., 2001) and productivity (Barr and Serneels, 
2009, Carpenter and Seki, 2011), it appears that the ability and willingness to cooperate 
should therefore present in particular for entrepreneurs an important asset. To be more 
precise, we argue that the specificity of the entrepreneurial environment inaugurates 
social norms, which cause entrepreneurs to adapt more pro-social behavioral strategies 
which consequently lead to higher levels of cooperation. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: We expect to observe a stronger tendency of entrepreneurs to 
cooperate in the public good game in relation to students as well as start-up 
employees, collaborators, and investors.  
 
We investigate cooperative behaviors of entrepreneurs by using a dynamic 
voluntary contribution mechanism, called a standard public good game (Ledyard, 1995), 
in our case with two players.41 Dilemma games, such as the public good game, are 
generally used for modelling and studying interactive and strategic behaviors of 
individuals. The game’s set-up is as follows: At the beginning of the game, each player, 
i=1, 2, is given a certain monetary endowment. The players then simultaneously decide 
how much of their endowment they want to invest into the creation of a public good or 
 
40 Thereby, referring to the reduction of performance risk not relational risk.  
41We apply non-cooperative game-theory, entailing only situations in which contracts or arrangements are 
not binding or enforceable, resembling the entrepreneurial environment. 
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project.42 The individual’s monetary payoff // strategically depends on the actions of the 
counterparty and is defined by the following payoff function:  
 
/	/(0&, 0.) = 234567238 − 0/ + ;(0& + 0.) 
Thereby, 0/ denotes player <0= contribution to the project. The production function 
of the project is given by the sum of both players contribution to the public good (0& +
0.). The marginal per capita return of investing into the project is given by α. Since the 
game is designed as a social dilemma game, it has to hold that 1/n < α < 1.43 Based on this 
condition, whatever the contribution of the opponent, the marginal cost of investing 
(equal to one) is higher than the marginal return of investing, and the dominant strategy 
for both players would be not to invest any endowment to the project (0& = 0. = 0). The 
Nash equilibrium payoff is therefore defined by //+, = 234567238.	However, since the 
joint marginal return (3 ∗ ;) is higher than the cost of investing, the Pareto efficient 
outcome is characterized by both players contributing their entire endowment to the 
project. In that case, the payoffs to both players is given by: 
/	/(0&, 0.) = 1.4 ∗ 234567238 
The game has been applied extensively within experimental economics to study 
whether individuals play the self-interested Nash solution, or act cooperatively by 
contributing to the project. Playing the game in an iterated version further allows us to 
measure subjects’ levels of conditional cooperation or reciprocity.44 
 
42 The project in our experimental instructions was not framed or specified further. It was just called “the 
project”. 
43 In our experimental design α was set at α=0.7. 
44 An important technical distinction needs to be made between reciprocity and cooperative behavior. While 
the former is described as responsive behavior to the previous actions of the counterparty regardless of 
potential future material gains/losses, cooperative behavior is rather in direct relation to these future 
potential payoffs (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). The willingness to contribute to the project because other 
players are also contributing describes the notion of positive reciprocity. Negative reciprocity arises when 
an individual, who contributed to the project in the previous round of the game (t-1), while the counterparty 
contributed nothing or significantly less (free-rode), decides in the current round (t) of the game to penalize 
the counterparty for this behavior by contributing significantly less (or zero) to the project (tit-for-tat). This 
means that after several rounds of the game, the behavior of free-riders and (negative) reciprocators is 
indistinguishable when considering their contribution levels in the current round only.  The same holds for 
(positive) reciprocators and players who always play a cooperative strategy. In game theory, it has been 
shown that variations of a tit-for-tat strategy in (infinitely repeated or open ended) games can sustain 
cooperation even among self-interested individuals (Axelrod, 2006). That is, cooperation does not need to 
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Having outlined our motivation for eliciting social preferences in the context of 
entrepreneurship and the relevant theoretical and empirical background, we next describe 
our approach for implementation and experimental design.  
4.3. Recruitment Procedure 
4.3.1. Entrepreneurs and professionals 
The data collection of the entrepreneurs and ‘professionals’ sample was conducted 
via lab-in-the-field experiments at two different entrepreneurship conferences in 
Hamburg and Berlin. Both conferences are characterized by a strong focus on technology 
and innovation – particularly in relation to digitalization. The first four experimental 
sessions were conducted at the European Conference on the Future Internet (ECFI) in 
Hamburg in November 2015. More than 1000 international guests participated at the 
conference. The crowd consisted of entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, business angels, 
accelerators, scientists and other individuals engaged or interested in the start-up and 
technology industry. The conference provided numerous workshops (e.g., hackathons), 
lectures, pitching competitions, and networking opportunities.  
 
An additional four sessions were conducted at the Tech Open Air (TOA) in Berlin, 
one of Europe’s leading interdisciplinary technology festivals. The festival is a well-
known technology conference (founded in 2012) in and out of Europe.45 At TOA a large 
number of entrepreneurs, investors and start-ups (predominantly from the digital and high 
technology industry) come together, with the aim of generating a platform for 
multidisciplinary knowledge exchange and development. The conference’s program 
includes speeches, pitches and various workshops, again catered towards an 
entrepreneurial and professional crowd.  
 
 
be the manifestation of ORP, but it has been shown that the cooperative equilibrium is much easier to reach 
and sustain when ORP and some altruism is present (Camerer and Fehr, 2006).  
45 TOA started in Berlin but has also organized conferences in i.e., Los Angeles and Tokyo. 
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The experiment was computerized using the experimental software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) and run via a mobile laboratory, consisting of 20 laptops and 
sideboard blinders in order to increase the level of anonymity and privacy.46  
 
The recruitment process for both conferences was identical: Subjects were recruited 
directly at the conference location. Upon approach, the opportunity to participate in a 
decision-making experiment in which they, based on their decisions, could earn money, 
was briefly explained. Potential subjects further received information about (a) the 
location of the room (which was also provided in the conferences’ programs), (b) the 
approximate duration of the experiment and (c) the different time slots available for 
participation. Additionally, flyers containing this information were handed out. 
 
We cannot, based on the experimental design, make any statements regarding the 
degree of acquaintance between subjects. However, throughout the recruitment process 
people were generally approached individually, or if in pairs, were asked to come to 
sessions at different time slots. Additionally, the minimum level of subjects per session 
was set to n=8, to further assure sufficient anonymity.  
 
All eight sessions lasted between 45 and 60 minutes. When subjects arrived at the 
experimental lab, they were randomly allocated to one of the 20 laptops. This was done 
by blindly drawing a numbered ticket, linked to one of the laptops. Once all subjects were 
allocated to a laptop, the experimental instructions were read out aloud by the 
experimenter and at the same time visible on the computer screens. Subjects were 
instructed not to communicate with each other throughout the entire experiment. Also, 
they were ensured that all information provided by them would be treated confidentially 
and anonymously, and that none of the other participants would be able to trace their 
contribution decisions back to them. In the first part of the instructions, subjects received 
information about the general structure of the experiment and its incentive compatible 
mechanisms. Finally, subjects were informed that they would receive further, more 
detailed instructions once they would enter the different parts of the experiment (please 
 
46 In particular for the context of our experimental design, anonymity plays an important role in order to 
avoid, i.e., reputation concerns beyond those intended by the game (for the effects of anonymity/scrutiny 
see, e.g., Hoffmann et al., 1994; Eckel and Grossmann, 1996; List, 2007; Franzen and Pointer, 2012).  
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refer to Appendix 6.3. for the complete instructions). Subjects had the opportunity to raise 
their hand and quietly ask the experimenters questions throughout the entire experiment. 
4.3.2. Business and economics students 
In addition to the subject pool from the conferences, we ran experimental sessions 
with student subjects, conducted in the decision-making laboratory of Humboldt 
Universität zu Berlin, in Mai 2017. Thereby, students from the field of business and 
economics47 were recruited via the recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). In total 
N=62 subjects participated. The operational procedure in the laboratory was identical to 
the one outlined for the participants at the conferences. Sessions lasted again between 45 
and 60 minutes.  
4.4. Experimental Structure  
The experiment itself consists of several different parts, which will be described 
next. The first four parts of the experiment represent the incentive compatible parts, 
followed by a questionnaire collecting control variables, which, based on past research, 
might be relevant for the study at hand (i.e., entrepreneurial intent and entrepreneurial 
self-efficacy, as suggested by Weitzel et al. (2010) and Urbig et al. (2012)).  
4.4.1. Elicitation of risk attitudes - Holt and Laury lottery 
In the first part of the experiment, subjects played a “Holt and Laury” lottery, 
whereby ten paired lottery choices (lottery “A” and lottery “B”) were presented. Subjects 
have, for each of the 10 presented lottery pairs, to decide which lottery type (A or B) they 
would prefer to play. This method allows eliciting an individual’s level of risk preference 
by observing at which lottery pair an individual makes the crossover from lottery “A” 
(the less risky lottery) to lottery “B” (Holt and Laury, 2002). Switching between lottery 
4 and lottery 5 implies risk neutrality, switching to lottery B before the fourth lottery 
choice implies risk seeking, switching after the fifth lottery pair to lottery B implies risk 
aversion. Professional and student subjects could earn up to €15.40 / €3.85 Euros in this 
part, respectively. A participant consistent with standard expected utility theory (EUT), 
 
47 Note, that we limited the recruitment process to students only from this field of study, as these types of 
students are most frequently used as proxies for entrepreneurs.  
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based on the axiom of monotonicity, can only have one crossover point. Further, the 
crossover always goes from the safe option (A) to the risky option (B). Finally, sticking 
with option “A” for all 10 lotteries violates EUT’s axiom of dominance. Some of our 
participants do violate the assumptions of rational behavior within this lottery game (i.e., 
depicting more than one crossover point) and hence exhibit inconsistent risk attitudes48. 
These individuals were eliminated from the analysis whenever risk attitudes were 
assessed. Higher values of this variable denote higher levels of risk aversion.  
4.4.2. Dictator game 1 
In the second part of the experiment, subjects played the first dictator game.49 
Thereby, subjects received the general instructions of the game, and were informed that 
the computer would randomly assign them to the role of “participant 1” (the dictator) or 
“participant 2” (the receiver). The game was worded in an unframed, neutral context, in 
which simply an “opportunity” was presented (please refer to Appendix 6.3. 
“Experimental Design”, for the detailed wording of the instructions). Dictators from the 
student/professional sample received an endowment of €5/€20 respectively. All 
endowments were payoff relevant. Instructions further highlighted that the randomly 
matched counterparty would hold only for this part of the experiment and would be 
randomly matched anew for each of the following parts. This was deemed necessary in 
order to enforce the aspect of unconditional kindness described earlier (section 4.2.2.1.). 
Subjects were informed that no money, earned in any part of the games, could be 
transferred to other parts. Next, subjects had to answer comprehension questions to ensure 
their understanding of the payoff function50. Once completed, the computer randomly 
allocated the roles, and the dictator made his/her allocation choice. It was possible to split 
the endowment in cent amounts.51 Notably, the receiver did not obtain any feedback 
 
48 The problem of multiple switching points is a known concern of this instrument (see e.g., Charness et al., 
2013). While Holt and Laury (2002) only observe a share of about 9 percent of subjects with multiple 
switching points, Laury and Holt (2008) observe about 28 percent of their subjects switching more than 
once.  
49 Note, subjects were not informed of playing another dictator game later in the experiment. They were 
simply told there would be several different parts of pay-out relevant games. 
50 In order to avoid potential anchoring heuristics, we presented the comprehension questions with letters 
rather than monetary amounts.  
51 Hence, action space in this game was continuous, and not as usual quasi-continuous, as subjects could 
decide to give any amount, and were not limited to giving in integer dollars. This was also decided on the 
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regarding the dictator’s choice until the very end of the experiment, as we wanted to avoid 
subjects being potentially influenced by such information in the following games. Since 
we are interested in eliciting subjects’ intrinsic preference of altruism/fairness, we aimed 
to exclude any potential mixed motive, i.e., strategic considerations. Therefore, this game 
was played as a “one-shot”, or static game.  
4.4.3. Cooperation game 
In the third part of the experiment, subjects played a standard linear public good 
game with 2 players (see also section 4.2.2.2.).52 For this part of the experiment, subjects 
were randomly matched with a new counterparty. The following monetary payoff 
function (1) was carefully explained to the subjects, providing several in-depth 
calculation examples in the instructions.53  
 
/	/(0&, 0.) = 234567238	 − 	0/ + ;	(0& + 0.) 
 
(1) 
The instructions described the public good neutrally as “the project”. In the 
following, we also refer to this game as the “cooperation game”. The total contribution to 
the project is given by the sum of contributions	0& + 	0.. In our design, the marginal 
payoff from individual i’s contribution to the project, 12#13# = −1 + ; = −0,3 is negative, 
but the social marginal benefits 1∑2#1∑3# = −1 + 2; = 0,4 are positive. As was outlined in 
section 4.2.2.2., the payoff function is designed so that the Pareto optimum is defined by 
subjects contributing everything to the “project”, while the dominant strategy for an 
individual subject is to contribute nothing. Endowments were the same as in the dictator 
game (€5 for the students, €20 for the professional sample). 
 
basis that an equal (50:50) split had to be made available to the subjects, which involved cent amounts in 
the 5 Euro endowment case. We deemed this crucial also for cross-sample comparison reasons.  
52 We decided on a two-player game, rather than a multi- player game as we wanted to minimize the 
coordination aspect and focus rather on the strategic aspect of cooperation, in line with our research 
question. In addition, while a public good game with two individuals is often argued to be like a classic 
prisoners’ dilemma game, the games are not identical. The voluntary contribution mechanism in the public 
good game has a considerably larger strategy set than in the classic prisoners’ dilemma game with only two 
choices, defect/cooperate (see also Isaac and Walker (1988) for a discussion on this).  
53 Thereby, the examples were constructed, ordered and written up in a way to minimize the possibility of 
subjects becoming anchored in their decision choice.  
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After reading the instructions, subjects had to answer six comprehension 
questions54, ensuring that all subjects clearly understood the procedure and the financial 
consequences of their choices. Once all participants had correctly completed the 
comprehension questions, they received further, more detailed game-specific 
information, i.e., that several rounds of the game would be played and that their randomly 
assigned counterparty would remain the same for all rounds played. As we are interested 
in investigating inter-temporal, strategic choices, subjects played ten rounds of the public 
good game. After every round, subjects received feedback about (i) their counterparty’s 
contribution, (ii) their own contribution and (iii) the consequently resulting (potential) 
profit from the respective round. Feedback information in the context of voluntary 
contribution games allows subjects to engage in social comparison, whereby the behavior 
of the counterparty serves as a reference point (Bazerman et al., 1992). This information 
is particularly important when individuals strongly care about how their contribution 
compares to the contribution behavior of the counterparty (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004). 
We decided not to explicitly inform subjects about the exact number of rounds to be 
played - instructions simply stated that they would play “several rounds of the game” – 
as we wanted to avoid behavior of strong iterated thinking. This arguably makes the 
situation more realistic (see Progrebna et al., 2011).55 Finally, participants were informed 
that at the end of the experiment, one of the rounds played would randomly be drawn by 
the computer for compensation purposes. Again, none of the profits earned in current 
rounds could be accumulated or used in following rounds.56 
 
54 Again, the questions were constructed, ordered and written up in a way we believed would minimize the 
possibility of subjects becoming anchored in their decision choices. 
55 It could be argued that noise is generated within our data by not telling subjects about the exact number 
of rounds to be played, as subjects could potentially guess about the exact number of rounds to be played, 
creating end-game effects. However, as subjects were aware that there would be more parts in the 
experiment (of which they had no detailed information, i.e., regarding their required time frames) we 
believe it was hard and unlikely for them to make estimates in this regard.  
56 We further decided not to elicit subjects’ beliefs regarding the actions of the counterparty, as beliefs do 
not allow us to distinguish between free-riders and distrustful conditional co-operators, i.e., those that 
contribute nothing and believe the other will not contribute anything either and people that contribute 
nothing because they believe others will contribute nothing (see Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). 
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4.4.4. Dictator game 2 
Once the public good game was completed, participants continued with part four of 
the experiment – which presented the last game. Here, subjects played another one-shot 
dictator game, this time taking the opposite role as in the first dictator game (i.e., if they 
were allocated the role of the receiver in the first dictator game, they were now allocated 
the dictator role and vice versa if they held the role of the dictator in the first game). The 
counterparty was randomly matched anew by the computer – this was stressed in the 
instructions. Endowments (levels identical as in the previous games) and allocation 
choices were pay-out relevant. Subjects received feedback regarding the dictator’s 
allocation choice at the end of the experiment, once the questionnaire, described below 
(see section 4.7), was completed. 
4.4.5. Stake size 
We varied stake sizes for the incentive compatible part of the experiment (i.e., the 
Holt and Laury lottery, the dictator game, and the public good game) within the 
professional crowd57 (entrepreneurs and other professionals working within the start-up 
industry), while all student subjects played for the same stakes. Thereby, the low-stake 
size in the sample of professionals was identical to the amounts applied in the student 
sample (i.e., a €5 endowment in the dictator and public good game), while the high-stake 
size was scaled by a factor of four (i.e., a €20 endowment in the dictator and public good 
game). Our reasoning for varying stake sizes was twofold: 
 
(1) The first reason is the classic argument of opportunity costs: as entrepreneurs and 
professionals in relation to students face generally higher opportunity costs when 
participating in decision-making experiments, the pay-out structure of experiments 
has to account for these different cost structures, so as to maintain the criteria of 
satiable rewards (Vernon Smith, 1979). Hence, rewards in experiments are usually 
scaled up by a certain factor when dealing with professionals rather than student 
 
57 At the ECFI all sessions were conducted with high stakes. At TOA two sessions were conducted as low-
stake treatment and two sessions as high-stake treatments. It was randomly decided at the beginning of the 
experimental session whether the session would be played as high or low-stake treatment. This was done 
by letting a randomly chosen subject pick from a choice of sealed envelopes and hand it to the experimenter 
(in which a piece of paper stated “high” or “low”). The subject did not know about the implications of her 
choice and did not see the envelope’s content. 
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subjects. In line with other studies (i.e., Sandri et al., 2010), we scaled the pay-outs 
by a factor of four for our professional sample. 
(2) We nonetheless decided to additionally run the experiment with low stakes in the 
professional sample. This was done on order to check whether results obtained across 
stake sizes are comparable – hence, whether stake size matters in these games, as the 
evidence in this regard is rather mixed.58 Further, as the entrepreneurial crowd was 
already attending the conferences anyway, it is debatable whether the opportunity 
cost in such an instance is as high as otherwise. Maybe lower pay-outs in such a case 
can still produce reliable findings at lower experimental costs.  
 
However, looking at the data of the professionals’ sample, we obtained 
considerably diverging results in the case of low stakes, suggesting the data in this 
instance to be potentially unreliable. Table A X, Appendix 6.3. summarizes these results. 
The interpretation of these findings become in particular difficult, as we cannot strictly 
disentangle the potential effect of stake size to the potential effect of experimental design 
(for example, did a certain experience in the cooperation game (partially) affect these 
results, potentially even in interaction with stake size; or are the observed findings 
completely independent of game experience?). Based on this vagueness, as well as the 
aforementioned mixed evidence in the context of games and stake size, we decided to 
approach this conservatively. In order to create an incentivized preference revealing 
context, the assurance of satiability of rewards is paramount for us (reason 1 above). 
Consequently, we decided to exclude the low stake data of the professional subject pool. 
While resulting in a smaller sample size, the quality of the data is thereby ensured. In the 
 
58 There is mixed evidence regarding the strategic effect of different stake sizes on players. While most 
studies found no difference in this regard (Forsythe et al. (1994); List and Cherry (2008) in case of the 
dictator game; Hoffman et al. (1996) and Slonim and Roth (1998) using the ultimatum game; Carpenter et 
al. (2005), applying both dictator and ultimatum game; Fehr et al. (2002) for the gift-exchange game; Clark 
and Sefton (2001) for a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma game; Kocher et al. (2008) for a linear public good 
game). Others found a negative correlation between stake size and contribution behavior (Johannson-
Stenman et al., 2005 in the trust game; Andersen et al. (2011) in the ultimatum game (however, it should 
be noted, that the stakes in this study were very high (some as high as an average annual income). In Engel’s 
(2011) meta-study on the dictator game, the author finds a significant negative effect on dictators’ allocation 
decisions for high stakes. Camerer et al. (1999) deal with the literature of stake size within bargaining 
games and conclude that stake size within this context does not affect subject’s average level of self-interest, 
but that higher stakes potentially decrease the variance of subjects’ behavior. Within this context, also risk 
aversion might play a significant role.  
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rest of the paper, we will consequently only deal with and analyze the data generated in 
the high-stake scenario.59  
4.4.6. Pay-out structure 
 Subjects’ total pay-outs were based on the previously described four parts and 
determined at the very end of the experiment. Thereby, for the first part (Holt and Laury 
lottery) the computer randomly chose one of the ten lottery pairs relevant for pay-out. For 
the dictator game, subjects were paid out the money they decided to keep for themselves 
(when allocated the role as dictator) and the money they (potentially) received (in the role 
of the receiver). Finally, as previously described, one of the ten rounds of the cooperation 
game were randomly selected for pay-out.  
 
Figure 3 summarizes the structure and important details of the incentive compatible 
part of our experiment.  
 
Figure 3: Summary of game structure for the elicitation of social preferences 
 
4.4.7. Questionnaire 
The experiment concluded with a questionnaire, collecting additional (control) 
variables. First, subjects had to answer some general demographic or business-related 
questions. There are slight variations in relation to these questions between the 
professional and student sample, based on the relevance (in Appendix 6.3. the 
questionnaires of the professionals and students are outlined separately). Entrepreneurs 
for example had to indicate how social they would consider their business. We collected 
the variable on a Likert-scale from 1 to 7: 1= operate a social business; 7= not at all social 
 
59 More information / data on this can be requested from the authors upon request. 
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business. A social business was thereby defined as follows: “a social business intends to 
explore and exploit opportunities to create social value while also pursuing financial 
goals. This includes any kinds of activities that have particularly social, environmental, 
or community objectives.” This definition was inspired by the GEM report on social 
entrepreneurship (see also Bosma et al., 2016). 
 
Students next had to answer questions regarding their entrepreneurial intentions 
(EI). Following the approach by Urbig et al. (2012), we measured this construct using a 
5-item measure developed by Chen et al. (1998). Example items include “How interested 
are you in setting up your business” and “How likely is it that you will set up your own 
business in the near future.” Responses to items were averaged to form an overall 
measure of entrepreneurial intention. Higher scores thereby represent greater levels of 
entrepreneurial intentions.60 Next, we measured trust, using the traditional questions from 
the German socioeconomic panel (SOEP). Then, participants answered questions 
eliciting personal values based on Schwartz’s value theory (Schwartz, 1992).61 The data 
in regards to trust and values will not be analyzed for the purpose of this paper.  
 
As Weitzel et al. (2010) find individuals to differ significantly in their allocation 
choices towards others, based on their scores in relation to entrepreneurial self-efficacy 
(in particular in relation to their scores on business vs. creative talent), we control for 
these aspects in our experimental design. For measuring entrepreneurial self-efficacy, we 
collect the same items as done in their research paper (based on Wilson et al., 2007; Zhao 
et al. 2005; Monsen62). In total 12 items are collected (please refer to Appendix 6.3. for 
the listing and exact wording of the items). On a 7-point Likert-scale, subjects had to rate 
their confidence regarding their ability to perform creative or business tasks (i.e., ability 
to be creative; ability to manage money) relative to their peers. These two factors will 
 
60 Students were additionally asked questions about their personality (see paper 4 for details) and 
unproductive and productive entrepreneurial motives (Hmieleski and Lerner, 2016). This data will be 
evaluated in detail in the fourth paper of this dissertation.   
61 Using the World Values Survey (WVS) - this instrument measures the ten basic, motivationally different 
values proposed by Schwartz’s value theory (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Spini, 2003): Power, achievement, 
hedonism, stimulations, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. 
62 The items by Monsen were suggested verbally during the study (see Weitzel et al, 2010 for details). 
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later be employed for testing their impact on contribution behavior for the student and 
professionals subject pool. 
 
This concludes the description of the experimental design and procedure. We next 
present the data and its analysis.  
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4.5. Data and Results 
4.5.1. Demographics: Entrepreneurs and professionals  
Across the two conferences a total of N=82 subjects participated. In the following, 
we also refer to these subjects as entrepreneurial crowd: n=46 stem thereby from the 
ECFI in Hamburg and n=36 from the TOA in Berlin. The sample’s average age is M=32 
years (S.D.=7.39) and consists to 80.5 percent (S.D.=0.398) of males.  
 
As we are particularly interested in the behavior and decision-making of 
entrepreneurs, we split the entrepreneurial crowd sample at times into the sub-samples of 
entrepreneurs63 (E) (n=55) and start-up employees, collaborators and investors (ECI) 
(n=27).64 The gender ratio amounts to 90.9 percent (S.D.=0.2901) male subjects in the 
sub-sample of entrepreneurs and 59.3 percent (S.D.=0.5007) in the sub-sample of start-
up employees, collaborators and investors (ECI). While this ratio appears unbalanced, in 
particular in case of the entrepreneurs, it is unfortunately reflective of the current gender 
ratio in the start-up industry. According to the German start-up monitor (2016), the ratio 
of female founders within the German start-up industry amounts to 13.9 percent. 
Correspondingly, the Diana Project65 (2014), investigating the gender gap within the 
venture capital industry, finds that out of all US companies receiving venture capital, only 
15 percent to have at least one woman on the executive team. 
 
Most subjects in our professional sample grew up in Europe (84.2 percent) and/or 
live there now (92.5 percent).66 The average working experience amounts to M=4.73 
years (S.D.=5.29) for the entrepreneurs and M=4.26 years (S.D.=4.184) for the start-up 
ECIs. The average pay-out for this sample group was 52.15 Euros.  
 
63 Individuals who founded a venture either by themselves or as part of a founding team.  
64 This sample consists of professionals with different background: e.g., employees of the start-up and 
technology industry (16 percent), consultants (14 percent), engineers/developers (12 percent), product 
managers (14 percent), creative artists (12 percent), and others (12 percent), such as business angels.  
65 This project was funded by the Kauffman Foundation, the U.S. Small Business Administration, the 
National Women’s Business Council, and the Swedish Institute for Small Business Research. 
66 We control for culture as it has been shown to be a potential influencer in these types of decision settings 
(i.e., Henrich, 2000). 
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4.5.2. Demographics: Student subjects 
We collected data on N=62 student subjects. The average age of this sample is M= 
23 years (S.D.=2.59). Thereby, females constitute 53.2 percent. We recruited students via 
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and exclusively from the faculty of economics and business.67 
Again, most subjects (93.5 percent) grew up in Europe. Average pay-outs were 13.47 
Euros. 
4.5.3. Comparison of conferences 
Before analyzing the games section of our experiment, we controlled if the data of 
the two conferences could be merged or whether results across conferences differed 
significantly. We did this by comparing the behavior of both dictator games, as well as 
the first round of the public good game. The first round of the public good game is 
analyzed separately from the other rounds of the game, as it constitutes an initial condition 
to cooperation (also termed first-period play) and is consequently unrelated to any 
learning. Results of all games show, using Wilcoxon rank sum tests, no significant 
differences for the contribution behavior of the ECFI and the TOA.68  We consequently 
merge the data of the conferences and proceed with the analysis. 
4.5.4. Analysis: Dictator game  
We start our analysis by looking at the behavior in the dictator game(s). Recall that 
each individual played the dictator game twice, but was only once in the role of the 
dictator (and once in the role of the receiver). Table 18 below demonstrates that our 
entrepreneurial crowd sample (separated by entrepreneurs and start-up ECIs) exhibits 
very similar allocation choices in both dictator games. Fairness considerations within the 
entrepreneurial crowd sample appear to be consistent, independent of whether you 
 
67 Thereby, 50 percent studied economics, 35 percent studied business, 10 percent studied a combination of 
economics and business, and about 5 percent majored in statistical methods. 
68Results for DG1: M=6.89, S.D.=3.34 and M=6.8, S.D.=3.95 respectively; z= 0.13, p=0.89. Results for 
public good game: M=14.39, S.D. =5.83 and M=12.21, S.D.=6.55 respectively; p=0.13. Results for DG 2: 
M=8.01, S.D.=6.41 and M=7.22, S.D.=3.81 respectively; z=0.367; p=0.71.  Using simple regression 
analysis, with contributions (% of endowment) made to the receiver/to the public good as the dependent 
variable, and controlling in addition to conference type also for group type (dummy variable termed 
entrepreneur) and gender, we find no significant relationship between the contribution behavior and 
conference type for both dictator games and the contribution behavior in the public good game. 
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actually own and operate a business – or ‘simply’ work within or closely associated to 
the start–up industry.  
 
Table 18: Summary statistics DG1 and DG 2: Entrepreneurs and Start-up ECIs 
Allocation (in % of endowment) of dictator to receiver: Dictator Game 1 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Entrepreneurs 23 34.65% 0.1795 0 0.5 
Start-up ECI 18 33.89% 0.1828 0 0.75 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test:     
E vs. ECI:  z=0.6; p=0.54 
  
Allocation (in % of endowment) of dictator to receiver: Dictator Game 2 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Entrepreneurs  32 38.03% 0.2551 0 1 
Start-up ECI 9 39.44% 0.3311 0 1 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test:     
E vs. ECI: z=0.148; p=0.88 
 
Due to the very similar behavior in this group and in order to increase statistical 
power, we join the data of the entrepreneurial crowd and compare their behavior to that 
of our student subjects in the dictator game.  
 
Comparing the professionals’ average donations to those of the student sample (see 
Table 19), we observe the entrepreneurial crowd to allocate on average M=34.3 percent 
(S.D.=0.1787) of their endowment to the receiver in DG1, while students allocate 
M=26.38 percent (S.D.=0.2472). The entrepreneurial crowd allocates hence, relative to 
the student sample, 30 percent more of their endowment to the receiver. The result is 
marginally significant using a Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (z=-1.650; p=0.09). The 
difference between the two groups is even more pronounced in the dictator game played 
after the cooperation game (DG2), and highly significant (z=3.805; p=0.000). We 
observe in DG2 relative to DG1, the entrepreneurial crowd subjects on average to slightly 
increase their allocations to the receiver (from E56&=34.31 percent to E56.=38.34 
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percent), while student subjects demonstrate a pronounced decrease in their allocation 
levels (from E56&=26.38 percent to E56.=14.92 percent). 
 
Table 19: Summary statistics DG1 and DG 2: Entrepreneurial crowd and students 
Allocation (as % of endowment) of dictator to receiver: Dictator Game 1 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Entrepreneurial crowd 41 34.31% 0.1787 0 0.75 
Students 31 26.38% 0.2472 0 0.98 
 Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: z=-1.650; p=0.09 
Allocation (as % of endowment) of dictator to receiver: Dictator Game 2 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Entrepreneurial crowd 41 38.34% 0.2691 0 1 
Students 31 14.92% 0.1910 0 0.5 
 Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: z=-3.805; p=0.000 
 
The data hence suggests that subjects who made their allocation choice in the role 
of the dictator after playing the cooperation game might have been influenced by the 
ordering of the games, and that this is not linear across the groups of students and 
professionals, but that students are more strongly affected by this ordering effect. 
Consequently, when joining the data of the dictator games in the following regression 
analyses, we control for the ordering of the games, as well as interaction effects in relation 
to group type (student vs. entrepreneurial crowd). The dummy variable in this case is 
termed game experience and equal to one, if the subject is allocated the role of the dictator 
after having played the cooperation game and zero otherwise. 
 
Table 20 summarizes the hierarchical regressions analyses. The results of the Tobit 
regressions show that in comparison to the student sample, the entrepreneurial crowd to 
allocate significantly more funds to the receiver (β=0.265; p=0.000), demonstrating 
higher levels of altruism or fairness considerations. The finding remains highly significant 
when controlling for game order (2) (β=0.264; p=0.000), as well as for an interaction 
effect between the group and game order variables (3) (β=0.167; p=0.025).69 As risk 
 
69 Note, also when running the regression separately for DG1 and DG2, the entrepreneurial crowd still 
allocates significantly more to the receiver (in DG1: β=0.151; p=0.024, in DG2: β=0.401; p=0.000). 
Regression results are provided in Appendix 6.3., Table A XII. 
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preferences did not enter any of the regression analyses significantly (or change the 
regressions’ output in any way), we dropped risk from the further analysis in order to be 
able to increase our sample size (as this allowed us to include those subjects violating the 
EUT assumptions in the Holt and Laury lottery), see Table A XI, Appendix 6.3. for output 
regressions with risk.  
 
Table 20: Tobit regressions - Dictator game 
Dependent variable: Individual contributions (as % of endowment) 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
Entrepreneurial crowd 0.265*** 0.264*** 0.167** 
  (0.0573) (0.0573) (0.0737) 
Male -0.124** -0.118** -0.127** 
  (0.0585) (0.0591) (0.0583) 
Game Experience - -0.0309 -0.149* 
    (0.0521) (0.0794) 
Entrepreneurial crowd*Game experience   - 0.203* 
      (0.103) 
Constant 0.176*** 0.188*** 0.250*** 
  (0.0478) (0.0522) (0.0596) 
Sigma 0.298 0.298 0.293 
  (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0220) 
Number of individuals 144 144 144 
Log Likelihood -61.07 -60.894 -58.99 
LR χ2 21.41 21.77 25.560 
(Prob.>χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs. censored at zero 40 40 40 
Obs. censored at one 2 2 2 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01     
 
In line with past findings (i.e., Eckel and Grossman, 1998), we find males to allocate 
significantly less money to their counterparty. In the third regression (3), we see the 
interaction effect (p=0.052), depicted also in Graph 3 below, as well as the dummy of 
game order (p=0.062) to be marginally significant.  
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Graph 3: Interaction effect: game order*subject type 
 
 
Next, we investigate the relationship of entrepreneurial self-efficacy, split into 
creative (CT) and business talent (BT)70, and in case of the student sample also the impact 
of entrepreneurial intent, onto the behavior in the dictator game.  
Entrepreneurial self-efficacy and entrepreneurial intentions in the dictator game 
We start by comparing behavior of students scoring high on the scale of 
entrepreneurial intent, to the behavior of the entrepreneurs in our sample. Therefore, we 
run a median-split procedure, separating student subjects71 into those with high 
entrepreneurial intentions (scoring above median), who in research studies would 
represent the “entrepreneurs” and those scoring below the median values (the “non-
entrepreneurs”). Comparing their average contributions, via a simple t-test, we find no 
significant differences (t=-0.6404; p=0.2622) between the allocation choices of “student 
entrepreneurs” (M=22.66 percent, S.D.=0.2033) and those scoring low on entrepreneurial 
intent (M=18.98 percent, S.D.=0.2485). Looking at the regression output for the student 
sample in Table 21, these findings are supported. The variable of entrepreneurial intent is 
insignificant for predicting (higher) contributions to the receiver in the dictator game.72 
Further, we find in our student sample no significant association between entrepreneurial 
 
70 In line with Weitzel et al. (2010), we ran a principal factor analysis (promax rotation) to confirm that we 
could separate BT and CT in the same manner.  
71 This variable was, for somewhat obvious reasons, collected exclusively for the student sample.  
72 We also ran tests of correlation (both Spearman and Kendall) confirming the results of the regression.  
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self-efficacy (both business and creative talent) and the dictator’s allocation choices. The 
coefficient of gender is significant (ß=-2.05; p=0.03). Males allocate less to the receiver, 
as was observed in the earlier regressions and in line with past findings (e.g., Eckel and 
Grossman, 1998).  
 
Table 21: Psychometric variables in the dictator game: Tobit regressions 
Dependent variable: Individual contributions (as % of endowment) 
Variable Entrepreneurs ECI Students 
Male -0.116 0.050 -0.205** 
  (0.117) (0.116) (0.0923) 
Entrepreneurial Intent - - 0.0293 
      (0.0469) 
Creative Skills 0.077* -0.0104 0.070 
  (0.0413) (0.0839) (0.0606) 
Business Skills -0.224*** -0.0641 -0.0995 
  (0.0674) (0.111) (0.0864) 
Game Experience  0.0887 0.0482 -0.0934 
  (0.0704) (0.116) (0.0938) 
constant 0.917*** 0.555 0.274 
  (0.255) (0.397) (0.267) 
Sigma 0.239 0.275 0.317 
  (0.0267) (0.0441) (0.0415) 
Number of individuals 55 27 63 
Log Likelihood -11.00 -8.99 -29.79 
LR χ2 0.0235 0.71 11.95 
(Prob.>χ2)   0.9503 0.035 
Obs. censored at zero 9 4 27 
Obs. censored at one 1 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01     
 
 
Turning to the findings for the entrepreneurs (column 1), we find a highly 
significant negative influence of business skills (ß=-0.224; p<0.01) onto dictators’ 
allocation choices. Creative talent affects entrepreneurs’ donations to the receiver 
positively, the finding is marginally significant (ß=0.077; p=0.068). The signs of both 
coefficients are in line with the findings by Weitzel et al. (2010) and Urbig et al. (2012).  
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In the sample of ECI, both business and creative talent are insignificant for 
predicting donation levels. We find creative talent to be irrelevant for start-up ECIs (ß=-
0.010, p=0.903). The gender variable in both groups (entrepreneurs and ECI) is 
insignificant, likely due to the imbalanced gender proportion in this sample (see section 
4.5.1.). An alternative explanation for this finding could be that past research has shown 
that females, self-selecting themselves into business contexts such as the vocation of 
entrepreneurship, to be frequently systematically different in their behavior in comparison 
to other females (Artinger and Schade, 2013).  
 
We also investigated whether entrepreneurs in our sample are influenced in their 
allocation choice by the way they operate their business, in a social sense (see section 
4.2.2.1.). We expected entrepreneurs, who run a (self-reported) social business to be more 
likely to make higher allocation choices in the dictator game. However, interestingly no 
significant relationship was found in this matter (β=-0.011; p=0.576).73  
 
This completes our analysis of the dictator game. Next, we analyze the data of the 
2-player public good game, measuring cooperative tendencies. 
  
 
73 The detailed statistical results in this regard are provided in Appendix 6.3., Table A XIII.  
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4.5.5. Analysis: Cooperation game  
Analyzing the data of the cooperation game, we observe – contrary to the findings 
of the dictator game data - significant differences concerning the contribution choices of 
entrepreneurs and start-up ECIs (see Table 22). We consequently refrain from joining the 
data, as was done for the analysis of the dictator game, but look at the results of these two 
groups separately. 
Initial levels of cooperation 
We start by evaluating the allocation choices in the first round of the game. Thus, 
analyzing the initial willingness to cooperate, before any learning regarding the 
counterparty’s behavior was possible. 
 
Table 22 summarizes the average allocation levels74 for the groups of entrepreneurs 
(E), start-up employees, collaborators and investors (ECI), and students respectively. We 
observe entrepreneurs, in relation to the other groups, to allocate significantly more funds 
to the project (M=73 percent), while the allocation choices of students and start-up ECIs 
are similar (M=55.33 percent and M=54.23 percent respectively) and in line with 
contribution levels observed in past research, which frequently amounts to approximately 
50% of the endowment (see i.e., Cookson, 2000; Croson, 1996; Andreoni, 1988).  
  
 
74 As was done in the dictator game, average allocation levels are measured as a percentage of the 
endowment, in order to be able to compare behavior across the different levels of endowment between 
students and entrepreneurs. 
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Table 22: Average allocations for the initial willingness to cooperate by groups 
  
Average allocation (in % of endowment) to the project in the first round of the game 
 Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Entrepreneur (E) 55 73.00% 0.2948 0 1 
Start-up ECI 27 55.33% 0.3147 0 1 
Student 62 54.23% 0.3678 0 1 
      
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: Cooperation game    
E vs. ECI E vs. Students ECI vs. Students    
z=-2.463; p=0.013 z=-2.796; p=0.005 z=-0.027; p=0.978    
 
The results of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests confirm entrepreneurs’ allocation 
choices in the first round to be significantly different to those of start-up ECIs (z=-2.463; 
p=0.013) and students (z=-2.796; p=0.005).75  
 
The Tobit regression for initial individual average cooperation levels is depicted in 
Table 23 below. The results confirm entrepreneurs to allocate significantly more funds to 
the project than ECIs (β=-0.268, p=0.048) and students (β=-0.268, p=0.021). The effect 
size is identical for students and non-entrepreneurs. Gender plays no influence in the 
context of the cooperation game.  
 
75 To get a better understanding of our sample and their respective cooperative behavior, we also classified 
subjects’ behavior based on their contribution choice in the first round of the public good game. 
Classification regarding cooperative dispositions has been suggested as useful. Andreoni (1995) for 
example argues that the regularly observed decline of contributions over multiple rounds in the public good 
game is due to co-operators becoming discouraged by their free-riding counterparties. Kurzban and Houser 
(2005) divide their subjects into co-operators, free-riders and reciprocators, based on their endowment 
proportion contributed to the pool, and their reaction to their co-player’s contributions. Their findings 
suggest stable individual differences in cooperative dispositions. Thereby, it should be noted that the 
literature does not provide a clearly defined theoretical cut-off point which determines whether an 
individual classifies as free rider or co-operator. Hence, splitting our sample into such types of group 
classifications involves some degree of arbitrariness. We follow the approach of Isaac and Walker (1988) 
and classify someone as a “co-operator”, if the contribution in the first round of the cooperation game 
exceeds 33 percent of the endowment; otherwise, (contributing 33 percent or less) subjects are classified as 
“free- rider”. A similar approach has been used by Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007) – where the cut-off value 
was set at 30 percent. The details of the chi-squared test for differences in distributions are provided in the 
Appendix, section 6.3., Table A XVII. Findings show that we have significantly (p<0.05) more free riders 
in the sub-groups of start-up professionals and students, while there are more entrepreneurs in the “co-
operator” classification. Again, this confirms the finding of our previous analysis identifying the group of 




Table 23: Initial cooperation levels - Tobit regression 
Individual contributions (as % of endowment) in t=1 
Start-up ECI -0.268** 
  (0.135) 
Student -0.268** 
  (0.115) 
Male 0.0970 
  (0.107) 
Constant 0.802*** 
  (0.124) 
Sigma 0.527 
  (0.0463) 
Number of individuals 144 
Log Likelihood -122.306 
LR χ2 10.85 
(Prob.>χ2) 0.0126 
Obs. censored at zero 15 
Obs. censored at one 46 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01   
  
 
We next investigate how individuals change their allocation choices over time in 
the game (across the ten rounds played). This provides us with insights regarding the 
strategic or reciprocal nature of their cooperation, i.e., how (un)conditional their 
cooperation is upon the cooperation of the counterparty.  
Average levels of cooperation 
Graph 4 below depicts the average contribution behavior per round for the three 
groups respectively. In relation to past public good game research (e.g., Isaac and Walker, 
1988; Ledyard, 1995; Andreoni, 1988; Fehr and Gächter, 2000), we observe generally 
similar contribution trends over time, although there are some large variations within our 
sample. Contributions decline from the first to the last round by 33.65 percent for 
entrepreneurs, by 26.37 percent for start-up ECIs, and by only 11.76 percent for students. 
However, due to the high initial levels of cooperation, in particular in case of the 
entrepreneurs, we also end up with high average contributions in the last round: 
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E789:7;:787<:((>1.&@)=54.62 percent; E(9<1789((>1.&@)=47.85 percent and 
E(9B:9C<;	,*E	(>1.&@) =40.74 percent – this is in comparison to i.e., 18.1 percent in 
Andreoni and Petrie (2004) and 10.6 percent in Croson (1996).  
 
Graph 4: Average individual contributions over time by group. 
  
 
In none of our groups do we observe declines even close to complete free riding. 
Despite displaying the strongest allocation decline across the game, we still observe 
entrepreneurs to make consistently higher allocation choices in comparison to the other 
two groups. Table 24 summarizes the average contribution levels across all ten rounds 













RD .  1 RD . 2 RD .  3 RD .  4 RD .  5 RD .  6 RD .  7 RD .  8 RD .  9 RD .  1 0
Entrepreneurs Start-Up ECI Students
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Table 24: Average allocation levels to the project (all 10 rounds) by group 
Average allocation (in % of endowment) to the project across all 10 rounds  
  Obs Mean S. D. Min Max 
Entrepreneur 55 58.48% 0.2615 0.148 1 
Start-up ECI 27 47.86% 0.2530 0 1 
Students 62 47.48% 0.3771 0 1 
            
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: Cooperation game       
E vs. ECI E vs. Students ECI vs. Students       
z=1.708; p=0.088 1.824; p=0.068 z=0.201; p=0.841       
 
While we see a marginally significant effect for the comparison of entrepreneurs in 
relation to the other two groups (see Table 24), we lose valuable information, particularly 
in relation to strategic concerns, by considering only average allocations over time.  
 
As a consequence, in the following we run random effects Tobit regressions, using 
all ten rounds of play. The panel data analysis takes into account all ten choices made per 
subject, and further controls for right and left censoring (i.e., making zero contribution to 
the project or contributing the entire endowment to the project). Thereby, the dependent 
variable presents the subject’s contribution to the “project”. Exogenous variables include 
the group variable (entrepreneurs being the omitted category), gender, and a variable 
controlling for conditional cooperation. Thereby, we follow the approach by Croson et 
al. (2005). The variable takes into account the amount the subject’s counterparty 
contributed to the project in t-1.76 As the aim of this research is to detect potential 
differences in ORP for these groups, we also include an interaction term between the 
group variable and conditional cooperation (reflecting reciprocal tendencies, since what 
you give in the current period t is dependent on what you received from your counterparty 




76 We also controlled whether it made a difference if you were allocated the role of the dictator in DG1, or 
not (similar to the variable game order). No influence of game order was found, and the rest of the results 
stayed quantitatively the same.  
77 We assume uncorrelated standard errors over the repeated responses at the pairs level. We additionally 
performed a robustness check with standard clustered errors using Tobit regressions. Results remain robust.  
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Table 25: Cooperation game - Random effects Tobit regression 
Individual contributions (as % of endowment)  
Conditional Cooperation 0.361*** 
 (0.0745) 
Start-up ECI -0.321* 
  (0.164) 
Student -0.502*** 
  (0.145) 
Male -0.056 
  (0.123) 
Conditional cooperation*ECI 0.202 
  (0.129) 
Conditional cooperation*student 0.616*** 
  (0.128) 
Constant 0.540*** 
 (0.146) 
Number of individuals 144 
Number of observations 1368 
Obs. censored at zero 361 
Obs. censored at one 410 
Log Likelihood -925.266 
Wald χ2 133.390 
(Prob.>χ2) 0.000 






Standard errors in parentheses; *p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
We find subjects to condition their behavior on the allocation choices of their 
counterparty in the previous period (β=0.361; p=0.000). More interestingly, start-up ECIs 
allocate less funds to the project than entrepreneurs (β=-0.321, p=0.051); this effect is 
even more pronounced for the students and highly significant (β=-0.502, p=0.001). The 




This is in line with other past research, reporting no systematic differences between male 
and female contribution behavior in public good experiments (see Ledyard, 1995; Eckel 
and Grossman, 2008).  
We see both students and start-up ECIs to be more conditionally cooperative than 
entrepreneurs (as both coefficients of the interaction terms are positive). This holds in 
particular for the students. Their cooperation is significantly more conditional than the 
entrepreneurs’ (p<0.01). Hence, students are systematically more influenced by 
reciprocal considerations in the given decision-making context. This is also observable 
from the slopes depicted in Graph 5 below.  
 























Interaction Effect: Cond. Cooperation * Group (with 95% CIs)
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Entrepreneurial self-efficacy and entrepreneurial intent in the cooperation game 
We finally investigate the impact of the psychometric variables, namely 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy and entrepreneurial intent, onto the behavior in the 
cooperation game. Thereby, we distinguish the connection in regards to initial 
cooperation and cooperation throughout the game (see Table 26 below). Further, results 
are reported for the entrepreneurial crowd, as well as for its individual sub-samples, 
namely entrepreneurs and start-up ECIs. 
 
Starting with initial cooperation, none of the psychometric variables (neither 
entrepreneurial intent nor entrepreneurial self-efficacy) significantly impact allocation 
choices to the project (regression results are presented in Appendix 6.3., Table A XIX). 
This holds for the student as well as for the entrepreneurial crowd sample.78 Analyzing 
the impact of business and creative talent on allocation choices of entrepreneurs and ECIs 
separately, we find none of the psychometric variables to significantly influence 
entrepreneur’s initial cooperation levels. For the sample of start-up employees, 
collaborators, and investors (ECI), we do find a marginally significant negative influence 
of business talent onto allocation levels in the first round of the game (b=-0.277, 
p=0.064). Creative talent (b=0.024, p=0.826) is not significant in this context.  
 
Looking at cooperative choices throughout the game (running a Tobit random-
effects regression, see Table 26) the findings are similar to the initial cooperation results. 
We find none of the self-efficacy variables to significantly influence entrepreneurs’ and 
students’ allocation choices. For the subsamples of start-up employees, collaborators and 
investors (ECI), we do find a highly significant negative relationship between business 




78 We do however find the variable of gender to be highly significant and positive (β=0.399, p=0.003), a 
result we view with some caution, given the specificity of the sample constellation, and past research in 
this field (i.e., Ledyard, 1995; Eckel and Grossman, 2008). 
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Table 26: Psychometric variables in the cooperation game. Tobit random-effects regression 
Dependent variable: Individual contributions (as % of endowment) 
Variable Entrepreneurs ECI Students 
Male -0.0547 0.0516 0.211 
  (0.281) (0.168) (0.275) 
Entrepreneurial Intent - - -0.0706 
    (0.140) 
Creative Skills -0.0181 0.108 0.228 
  (0.0972) (0.119) (0.176) 
Business Skills -0.222 -0.433*** -0.0703  
  (0.155) (0.165) (0.255) 
constant 1.665*** 1.554*** 0.107 
  (0.614) (0.588) (0.797) 
Number of individuals 55 27 62 
Number of obs. 550 270 620 
Obs. censored at zero 102 56 212 
Obs. censored at one 190 160 189 
Log Likelihood -476.25 -201.83 -365.38 
Wald χ2 2.67 7.21 2.09 
(Prob.>χ2) 0.445 0.065 0.719 




0.543 0.379 0.951 
  0.557 0.421 0.413 
         ρ 0.487 0.449 0.841 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
Next, we summarize and discuss our findings, consider the potential limitations of 






4.6.1. Findings for the dictator game 
Summarizing the findings in relation to the preference of altruism or fairness 
considerations, we find entrepreneurs as well as start-up employees, collaborators, and 
investors to make systematically higher allocation choices to the receiver in the dictator 
game than student subjects. This finding hence only partially supports our first 
hypotheses, namely that entrepreneurs allocate more funds to the recipient than both of 
the other natural groups in our sample (students and start-up ECIs). While this finding 
is noteworthy, the interpretation is not an easy one. We know from past studies (List, 
2004; Carpenter et al., 2008; Burks et al. 2009; Falk et al., 2013) that “[…]  students in 
the laboratory tend to produce the lower bound of social preference measures.” (Burks et 
al., 2009, p. 459). This also holds for our findings. However, given that a large share of 
entrepreneurs (as well as ECIs) are likely to have studied business and economics before 
embarking onto their vocation as entrepreneurs, our findings do indicate that social 
preferences might either not be as stable as suggested (i.e., De Oliverira et al., 2012), or 
that the context of workplace indeed plays a considerable role, or both.  
 
Comparing our results to those of Engel’s (2010) meta-study of dictator games 
(Engel reports a range between about 27 percent and 38 percent of endowment), we find 
the allocation levels of the entrepreneurial crowd (M=36.33 percent) to be at the “upper-
end” range, while our student subjects (M=20.74 percent) are playing even “tougher” than 
the results provided by Engel (2010). Based on these numbers, we may conclude that 
there appear to be considerable concerns of altruism/fairness within the start-up industry. 
It would be interesting to observe in future studies how these findings compare to other 
professions (i.e., from the financial and/or medical sector).  
 
 Somewhat surprisingly, but in line with the findings by Jänicke and Lauritzen 
(2019), we do not find a relationship between the behavior in the dictator game and the 
(self-reported) measure of a social business. Hence, our findings do not support our 
second hypothesis. This clearly raises the question as to how the shaping of social 
preferences exactly manifests into the daily as well as long-term decision-making of 
entrepreneurs, something we did (apart from the social business variable) not control for 
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in our experimental design. As this information would also provide insights regarding the 
external validity of our findings, we invite future research to further investigate this 
aspect.  
 
Another interesting finding, less connected to entrepreneurship research but 
valuable for experimental research, presents the observation that students appear to be 
more influenced by the ordering of the games. While students strongly decreased their 
allocations in DG2, relative to DG1, entrepreneurial subjects slightly increased their 
donations in DG2. We invite future research to further investigate this aspect, as this 
might be in particular relevant for studies investigating a range of economic games as a 
within-subject design.  
4.6.2. Findings for the cooperation game 
We observe entrepreneurs, in comparison to both students as well as start-up 
employees, collaborators, and investors (ECIs) to exhibit a significantly higher initial 
willingness to cooperate in the public good game. While entrepreneurs allocate on 
average M=73 percent of their endowment to the public good in the first round of play, 
students and ECIs both allocate on average about M=55 percent.  
 
Considering all periods of play, we again observe entrepreneurs to allocate 
consistently (in all rounds) more funds to the ‘project’ than both students and ECIs. Our 
findings hence indicate entrepreneurs, in line with our third hypothesis, to hold stronger 
concerns for pro-social behavior when it comes to the context of cooperation. As argued 
in section 4.2.2., this finding is most likely driven by the unique conditions of the 
entrepreneurial environment, facilitating or shaping social norms conducive for 
cooperation.  Entrepreneurs appear to have (developed over time?) a better understanding 
of the mutual benefits from cooperation in a social dilemma game - which in many ways 
reflect the payoff structures they face in their business operations (i.e., when dealing with 
investors, suppliers and similar, see Cable and Shane (1997) for a nice theoretical 
discussion on this). Hence, the willingness to cooperate might offer a very relevant 
comparative advantage in this context.  
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As was the case for the preference of altruism, we do not find a significant link 
between cooperative preferences and (self-reported) social venturing. While arguably 
somewhat less surprising in this context, it would have still been valuable to get an 
indication as to how social preferences, elicited via laboratory experiments, manifest in, 
i.e., operational or strategic decision-making of entrepreneurs.  
 
The last two points discussed, both relate to the generalizability of our findings and 
its implications. There is an ongoing debate in the academic literature regarding the 
external validity of social preferences in the field. How do social preferences elicited in 
laboratory settings actually play out in the “real world”? Can we systematically link 
behavior observed in the field to behavior elicited in the laboratory when it comes to 
social preferences? While a sound experimental design is crucial in this context (see 
Levitt and List, 2007; Schade, 2005), the empirical evidence in this matter is still rather 
mixed: Some studies report a significant link between laboratory and field behavior for 
social preferences (Barr and Serneels, 2009; Franzen and Pointer, 2013; Kolstad and 
Lindkvist, 2012; Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011), other studies find no association (Goeschl 
et al., 2015; Torres-Guevara and Schlüter, 2016). Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) for example 
report a significant link between behavior in economic games measuring cooperation and 
actual cooperative behavior in the workplace. As we did not control for operational or 
strategic decisions of entrepreneurs in our experimental design (apart from the social 
venturing aspect), we cannot make claims regarding their potential link to social 
preferences. We invite future research to observe how and to what extent these stronger 
cooperative tendencies influence entrepreneurs’ decisions as well as certain venture 
performance measures, e.g., earnings and productivity. For future studies it would be 
interesting to observe to what extent our finding in the public good game is driven by 
efficiency concerns.  
 
Our findings show students to be significantly more influenced by the factor of 
conditional cooperation considerations than entrepreneurs. Hence, while entrepreneurs 
act rather independently of their counterparty’s choice to cooperate in the previous period, 
students (but also ECIs) are highly influenced by this. While the implications of this could 
be diverse in an operational context, the finding suggests entrepreneurs to be more 
autonomous in their choices. Given that entrepreneurs, based on their job environment, 
have to make their own judgements and cannot follow the approach of others (see also 
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Shane et al., 2003), this finding makes sense. The ability to make independent decisions 
is an essential facet of entrepreneurship and regarded as a major pull factor into this 
profession (i.e., Hessels et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2003).  
 
Interestingly, in this part of the experiment, we do not find the student sample to 
present the lower bound for cooperation. In most of the rounds the students’ behavior 
resembles that of start-up employees, collaborators and investors (in the last rounds of the 
game ECIs demonstrate even lower contribution levels than students). This also indicates, 
that the setting of the conferences (as opposed to the setting in the stationed laboratory) 
did most likely not provide an experimental context, which threatened the internal validity 
of our experimental design. This will be discussed in more detail in the limitations section 
below.  
 
Next, we discuss our findings relating altruism and cooperation to the psychometric 
variables of entrepreneurial intentions (for student sample only) and entrepreneurial self-
efficacy (for both the student and entrepreneurial crowd sample).  
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4.6.3. Psychometric variables in the context of social preferences 
We do not find a relationship between entrepreneurial intent and altruistic as well as 
cooperative tendencies. Students with the intention to start a new venture do not display 
stronger pro-social behaviors in our sample. Considering this result in combination with 
the divergent findings observed for entrepreneurs and students in relation to their 
allocation choices in the dictator and public good game, raises the potential issue of using 
students as proxies for entrepreneurs in academic research. There are at least two potential 
reasons for observing students with entrepreneurial intentions to donate significantly less 
in the dictator game than actual entrepreneurs: (1) Either students scoring high on 
entrepreneurial intent actually will (or are highly likely to) become entrepreneurs later on 
in their life (hence there is no problem with the using the questionnaire as such for 
classifying students as entrepreneurs) but by the time they actually are entrepreneurs, they 
behave differently as to when they were students (i.e., because the context /social norms 
of the environment changed). This would then raise the discussion of stability of 
preferences across context and over time. (2) Or there is a problem associated with using 
entrepreneurial intent questionnaires for classifying students into future job choices.79 We 
invite future research to investigate these suggested aspects further.  
 
For the variable of entrepreneurial self-efficacy (both business and creative talent), 
no significant relationship was found for altruism and cooperation in case of the student 
sample. Hence, we are unable to replicate the findings of Urbig et al. (2012) and Weitzel 
et al. (2010) in this aspect.  
 
Looking at the influence of entrepreneurial self-efficacy onto game behavior for the 
entrepreneurial crowd, a significant impact of business and creative talent onto game 
behavior is found. However, the impact differs based on game type and sub-sample (i.e., 
entrepreneurs vs. ECIs) under consideration. For the dictator game, we find 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy to exclusively influence entrepreneurs’ behavior in a 
significant way. Findings are thereby in line with Weitzel et al. (2010) and Urbig et al. 
(2012). Entrepreneurs’ allocation choices in the DG are negatively influenced by their 
self-assessment of business skills (ß=-0.224; p<0.01), while creative skills show a 
 
79 For an informative overview of using entrepreneurial intent in entrepreneurship as well as other research, 
please refer to Thompson (2009) 
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marginally significant positive effect in this context (ß=0.08; p=0.068). This finding 
holds valuable information for policy makers. In line with the discussion of Weitzel et al. 
(2010), our results imply selfish behavior to be associated with entrepreneurial talent, and 
that the type of talent (i.e., business vs. creative talent) is thereby of relevance. In 
particular in contexts fostering entrepreneurial talent/self-efficacy this offers essential 
input. 
 
In the cooperation game, however, we find neither business nor creative talent to 
significantly influence entrepreneurs’ distribution choices. However, start-up employees, 
collaborators and investors (ECI) in this context are significantly negatively impacted in 
their allocation choices by their self-assessed business allocation skills (b=-0.433, 
p<0.01). We interpret this finding as follows: It appears that entrepreneurs have a better 
understanding regarding the strategic value of cooperation. However, this understanding 
is retrieved independently of the business and creative skill set. It would be interesting to 
investigate in future studies how this understanding originates.  
 




Some potential shortcomings, such as the imbalanced gender ratio within our 
professionals’ sample, have been discussed in the paper and will consequently not be 
repeated here. We also outlined (see section 4.3 and 4.4) how various procedures were 
ensured (i.e., throughout the recruitment process and throughout the experimental 
sessions), in order to decrease threats to internal validity. Nonetheless, we cannot entirely 
rule out concerns in this context, as demand effects/social desirability bias or the self-
selection into laboratory experiments, which in particular in the framework of social 
preferences constitute a concern (for an interesting discussion on self-selection into 
laboratory experiments, see Krawczyk, 2011; Falk et al., 2013; Abeler and Nosenzo, 
2015), could play a role in the context of our experiment.  
 
A limitation of our study we want to discuss in more detail is the comparison of 
data collected in an on-campus laboratory setting (in case of the students) versus data 
collected via a lab-in-the-field experiment conducted at professionals’ conferences. In the 
case of investigating social preferences, the social context of the experimental situation 
plays an important role, as individuals might follow different norms and consequently 
behave differently, based on the given context (Carpenter et al., 2009; Lönnqvist et al., 
2011). We were careful in our experimental design as well as in the actual conducting of 
the experiment, to be as consistent as possible across the two groups. The exact same 
wording and procedures were used, in order to avoid potential framing effects in this 
regard. However, due to the fact that the laboratories themselves were embedded in 
different contexts, we cannot be sure of a social framing effect, or the potential extent 
thereof. This is the classic trade-off between external vs. internal validity. While it would 
have been optimal to recreate the exact same laboratory situations, and thereby avoid 
potential internal validity issues, we would have been unable to access the professionals’ 
sample pool in the same manner. One could argue that the setting of a conference presents 
an environment more conducive for making “social choices” than the setting of a “classic” 
decision laboratory, as conferences might induce for example (i) collective or communal 
feelings. On the other hand, one could argue that a conference setting creates a rather (ii.) 
competitive atmosphere. Both cases would present a valid threat to the internal validity 
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of our experimental set-up. However, our data strongly suggests that none of these 
“special” conference settings occurred.80 
 
The sequence of the experimental structure (i.e., eliciting first the preferences and 
then the psychometric variables) could raise concerns in relation to order effects.81 
However, having discussed the pro and contra arguments of running psychological 
questionnaires before preference measures and vice versa, we decided to first elicit 
economic preferences and then elicit the traits of personality. We argue that for this setting 
there is no perfect experimental solution, but rather a decision based on trade-offs. For 
the purpose of our research, the preference measures (and their comparison across groups) 
presented the priority. Further, we were concerned that placing the psychological 
questions before the games could prime subjects, in particular as context has been shown 
to play a strong influence for these types of games.  
 
While the majority of decisions in our experimental design were incentive 
compatible, the questionnaire required subjects to self-report on certain variables, i.e., the 
social business variable, but also entrepreneurial self-efficacy (BT and CT) and 
entrepreneurial intentions. This data hence represents a rather subjective evaluation of, 
i.e., skill sets. However, while a more objective measure might be desirable this is not an 
easy or even realizable task (see also Weitzel et al. (2010) for a discussion on this).  
 
We further raise a potential limitation concerning generalizability. As described in 
section 4.2.2., the social norms of an environment play a decisive role for the different 
manifestations of pro-social behaviors. Gneezy et al. (2016) for example find 
significantly different cooperative behaviors between fishermen on lakes and fisherman 
on the sea, based on the different norms of cooperation in these two environments. Future 
 
80 For the case of (i.): A communal or collective vibe should in particular increase contribution levels in the 
public good game. However, we find ECIs and students, who are frequently referred to as the lower bound 
in relation to social preference (Burkes et al. 2009; Falk et al., 2013) to behave very similar in regards to 
the public good game. For the case of (ii.): We find both entrepreneurs and ECIs to allocate (even in relation 
to meta studies, see Engel, 2010) considerable amounts in the dictator game, which would have been rather 
unlikely in a competitive or even hostile environment.  
81 Note, the ordering effects in relation to the games/preferences was dealt with in the paper (section 4.4.). 
Here, we described how certain mechanisms were implemented (i.e., giving feedback in relation to DG 1 
and DG2 only at the end of the experiment) in order to decrease these effects as much as possible. We 
additionally controlled for this aspect in our analysis.  
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research would need to establish how pro-social behaviors of entrepreneurs are influenced 
by social norms, based on i.e., different countries, cultures or simply contexts.  
4.8. Conclusion 
We find entrepreneurs to be indeed more willing to share and cooperate than start-up 
professionals and, importantly, than economics and business students.82 Our findings 
suggest that standard economic approaches, which pay no or little attention to the 
influence of social and cooperative attitudes (but rather assume the entrepreneur to act as 
a self-interested individual with the only objective of maximizing profits), to ignore 
valuable information, which could help us to better understand the entrepreneur. In 
particular in relation to their (social) decision-making processes, it seems essential to 
widen our assumptions. Accounting for the presence of social or other-regarding 
preferences, such as the willingness to cooperate thereby seems a viable starting point. 
Gaining insights regarding the complexity of entrepreneurial motivations and preferences 
can offer important insights for policy makers. In a next step, one should investigate how 
our findings manifest into the decision-making of entrepreneurs, such as their day to day 
operations or their long-term strategic planning. Interestingly, we could not establish a 
relationship concerning the manifestation of social business operations and pro-social 
allocation choices in the dictator as well as the cooperation game. The findings of our 
experiment also indicate potential problems of deducting experimental findings sampled 
from business and economic students to the population of professional entrepreneurs. 
There appear to be some generalizability issues when using student samples as proxies 
for entrepreneurs, at least in some contexts. Therefore, researchers should, despite the 
higher costs83 and recruitment efforts, venture out into the field to reproduce their results 
with actual entrepreneurs in order to draw more reliable conclusions.  
 
82 Future research needs to further investigate the findings obtained in the dictator games in relation to 
sample size. While past research has investigated stake sizes in relation to contribution behavior, our 
findings imply that stake sizes might matter more than expected in this regard.  
83 The importance of satiable rewards was confirmed within our experimental proceedings. Using 
professionals as experimental subjects is expensive but necessary in order to compensate sufficiently for 
their opportunity costs and to obtain reliable results. 
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5. ESSAY NO. IV 
The dark triad and its relations to social preferences and 
(un)productive motives in an entrepreneurial context 
Christine Lauritzen 
 
This paper offers four different contributions. While each has its own motivation, 
they ultimately all contribute towards a better understanding of entrepreneurial 
decision-making, in particular in relation to social and sustainable choices. 
Entrepreneurs have been associated with a disposition of socially undesirable 
personality traits, so-called dark traits (e.g., Akhtar et al., 2013; Wales et al., 2013; 
Mathieu and St. Jean, 2013). Consequently, the paper investigates the relationships 
of socially undesirable personality traits (i.e., Machiavellianism, psychopathy and 
narcissism) onto social preferences (contribution 1), entrepreneurial intentions 
(contribution 2) and productive and unproductive entrepreneurial motives 
(contribution 3). It further examines if and how productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurial motives are related to social preferences (contribution 4). The 
results suggest a rather weak relationship between dark personality traits and the 
social preference of altruism. I find exclusively for the trait of Machiavellianism a 
significant impact on cooperative tendencies. Results further indicate potential 
future entrepreneurs to be less likely to hold psychopathic tendencies and to be no 
more, but also no less, inclined to hold narcissistic tendencies than other 
individuals. The data shows a significant positive relationship between 
unproductive entrepreneurial motives and the dark traits of narcissism as well as 
psychopathy. These findings indicate that individuals with higher entrepreneurial 
intentions are not characterized by personality traits, which can systematically be 





In this paper, I offer four different contributions. While each has its own motivation, 
they ultimately all contribute towards a better understanding of entrepreneurial decision-
making, in particular in relation to social and sustainable choices. The paper investigates 
the relationships of socially undesirable personality traits (Machiavellianism, 
psychopathy and narcissism) onto social preferences (altruism and cooperation) 
(contribution 1), entrepreneurial intentions (contribution 2) and productive and 
unproductive entrepreneurial motives (contribution 3). It further examines if and how 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurial motives are related to social preferences 
(contribution 4).  
 
In particular for an entrepreneurial context, it is valuable to understand whether 
socially undesirable personality traits, so-called dark traits, are more prominent in 
individuals intending to start an entrepreneurial venture, as has been suggested in the 
entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Akhtar et al., 2013; Wales et al., 2013; Mathieu and St. 
Jean, 2013). In case of observing individuals with high entrepreneurial intentions to be 
more strongly characterized by dark personality traits, the logical next step would be to 
understand how this manifests into their social and (un)productive decision-making. I 
contribute here by analyzing the association of dark traits onto social preferences as well 
as productive and unproductive entrepreneurial motives following the approach by 
Hmieleski and Lerner (2016).  
 
While traditional economic models assume individuals to be rational, self-
interested decision-makers, we know from multiple studies in the field of behavioral or 
experimental economics that individuals clearly deviate from this assumption. Scholars 
have suggested that a potential factor driving behavioral heterogeneity in economic 
games is the influence of personality (see e.g., Almlund et al., 2011; Becker et al., 2012; 
Borghans et al., 2008). The question whether the personality of the player is relevant for 
game behavior is an interesting one, because should heterogeneous behavior in games be 
understood via the influence of psychological constructs, it would be easier to interpret 
the given results, especially within a psychological context, and would potentially allow 
us to make better or broader behavioral applications (see also Zhao and Smillie (2015) 
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for a discussion on this). I contribute to this stream of literature by empirically 
investigating the impact of the dark triad of personality, consisting of the traits of 
narcissism, Machiavellianism and psychopathy (Jonason and Webster, 2010), onto the 
behavior in the dictator game (Forsythe et al. 1994), as well as in a two-player public 
good game (Leydard, 1995).84  
 
Over the past years, the dark triad of personality has found increasing attention in 
the field of occupational choice and organizational behavior, as personality is likely to 
play a decisive role in operational decision-making. Research has thereby focused in 
particular on the traits of corporate leaders and managers (e.g., Babiak and Hare, 2006; 
Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006; Babiak, et al., 2010; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007), most 
likely driven by the increasing problem of white-collar crime (Benson and Simpson 
2009). However, also in the field of entrepreneurship there has been a growing interest 
regarding the influence of dark traits onto entrepreneurs and how these traits might affect 
the behavior of entrepreneurs, such as their social, sustainable, and economical decision-
making (Hmieleski and Lerner, 2016; Miller, 2014; DeNisi, 2015; Shepherd et al., 2013; 
Webb et al., 2009). Within this context, Klotz and Neubaum (2015) explicitly encourage 
entrepreneurship scholars to investigate the role of the dark triad of personality (p.9) so 
as to better understand the potential downside of entrepreneurial personalities, in 
particular regarding their effect or interaction with entrepreneurial outcomes. I contribute 
to this stream of literature, in an identical manner to Hmieleski and Lerner (2016), by 
experimentally analyzing the link between the dark triad and entrepreneurial intentions.  
 
 Furthermore, in order to gain a better understanding of how the prevalence of dark 
personality traits might impact social and sustainable decision making of entrepreneurs, 
I measure subjects’ productive and unproductive entrepreneurial motives (Hmieleski and 
Lerner, 2016). Hereby, I am particularly interested in observing how individuals with 
 
84 We thereby focus exclusively on the role of personality traits and exclude other psychological concepts, 
such as behavioral activation system (BAS) (see Scheres and Sanfey, 2006) or cognitive ability/intelligence 
(see e.g., Proto and Rustichini, 2014; Putterman et al., 2011; Samson and Kostyszyn, 2015). In particular 
cognitive ability is frequently collected as additional explanatory variable (e.g., Kagel and Mc Gee, 2014; 
Jones 2008; Burks et al. 2009; Ben-Ner and Kramer 2011; Ben-Ner et al., 2008) within this stream literature, 
as it is debated as to whether cognitive ability should be regarded as independent of personality or an 
integrated component of it (compare e.g., Borghans et al. 2008; Rustichini et al. 2016; De Young, 2011). 
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high entrepreneurial intentions score on the scale of the dark triad and whether these traits 
have a significant impact on productive or unproductive entrepreneurial motives.  
 
Given the ever-increasing environmental issues on our planet, its limited natural 
resources in combination with an increasing world population, I believe entrepreneurship 
to play a major role on how and whether we are going to tackle these pressing problems. 
Thereby, our planet and our society desperately need entrepreneurs with productive 
entrepreneurial motives, willing to create sustainable value for society rather than 
exclusively for themselves. Understanding the link between (dark) personality traits and 
entrepreneurial intentions as well as between personality traits and entrepreneurial 
motives can therefore offer us valuable insights. In particular for governmental policy this 
information might allow for an effective setting of incentives, so as to induce more 
sustainable and mindful venturing.  
 
A further contribution of the paper is provided by investigating the link between 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurial motives and the social preferences of 
altruism and cooperation. A better understanding of the connection between these two 
constructs gives us valuable insights as to how interpret findings. This holds for both 
measures, i.e., can productive entrepreneurial motives be interpreted with altruistic 
concepts? And vice versa, can we get an indication as to what altruistic or cooperative 
preferences exactly measure in an entrepreneurial motive context? 
 
To explore these relationships, I analyze the data of N=62 business and economics 
students from Berlin, who played incentivized economic games –the dictator game 
(Forsythe et al., 1994) for the case of altruism, and a 2-player public good game (Ledyard, 
1995) for the case of cooperation. I additionally collected data on entrepreneurial 
intentions (Chen et al., 1998), the dark triad (Paulhus and Williams, 2002), and 
entrepreneurial (un)productive motives (Hmieleski and Lerner, 2016).  
 
Investigating the association of the dark triad and social preferences (contribution 
1), I find exclusively for the trait of Machiavellianism a significant impact on cooperative 
tendencies. Considering the dark triad in the context of occupational choice (contribution 
2), I find the traits of psychopathy and Machiavellianism to significantly influence 
entrepreneurial intentions, albeit in opposite directions. Interestingly, I find individuals 
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with high entrepreneurial intentions to exhibit significantly lower levels of sub-clinical 
psychopathy. Relating the dark triad to entrepreneurial motives (contribution 3), I find a 
significant positive relationship of both psychopathic and narcissistic tendencies onto 
unproductive entrepreneurial motives. Combining the last two findings, it appears that 
individuals with higher entrepreneurial intentions are generally not characterized by dark 
personality traits, which can systematically be linked to unproductive entrepreneurial 
motives. Given the societal and environmental pressures on our planet, this is deemed 
good news.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical background and 
relevant literature for linking personality traits and preferences. It describes the theoretical 
background of the dark triad and its application in relation to (social) preferences. In 
section 3, I summarize research linking the dark triad of personalities to the occupational 
choice of entrepreneurship. Both sections close with formulations of hypotheses based on 
the relevant literature. Section 4 describes our sample, the experimental design and its 
measures. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis. Section 6 discusses the findings, 
provides the study’s limitations and outlines potential for future research. 
5.2. Theory and Literature: Personality Traits and Economic Preferences 
Researchers, proposing a systematic link between behavioral heterogeneity in 
economic games and personality traits, have developed economic models of personality 
(Almlund et al., 2011; Borghans et al., 2008; Ferguson et al., 2011; Becker et al., 2012). 
These models look not only at the direct link between personality and preferences, but 
also try to determine whether preferences and personalities act as complements or 
substitutes in predicting certain life outcomes, such as life satisfaction (Becker et al., 
2012). However, research in this field is still rather at the beginning, and the link between 
personality and social decision-making is currently far from robust. Also, due to their 
centrality within personality research, studies linking preferences to personality traits 
have been strongly based around the personality constructs of the BIG 5 and its extended 
version HEXACO, which additionally includes the honesty-humility dimension (e.g., 
Ben-Ner et al., 2004a; Ben-Ner et al. 2004b; Ben-Ner et al., 2008; Ben-Ner and 
Halldorsson, 2010; Brandstätter and Königstein, 2001, Hilbig and Zettler, 2009; 
Thielman and Hilbig, 2014; Hilbig et al., 2012; Hilbig et al., 2015; Becker et al., 2012; 
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Baumert et al. 2014; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2016; Brocklebank et al., 2011; Kurzban and 
Houser, 2001; Lönnqvist et al., 2011; Perugini et al., 2010; Pothos et al., 2011; Skatova 
and Ferguson, 2011). Thereby, the focus has been particularly on traits, which given their 
definition, are related to (anti)-social or cooperative behaviors, such as agreeableness and 
extraversion (e.g., Brandstätter and Königstein, 2001). However, other types of 
personality beyond the BIG 5, such as locus of control, sensation seeking, Type A 
behavior, or self-monitoring have also been investigated in this context (e.g., Becker et 
al., 2012; Boone et al., 1999; Kurzban and Houser, 2001). 
 
Zhao and Smillie (2015) discuss the relationship of personality traits onto 
behavioral heterogeneity in games based on situational factors. The authors argue that 
depending on whether the decision situation is characterized as “weak” or “strong”, 
personality traits play more or less of an influence in the given decision-making context. 
They classify the dictator game as a weak situation, on the premise that there is no veto 
power of the counterparty. The authors argue that in these weak or ambiguous situations 
the role of personality in predicting behavior is more pronounced than in strong situations 
(Zhao and Smillie, 2015). Hence, the type of game under investigation might play a role 
when analyzing the relation between personality traits and preferences, as motivations 
and preferences are likely to be different, depending on game type (see also Charness and 
Rabin, 2002). It is hence valuable to consider a range of games within this context 
(Broklebank et al., 2011). I contribute here, by analyzing whether the observed behavior 
is consistent across the dictator and public good game.  
 
There have been concerns regarding methodological complications within this 
research field, leading possibly to measurement problems and confounding factors, 
causing diverse, unstable or hard to interpret findings. While some of these problems arise 
due to the interdisciplinary work of economics and psychology, others are independent 
of it. Within this context, the problem of diverse elicitation methods in relation to 
preferences has been raised. This is not exclusively a problem of interdisciplinary work, 
as even within the field of economics there are various methods for eliciting data 
reflecting altruistic tendencies, such as the strategy method (Selten, 1965; Fischbacher et 
al., 2001) and the classic dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994) (see also Brandts and 
Charness, 2011). Analogous, in the field of psychology different versions of 
questionnaires are used for measuring the same personality trait construct, i.e., for 
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narcissism using the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI, Raskin and Hall, 1979) or 
NPI-16 (Ames et al., 2006). Comparability of studies can thereby become a problem. 
Other measurement issues arise due to the diverse framings of decision situations (i.e., 
hot vs. cold methods), different scales of payout85 or no real payoffs at all but rather 
hypothetical payoffs (mainly, but not exclusively done by psychology scholars). This is 
problematic, as one might potentially compare subjects, who in the case of hypothetical 
payoffs, answered in a way they believed to be socially desirable, to subjects, who are 
more sensitive to potential rewards. The last point is in particular relevant, as behavioral 
game theory is strongly influenced by the factor of social desirability (Fleming and Zizzo, 
2011). Finally, also the role of culture is a noteworthy factor to be considered when 
comparing results across studies, something I consider in more detail when comparing 
my results to those of Hmieleski and Lerner (2016). 
 
As a consequence, I exclude in the literature overview studies using psychological 
elicitation methods of social preferences, such as i.e., the social value orientation scale 
(van Lange et al., 1997) or other self-reports on altruism or social behavior, including 
volunteering (e.g., Oda et al., 2013; Rushton et al., 1981; Carlo et al., 2005; Krueger et 
al., 2001; Bekkers, 2007; Evan and Revelle, 2008; Erez et al., 2008), as the problem here 
is not only to find a sound basis on which to compare these different methods of 
elicitation, but also one of missing incentivization to reveal true preferences. In relation 
to the dark traits of personality, I include in the following overview exclusively studies, 
which measure traits at a sub-clinical level and perform the experiment solely with non-
clinical subjects.86  
 
Interesting new research, which investigates the relationship between measures 
elicited by economists (via revealed preferences) and psychologists (via questionnaires) 
is done by Bönte et al. (2017). The authors empirically investigate the relationship 
between behavioral competitiveness (via economic measures) and self-reported 
competitiveness (measured with tools from psychology). Their findings propose that 
economic and psychological measures do share a common conceptual ground. This would 
 
85 See Camerer and Hogarth (1999) on a discussion of different financial incentives in experiments. 
86 Excluding studies performed with individuals who are currently under clinical or forensic supervision 
(e.g., Koenigs et al., 2010; Mokros et al. 2008). 
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mean that economic experiments may help to assess personality measures and in turn 
personality concepts could improve our understanding of economic behavior. However, 
the authors also point out that motives and context matter within this framework. In the 
case of competitiveness, the authors find that it is in particular for the decision-making of 
individuals with neurotic tendencies important to know whether the competition provides 
additional benefits (beyond simply competing as measured in economic experiments), 
such as the potential for personal development (i.e., measured in psychometric studies). 
Hence, the failure to account for such nuances may well lead to missing important 
information or result in mixed, inconclusive findings (Bönte et al., 2016).  
 
Next, I outline in detail the theoretical background of the dark triad of personality, 
describe its theoretical origins, and its individual traits in more detail. I then discuss how 
Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism have been linked to social preferences as 
well as to occupational choice, using the case of entrepreneurship. For a detailed 
theoretical background of social preferences, in particular in relation to altruism and 
cooperation, and their elicitation via a revealed preference approach, please refer to 
Lauritzen et al. (2020). 
5.2.1. The dark triad of personalities 
The dark triad is a term used to describe the constellation of three malignant 
personality traits: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and (sub-clinical) psychopathy (Paulhus 
and Williams, 2002). It has been developed by the Canadian psychologists Paulhus and 
Williams (2002), and has in particular in the last few years received increasing attention. 
Essentially, these traits share the underlying component of dishonesty, manipulation in 
pursuit of selfish gains, and lack of empathy and morality (Paulhus and Williams, 2002). 
They have been linked to behaviors such as stealing, fraud, cheating, gaining at the costs 
of others (Babiak et al., 2006; Hare, 1999; Williams et al., 2010), limited affective 
empathy (Jonason et al., 2013; Jonason and Krause, 2013), and as lacking “altruistic or 
prosocial ideals” (Hmieleski and Lerner, 2016, p. 9). Beyond this element of “callous-
manipulation” (Jones, 2013, p. 563) however the traits present distinct constructs 
(Paulhus and Williams, 2002; Vernon et al., 2008; Rauthmann, 2011). In general, women 
have been shown to score lower on the dark triad than men (Jonason and Webster, 2010). 
Studies find a significant positive relationship between the dark triad and impulsivity as 
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well as sensation seeking (Crysel et al., 2013), a favoring of short-term relationships 
(Jonason, et al. 2012), counterproductive behaviors (O’Boyle, Forsythe, Banks and 
McDaniel, 2012), and selfish financial decision-making (Jones, 2013; Jones, 2014). 
Different measures of this construct are available. Most popular are thereby the so-called 
dirty dozen (Jonason and Webster, 2010), applied in our study, and the short dark triad 
(SD3) (Jones and Paulhus, 2014). For an interesting review regarding the dark triad’s 
development, elicitation, and general results, as well as a discussion in regards to “nature 
vs. nurture”, please see Furnham et al. (2013).  
 
The dark triad has been studied in a wide range of context, such as mating behavior87 
(Jonason et al., 2011; Jonason et al., 2010; Paulus and Williams, 2002; Jones and Paulhus, 
2011); educational contexts88 (Williams et al., 2010; Nathanson et al., 2006), and 
interpersonal relationships89 (Zuroff et al., 2010). Two other environments in which the 
dark triad has been studied, and which are central for the purpose of this paper, are that 
of (anti)-social behavior and the workplace. Research from this field is in detail 
summarized in section 5.2.2. and section 5.3 respectively.  
 
Next, I outline the three individual traits underlying the dark triad and their 
theoretical backgrounds in more detail. 
5.2.1.1. Psychopathy 
Psychopaths have generally been described as individuals with manipulative 
behavior, superficial charm, sensation and risk seeking, an inclination to violate social 
norms, impulsivity, and lacking empathy (Hart et al.,1994; Hare, 2006; Newman et al., 
1987; Patrick et al., 2005). However, at the same time, people with elevated levels of 
psychopathy might demonstrate positive attributes such as being charming, entertaining 
and intelligent (Akhtar et al., 2013). Several instruments have been developed to measure 
psychopathy. In the two-factor model, the first factor describes primary psychopathy, 
 
87 Demonstrating a generally short-term, impulsive mating style (Jones and Paulhus, 2011), and poaching 
partners from others (Jonason et al., 2010). 
88 Thereby, demonstrating high levels of cheating, plagiarism and unduly claiming credit.  (Williams et al., 
2010, Nathanson et al., 2006). 
89 While all concepts have in common the component of ruthless self-advancement (Zuroff et al., 2010), 
the individual measures of the dark triad are related to distinctive personality styles.  
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comprising affective and interpersonal traits such as selfishness, callousness, lack of 
empathy and guilt (see Levenson et al., 1995). The other factor, secondary psychopathy, 
measures more behavioral (e.g., risk-taking) components and an anti-social lifestyle (see 
Hare 1991, 2006; Hare and Neumann, 2006). The later factor is also responsible for the 
propensity of psychopaths to engage in violent or illegal behaviors (Stevens et al., 
2012).90 
5.2.1.2. Narcissism 
Narcissism is a pathological form of self-love (Freud, 1957[1914]). It measures 
constructs, such as obsessive attention seeking, grandiosity, vanity, self-focus, egotism, 
and exploitativeness in relationships (Emmons, 1987; Millon and Davis, 1996). 
Narcissists have inflated views in a variety of self-regarding concepts, such as their 
creative abilities, their cleverness, and their looks. Interestingly, this view does not hold 
in regards to moral and caring tendencies (Campbell et al., 2002). They further have a 
strong tendency to blame others for underperformance or personal failure (Campbell et 
al., 2000; Gosling et al., 1998). Narcissism has been linked to several other personality 
traits including sensation seeking (Emmons, 1981), creativity (Raskin and Hall, 1980), 
and extraversion (Emmons, 1984). An established scale to measure narcissism in 
individuals is the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI, Raskin and Hall, 1979). 
Emmons (1984, 1987) discovered four distinct factors describing the construct of 
narcissism within the NPI, which he categorized as exploitativeness/entitlement, 
leadership/authority, superiority/arrogance, and self-absorption/self-admiration. 
Narcissistic individuals, due to their overconfidence and excessive levels of optimism in 
their own regard (Paulhus and Williams, 2002, Campbell Goodie and Foster, 2004), like 
to engage in risky behaviors or decision-making (Campbell, 2004), believing they can 
beat the odds while downplaying potential consequences (Lakey et al., 2008).  
5.2.1.3. Machiavellianism  
Out of the dark triad Machiavellianism is the only trait not derived from a 
personality disorder. Christie and Geis (1970) were one of the first researchers interested 
in measuring and studying Machiavellianism (MACH), which got its name from the 
renaissance politician and philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli. Since then, their well-known 
 
90 Cooke and Michie (2001) later expand this by a third factor namely interpersonal, affective and lifestyle. 
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MachIV scale has been used and validated in numerous studies (see e.g., Gunnthorsdottir 
et al., 2002). People scoring high on “MACH” have been described as manipulative and 
deceptive, promoting their self-interest even at the cost of exploiting others (Barnett and 
Thomson, 1985). Studies suggest that individuals scoring high on MACH are more risk 
seeking than their low scoring counterparts. However, in contrast to individuals high on 
psychopathy, high MACHs thereby do not take needless risks (Jones, 2013). High 
MACHs are more prone to lie (Allsopp et al., 1991). Machiavellianism does not correlate 
with any measure of standardized intelligence (Wilson et al., 1998), income, or status 
(Hunt and Chonto, 1984). Interestingly, Machiavellianism is not linked to impulsivity but 
is rather of strategic, cautious nature (Jones, 2013) - for example, engaging in anti-social 
behavior only when there is little risk of being caught (Cooper and Peterson, 1980). This 
might explain why people scoring high on MACH are often seen as more likeable than 
low MACHs (Wilson et al., 1998). Individuals scoring high on Machiavellianism have 
issues establishing long term relationships, as they expect their own level of selfishness, 
in particular in relation to reciprocity, to be present in other individuals (Jones, 2014). 
They take without giving in return (Ermer and Kiel, 2010) and are known for their strong 
desire to win at all costs, even at the expense of others (Buckels et al., 2013; Cote et al., 
2011). In addition, they prefer to gamble with the money of other parties (Jones, 2013) 
and have strong emphasis on short-term advances (Jonason and Trost, 2010). Cote et al. 
(2011) and Hmieleski and Lerner (2016) describe the tendency of high MACHs to not 
reciprocate in social exchanges once there are no more future benefits to be expected from 
the counterparty, or once their own goals have been achieved. Winning is thereby of 
centrality within their motivation structure (Jonason and Trost, 2010). 
 
After having outlined the three traits of the dark triad, I next summarize research 
dealing with these personality traits in the social preferences literature. 
5.2.2. The dark triad and social preferences 
Given the definitions of the dark triad in combination with the theoretical 
underpinnings of social preferences,91 in particular those of altruism/fairness and 
cooperation, it is somewhat reasonable to expect a negative relationship between the dark 
triad and social preferences.  
 
91 For a theoretical review of social preferences, please refer to Lauritzen et al. (2020). 
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In the following sections, I outline studies which have investigated these 
relationships in depth. Out of the three traits, Machiavellianism has received the most 
attention, in particular in relation to trust games, closely followed by psychopathy. The 
least amount of research is found with regards to narcissism and preferences.  
5.2.2.1. Machiavellianism and social preferences 
Meyer (1992) analyzed the relationship between Machiavellianism (MachIV, 
Christie and Geis, 1970) and two types of hypothetical ultimatum games.92 The findings 
show below average MACHs to reject unfair offers more often than high MACHs in the 
strong bargaining condition, while no significant differences were found in the weak 
bargaining condition. The findings propose fairness considerations to be rather negatively 
correlated with Machiavellianism, and since these types of considerations have strongly 
been linked to behaviors in the dictator game (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1986; Rabin, 1993; 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), they suggest a negative relationship between allocation choices 
in the dictator game and Machiavellianism. Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002) research how 
Machiavellianism influences behavior in a $10 trust game. The authors argue that 
individual differences in trust and reciprocity might be driven by personality traits as 
decision heuristics, often driven by emotions, and that these might play an important role 
within the context of economic games. People scoring high on dark personality traits, 
such as Machiavellianism, are generally described by a rather cool affect, i.e., lower levels 
of emotional arouse-ability and less bound by social norms. Based on this, these 
individuals are argued to be more likely to cheat or non-reciprocate in economic games, 
and to behave in a way that reflects their personal interests, even if that means exploiting 
the counterparty (see also Lykken, 1995; Frank, 1988; Hirschleifer, 1987 for similar 
arguments). Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002, p.56) hypothesize:  
 
“High Machs with their cool rational attitude should be true  gamesmen, and 




92 The first being a standard one-shot ultimatum game, the other a repeated, modified ultimatum game.  
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While the authors find no significant difference regarding the trusting behavior in 
the game, they find individuals scoring high on Machiavellianism to defect on reciprocal 
behavior, by playing the dominant strategy in the second stage of the trust game. Burks 
et al. (2003) have a very similar experimental set-up to Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002). 
Their findings however are rather contradictory: they find that the MACH scale “[…]  
predicts distrust but not lack of trustworthiness […].” (Burks et al. 2003, p. 195) and 
hence a negative association between Machiavellianism and the amount transferred by 
the trustor (p<0.01). They find no significant effect for the relationship between 
Machiavellianism and the trustee. Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010) also analyze the 
relationship between Machiavellianism and behavior in the trust game, they find a 
significant but weak correlation between Machiavellianism and the amount sent back by 
the trustees (r=-0.18; p<0.10).93 The relationship however becomes insignificant when 
controlling for the Big Five as well as demographic factors. The findings of these studies 
show that the relationship between Machiavellianism and behavior in the trust game is 
far from clear or straightforward. Wilson et al. (1998) identify low-MACH individuals as 
being more cooperative, while high-MACHs display a rather exploitative nature.94 Berg 
et al. (2013) analyze in their study the relation between the dark triad and various 
hypothetical95 economic games (a dictator game, a ten-round prisoner’s dilemma game 
and an ultimatum game). In the dictator game, the authors find all three traits to positively 
correlate with the amount retained by the dictator (p<0.001 for Machiavellianism and 
psychopathy; p<0.01 for narcissism). In the ultimatum game, rejection rates are also 
positively correlated with psychopathy and Machiavellianism, and in the prisoner’s 
dilemma game defections are positively correlated with Machiavellianism and 
psychopathy (p<0.001). 
 
Based on the discussed findings, I next formulate my hypotheses in relation to the 
personality of Machiavellianism and the elicited behavior in the games. 
 
 
93 The authors do not analyze the relationship between MACH and the amount sent back. 
94 The authors experimentally investigate the relationship between Machiavellianism and cooperation via 
the story-telling method. 
95 Hypothetical in terms of partner and incentive payout.  
 164 
HYPOTHESIS 1 a: I expect a negative association between the trait of 
Machiavellianism and the amount allocated by the dictator to the receiver. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2 a: I expect a negative association between the trait of 
Machiavellianism and the initial willingness to cooperate in the first round of 
the public good game.  
 
I further investigate the association between the dark triad and cooperative 
tendencies over time (rounds) in the public good game. We know from past research, that 
contribution levels in the public good game generally decline over time, as the strategic 
value to cooperate declines (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001). Because Machiavellianism is, 
based on its theoretical foundations, in particular characterized by strong competitive and 
strategic concerns, focusing on short-term gains (Jonason and Trost, 2010) also in relation 
to reciprocity (Jones, 2014), it is in particular interesting to observe how high MACHs 
compare to low MACHs in this context. Based on the outlined theoretical foundations, I 
expect a negative relationship between the contribution levels in the public good game 
over time and Machiavellianism, as the strategic value of cooperation declines. In the 
following, I formulate my hypothesis in relation to Machiavellianism and cooperation 
over time.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: I presume that the willingness to cooperate in later rounds of the 
public good game is significantly lower among high MACH individuals, as the 
strategic value of cooperation declines over time.  
5.2.2.2. Psychopathy and social preferences 
Rilling et al. (2007) analyze the behavioral, emotional and neural correlates of 
psychopathy in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game.96 The authors find, controlling for 
gender, a negative correlation of psychopathy and cooperative behavior (p<0.05) within 
the male subject pool. Jones et al. (2013) find a positive association between psychopathy 
and the tendency to gamble with other people’s money (however, no association was 
found when gambling with one’s own money) even in situations of certain losses. Osumi 
 
96 Whereby individuals actually played against the computer, which was fixed to play a forgiving tit-for-
tat-strategy. 
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and Ohira (2010) elicit psychopathic tendencies and let subjects play an incentivized 
ultimatum game.97 The authors find a positive relationship between primary psychopathy 
and the acceptance of unfair offers (p<0.01). Curry et al. (2011) investigate the role of 
psychopathy in three types of prisoner dilemma games (simultaneous discrete, 
simultaneous continuous and sequential discrete) and a standard ultimatum game. They 
find psychopathy leading to lower levels of cooperation, while the effects in the 
bargaining game are diverse.98  
 
Given these results, which report a rather negative association between psychopathy 
and other-regarding preferences, I devise my hypotheses in this regard as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1 b: I expect a negative association between the trait of (a) 
psychopathy, and the amount allocated by the dictator to the receiver. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2 b: I expect a negative association between the trait of (a) 
psychopathy, and the initial willingness to cooperate in the first round of the 
public good game.  
 
5.2.2.3. Narcissism and social preferences 
The least amount of research, linking the traits of the dark triad to social 
preferences, is found with respect to narcissism. Thereby, the study by Berg et al. (2013) 
was already discussed in section 5.2.2.1.: Findings report a positive and significant 
relationship with respect to the dictator game (r=0.19, p<0.01) as well as the ultimatum 
game, but only in the condition where the proposer offered 30% of the endowment 
(r=0.17; p<0.05). To the best of my knowledge, the only other study investigating this 
context further is by Campbell et al. (2005). The authors examine in an empirical study 
the social cost of narcissism via a social dilemma situation (based on the commons 
dilemma by Hardin, 1968). They find narcissistic individuals to not only display higher 
 
97 The design is inspired by Koenigs and Tranel’s (2007) version, where the proposer does not really exist. 
98 The Machiavellian egocentricity scores were negatively associated with cooperation in the simultaneous 
prisoner dilemma games and lower levels of reciprocating or initiating cooperation in sequential prisoner’s 
dilemma games. Machiavellian egocentricity was positively associated with higher offers in the ultimatum 
game 
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desires for profits than non-narcissists, but also that the commons were faster exploited 
and ruined when narcissists were involved. They conclude that “In the context of a 
resource dilemma, narcissism confers a benefit for the self but a longer-term cost to others 
and to the commons.” (Campbell et al., 2005, p. 1367). 
 
Based on the presented research studies, as well as the theoretical background of both the 
dark triad of personality and social preferences, I propose the following hypotheses with 
respect to narcissism:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1c: I expect a negative association between the trait of narcissism 
and the amount allocated by the dictator to the receiver. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2 c: I expect a negative association between the trait of narcissism 
and the initial willingness to cooperate in the first round of the public good 
game.  
 
After having outlined the literature of the dark triad and its relations to social 
preferences, I next describe literature relating the dark triad to occupational choice, 
thereby focusing on entrepreneurship. However, as research in this area is somewhat 
limited, I also take into account research from the field of organizational behavior, 
specifically from the leadership literature, as past research has established leadership to 
be an essential factor of entrepreneurial activity (see e.g., Hemmen et al., 2012; Felix et 
al., 2019).  
5.2.3. The dark triad and occupational choice for the case of entrepreneurship 
Personality research is nothing new in the field of entrepreneurship. Research from 
this domain includes, but is not limited to, risk propensity (Burmeister-Lamp et al., 2012; 
Steward and Roth, 2007, Koudstaal et al., 2016), the five-factor model (Zhao and Seibert, 
2006; Rauch and Freese, 2007), need for autonomy (Rauch and Freese, 2007), self-
efficacy (Chen et al., 1998; McGee et al., 2009), (over) confidence (Koellinger et al., 
2007; 2013), and locus of control (Rauch and Freese, 2007; Mueller and Thomas, 2001). 
For a comprehensive overview, see Brandstätter (2011). However, more recently 
researchers, such as Klotz and Neubaum (2016), have discussed the conceptualization of 
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personality traits within entrepreneurship research, thereby highlighting the importance 
to increase research with regards to dark traits. The authors explicitly encourage 
researchers to consider the traits of Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism and 
to investigate how these might affect or interact with entrepreneurial outcomes (Klotz and 
Neubaum, 2016).  
 
Trait theoretical backgrounds that potentially explain why (if) entrepreneurs are 
different to other people in relation to their personality structure can be found in Judge et 
al. (2009). The authors outline and review three different theoretical approaches within 
the trait approach, namely (1) evolutionary theory and evolutionary psychology, (2) 
behavioral genetics and (3) socio-analytic theory. Evolutionary theory and evolutionary 
psychology provide a theory for the existence of personality traits (namely a process of 
mutation and selection) as well as the efficacy of certain traits.99 Evolutionary theory 
posits that certain traits are more evident in some people, as they equip them with some 
type of advantage. This approach would hence provide one potential reason for the 
argument that entrepreneurs are different to other people in regards to their personality 
structure - namely that the traits they have been endowed with encourage and support 
them in the profession of being an entrepreneur, due to the better personality-environment 
match. Hmieleski and Lerner (2016) draw on life history theory100 as well as social 
exchange theory101 for evaluating the relationship between dark traits and becoming an 
entrepreneur. Other theories that have been applied in order to explain why and how 
individuals with certain values, needs and personality structures select themselves into 
the vocation of entrepreneurship are career choice theory (Holland, 1997), person-
environment fit theory (Judge and Kristof-Brown, 2004), and contingency theory (Carsrud 
and Johnson, 1989).  
 
99 Thereby, the traits that would support an individual to become an entrepreneur are not necessarily the 
same as the ones that help you to be an effective entrepreneur. 
100 This theory provides a framework as to how individuals, faced with certain trade-offs, should make 
allocations with respect to time and energy towards assignments and traits, so as to optimize their well-
being (see e.g., Del Giudice et al., 2016). 
101 Emerson (1976), describes it as a frame of references, rather than a theory and states: “As I see it, its 
scope is defined by an assumption: that a resource will continue to flow only if there is a valued return 
contingent upon it. Psychologists call this contingent return reinforcement - economists simply call this 




Over recent years, there has been an increasing stream of literature dealing with 
socially undesirable personality traits, often referred to as “dark traits”, in the corporate 
and leadership literature in general (e.g., Babiak and Hare, 2006; Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 
2006; Babiak et al., 2010; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007), but also within 
entrepreneurship research (Miller, 2014; DeNisi, 2015; Klotz and Neubaum, 2016; 
Hmieleski and Lerner, 2016). These studies investigate the potential facets of dark 
personality traits and discuss their implications in relation to moral and ethical decision-
making. Thereby, Vallaster et al. (2019) offer a comprehensive literature review in 
regards to entrepreneurship and ethics, and Dickel and Graeff (2018) in relation to 
entrepreneurship and corruption. The growing interest for this field of research is most 
likely driven by the increasing problem102 of corporate or white-collar crime (Benson and 
Simpson, 2009). But it is clearly also for the field of entrepreneurship highly relevant to 
understand the association of personality and entrepreneurial behavior, as their decision-
making has a large societal impact.  
 
I am interested in observing how individuals with high entrepreneurial intentions 
score on the scale of the dark triad and further, whether these traits have a significant 
impact on productive or unproductive entrepreneurial motives. I thereby replicate the 
approach by Hmieleski and Lerner (2016). Given the environmental pressures on this 
planet, our society desperately needs individuals with productive entrepreneurial motives, 
such as the willingness to create sustainable value for society rather than exclusively for 
oneself, to self-select themselves into the vocation of entrepreneurship. Understanding 
the link between (dark) personality traits and entrepreneurial intentions as well as 
between personality traits and entrepreneurial motives could offer us valuable insights in 
this regard. 
 
Within this context, it is certainly also important to critically acknowledge what a 
significant relationship between entrepreneurial intentions and dark personality traits 
implies about the culture of our society. Following the argumentation of life history 
theory, it suggests that in order to succeed in an entrepreneurial environment, individuals 
 
102 The debate, whether white-collar crime actually increased or became simply more transparent/public, 
albeit an interesting one, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 169 
need to select behavioral strategies characterized by socially undesirable, exploitative, 
deceptive, manipulative, and generally malignant behaviors. The effects of this, on so 
many levels, hold destructive potentials. I argue that this notion presents a challenge our 
society urgently needs to address and rethink in order to move towards a more social and 
sustainable entrepreneurial and business culture. Thereby, governmental policy could, via 
offering the right incentives, play an important role.  
 
It is important to highlight that when talking about dark traits or even 
psychological disorders, such as psychopathy, the focus in this paper is evidently on 
individuals who manage these forms of personality successfully. So, while exhibiting 
these “dark” behavioral tendencies, they still manage to achieve (professional) success in 
real life. The literature thereby distinguishes between two different ways of success. On 
the one hand, success is used to describe the event, where an individual, exhibiting i.e., 
psychopathic tendencies, manages to avoid being institutionalized (Mullins-Nelson et al., 
2006), while the other approach focuses on individuals who achieve professional success 
despite (or maybe even because) of their psychopathic tendencies. (e.g., Babiak and Hare, 
2006; Lykken, 1995). Research has thereby established that individuals with a 
psychopathic personality disorder can be found in all kinds of employment positions: in 
boardrooms (Babiak and Hare, 2006; Babiak et al., 2010), in politics (Lilienfeld et al., 
2012; Dutton, 2016), but also in blue collar work (Palmen et al., 2018). These studies 
outline why and how these individuals manage to stay in their jobs, often very 
successfully so. Similar research can be found for the trait of narcissism. Chatterjee and 
Hambrick (2007) for example investigate the influence of CEO’s narcissism onto 
company strategy and performance. 
 
However, the line between bright and dark traits can be far from clear. Danny 
Miller (2014) describes the “Janus-faced” character of an entrepreneurial personality, 
namely the way a positive or bright character trait, such as need for achievement can, 
when taken to the extreme end of the scale, turn into a negative or dark trait (i.e., 
aggressiveness or ruthlessness). Judge et al. (2009) outline in a similar manner, albeit 
within the context of leadership, how bright (dark) traits, while mainly leading to positive 
(negative) implications, can also under certain circumstances or at extreme levels have 
negative (positive) implications for both leader emergence and effectiveness. Baibak et 
al. (2010, p.192) argue that “[…] psychopathy is more strongly associated with style than 
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with substance.” The authors discuss that while these individuals often exhibit sub-
optimal performances and management styles, due to the interpersonal problems caused 
by the erratic side of their psychopathic behavior, the positive sides of psychopathic 
behavior, such as being charismatic, lead to successful impression management and 
strong presentation abilities that manage to hide or at least obscure insufficient 
performances, and hence keep executives in their position. Similar conclusions have been 
made in the leadership literature in relation to the personality trait of narcissism. Again, 
while this trait holds positive aspects in relation to leadership, such as charisma, 
creativity, drive for innovativeness, commitment, and vision (Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 
2006; Campbell et al., 2011; Deluga, 1997; Maccoby, 2004; Wales et al., 2013), there are 
also considerable problems attached to narcissism in relation to successful leadership, 
such as the violation of integrity, discriminating sub-ordinates (Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 
2006), and the reluctance to acknowledge mistakes (de Vries and Miller, 1985). 
 
In the following, I review literature evaluating how the characteristics of the dark 
triad match well with the oftentimes stressful requirements of an entrepreneurial 
environment.  
 
Concepts of the dark triad, or by definition closely related to it, which have been 
researched in the context of entrepreneurship include greed and hubris103 (Haynes, Hitt 
and Campbell, 2015; Hayward, Shepherd and Griffin, 2006104), behavioral disinhibitions 
(Lerner, 2016), sub-clinical psychopathy (Akhtar et al., 2013; Hmieleski and Lerner, 
2016), narcissism (Wales et al., 2013105, Mathieu and St. Jean, 2013; Hmieleski and 
Lerner, 2016), and ADHD-like behavior (Wiklund et al., 2017; Verheul et al., 2015). 
Arguments for the causal mechanism linking personality disorders with the occupational 
choice of entrepreneurship vary: While these traits are generally regarded as 
dysfunctional, in the context of entrepreneurial venturing they might actually offer some 
 
103 Haynes et al. (2015) outline and discuss how greed and hubris negatively affect the human as well as 
social capital of entrepreneurial ventures and consequently also the financial performance and success of 
the start-up. 
104 The authors discuss the topic theoretically not empirically. 
105 The authors find a propensity of narcissistic CEOs to increase entrepreneurial orientation in the 
companies they work for.  
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benefits.106 Individuals scoring high on dark personality traits have been shown to deal 
better with the uncertainties present in the entrepreneurial environment, as well as its 
challenges (Jonason et al., 2009; Jonason and Tost, 2010). Thereby higher levels of 
resilience play an important role (see Hayward et al., 2010). Individuals high on dark 
personality traits have further demonstrated biases towards risk taking, gambling, novelty 
seeking, creativity, the disruption of the status quo (Jones, 2003; Mathieu et al., 2013; 
Wiklund et al., 2017), and elevated levels of confidence (Mathieu and St. Jean, 2013). All 
characteristics which have been related to those of entrepreneurs (see e.g., Koellinger et 
al., 2007; Burmeister and Schade, 2007). In addition, entrepreneurship may allow these 
individuals to attain the level of power, independence, flexibility, and influence they, 
based on their personality profile, seek.  
 
Looking at the traits of the dark triad more specifically, narcissistic individuals 
have demonstrated inflated, biased levels of confidence regarding not only their chances 
of success, but also in relation to the required capabilities and resources in order to 
effectively and successfully engage in venturing (Navis and Ozbek, 2016). Thereby, 
disregarding the associated risks (Campbell et al., 2004; Wales et al. 2013). Additionally, 
narcissists crave the admiration and respect of others, so starting up one’s own venture 
might present an attractive vocation option for them, as founding an entrepreneurial 
venture is often regarded as highly appealing, due to the success stories presented in the 
media of, e.g., Zuckerberg, Musk, and Page, rather than the actual high failure rates 
prevailing in venturing (representative bias). Further, narcissists match certain other 
personality features that have been detected in past entrepreneurship research. These 
include higher levels of risk-taking propensity (Stewart and Roth, 2001; Foster et al., 
2009a; Foster, et al., 2009b), overconfidence (Koellinger et al., 2007), self-efficacy and 
internal locus of control (Rauch and Frese, 2005; Chen et al., 1998; Mathieu and St. Jean, 
2013), high extraversion, high openness to experience, and low agreeableness 
(Brandstätter, 2011; Paulhus and Williams, 2002). Mathieu and St-Jean (2013) find 
within their sample of student entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (comprising non-
entrepreneurial students, employees and managers) that entrepreneurial subjects showed 
 
106 Thereby, the benefits apply to the choice of becoming and staying an entrepreneur, but not necessarily 
in relation to the performance of the venture nor its sustainability in terms of both economics and 
environmental concerns.   
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significantly higher levels of narcissism. Moreover, the authors report a significant 
relationship between narcissism and entrepreneurial intentions. Akhtar et al. (2013) find 
entrepreneurial tendencies, as well as abilities, to be positively related to primary 
psychopathy. The authors also find primary psychopathy to be negatively related to social 
entrepreneurship (Akhtar et al., 2013).  
 
While dark traits might increase the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur due 
to the aforementioned reasons, the effects of these traits onto venturing performance are 
rather dire. Kets deVries (1985) was one of the first to empirically investigate how dark 
personality traits of entrepreneurs can have destructive effects on the success of 
entrepreneurial ventures, i.e., by being too detail oriented or by failing to collaborate. 
Stevens et al. (2012) empirically examine how successful psychopaths, using 
undergraduate students as subjects, respond to ethical dilemmas in different business 
settings.107  Thereby, the subjects need to respond to four different scenarios, each 
depicting some sort of ethical dilemma in a business setting (i.e., foregoing quality or 
safety for profits). They find, mediated by moral disengagement108, a significant positive 
relationship between unethical decision-making and successful psychopaths. The authors 
conclude that individuals, who despite their psychopathic tendencies, manage to live 
successful lives, are more prone to making unethical business choices than individuals 
without such declinations, while cognitively distancing themselves from these choices 
via moral disengagement (Stevens et al., 2012).  
 
For this part of the study, I closely follow the approach by Hmieleski and Lerner 
(2016) and elicit the identical relevant variables. Replicating their study allows us to get 
an indication regarding the robustness and generalizability of the results, in particular 
across different cultures. I consequently formulate the following hypotheses in the same 
direction as done in their paper. 
 
 
107 Unethical decision making is conceptualized as “(…) an individual’s willingness to engage in a moral- 
or norm-violating behavior, where there is no obvious correct or incorrect course of action often in response 
to an ambiguous situation.” p. 142. 
108 Convincing oneself that ethical or moral standards do not apply to oneself in a certain situation (Bandura 
et al., 1996). 
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HYPOTHESIS 4: I expect students’ scores on (a) Machiavellianism, (b) 
psychopathy, and (c) narcissism to be positively related to entrepreneurial 
intentions. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Individuals’ levels of (a) Machiavellianism, (b) psychopathy, and 
(c) narcissism will be negatively associated with their level of productive 
entrepreneurial motives. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 6: Individuals’ levels of (a) psychopathy, (b) Machiavellianism, and 
(c) narcissism will be positively associated with their level of unproductive 
entrepreneurial motives. 
 
The authors find a positive association between narcissism and entrepreneurial 
intentions, while both Machiavellianism and psychopathy are insignificant in this context. 
They additionally find all three traits to be positively related to unproductive 
entrepreneurial motives. Concerning productive entrepreneurial motives, their findings 
are rather mixed. The authors report a significant positive relationship for narcissism, a 
significant negative relationship for psychopathy, and no relationship in regards to the 
variable of Machiavellianism. 
 
I next describe the experimental design and its individual measures before outlining 
the study’s empirical analysis and the specific findings. 
5.3. Data  
5.3.1. Sample 
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of Humboldt Universität zu Berlin 
in Mai 2017. N=62 students from the field of business and economics were recruited via 
the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Half of the subjects were enrolled 
in economics, 35 percent in business studies, 10 percent studied a combination of 
economics and business, and about 5 percent majored in statistical methods. Experimental 
sessions lasted between 45-60 minutes. Average pay-outs amounted to 13.47 Euros. The 
subject’s average age is M=23 (S.D.=2.59) years. A bit less than half of the subject pool 
is male (46.8 percent) and predominantly from Europe (93.5 percent). The experiment 
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was programmed with the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Confidentiality and anonymity were ensured by the experimental design as well as 
experimental procedures throughout the entire process.  
5.3.2. Measures  
The experiment consists of several different parts, eliciting a range of measures, 
which will be outlined next.  
5.3.2.1. Elicitation of preferences 
The research started with the elicitation of different preferences, all via an 
incentivized, revealed preference approach. 
 
Risk preferences were elicited via the Holt and Laury lottery framework (Holt and 
Laury, 2002). In the framework, subjects have to decide for then different lottery pairs, 
which type of lottery they prefer to play. There are two different types, one presenting a 
riskier lottery (lottery B) than the other (lottery A). Generally, the individual’s crossover 
point (switching from lottery A to lottery B) determines the individual’s risk preference.109  
 
In the second part of the experiment, subjects played a neutrally framed one-shot 
dictator game, as an elicitation measure of altruism/fairness. Students, in the role of the 
dictator (random allocation of roles by the computer), were endowed with 5 Euros. The 
dictator’s task was to decide how much of the endowment she/he wanted to allocate to 
her/his counterparty, the receiver. Decisions were payout relevant. The receiver did not 
get any feedback as to how much the dictator allocated to her/him, in order to avoid any 
potential spillover effects of this information onto the next game, the public good game. 
Further, it was stressed that for each type of game, the counterparty would randomly be 
matched anew.110  
 
 
109 Risk will not be evaluated here. As outlined in Lauritzen et al. (2020), a considerable share of students 
demonstrated irrational behaviors during this task, such as multiple switching points (which is not unusual 
to happen in the Holt and Laury lotteries). Also, risk entered all relevant regressions insignificantly and 
was consequently dropped from the further analysis.  
110 As Lauritzen et al. (2020) use the same experimental design, very detailed information regarding the 
game set-up, instructions etc., can be obtained from that paper.  
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For the measure of cooperation, subjects had to play a 2-player-repeated public 
good game. Subjects were matched with a new counterparty, which stayed constant for 
all ten rounds of the game. A range of comprehension questions ensured subject’s 
understanding of the game’s payoff function:  
 
!	!($", $#) = 5€ − 	+,-	.+-/0123/1+-	/+	/ℎ5	60+75./ + 0.7	(+,-	.+-/0123/1+-	/+	/ℎ5	60+75./
+ .+3-/506<0/=$>	.+-/0123/1+-	/+	/ℎ5	60+75./) 
 
After each round played, subjects obtained feedback regarding their counterparty’s 
contribution, their own contribution, and the resulting payoff based on those contribution 
levels. Subjects did not know about the exact rounds to be played in order to avoid 
behaviors driven by strong iterated thinking (see Lauritzen et al. (2020) for a discussion 
on this aspect). 
  
The public good game was then followed by another dictator game. The parameters 
were identical to the first dictator game, however this time all participants who were 
allocated the dictator role in the first dictator game, became the receiver in the second 
dictator game and vice versa. Figure 4 below summarizes the details for the elicitation of 
the social preferences.  
 
Figure 4: Summary of experimental game structure 
 
 
Subjects’ total pay-out was determined at the end of the experiment (after the 
questionnaire). Thereby, for the first part (Holt and Laury lottery) the computer randomly 
chose one of the ten lottery pairs relevant for pay-out. For the dictator game, subjects 
were paid out the money they decided to keep for themselves (when allocated the role as 
dictator) and the money they (potentially) received when in the role of the receiver. 
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Finally, one out of the ten rounds of the cooperation game was randomly selected by the 
computer for pay-out.  
5.3.2.2. Control variables and entrepreneurial intentions 
In order to rule out alternative explanations in relation to our hypotheses, the 
experiment proceeded with a questionnaire, collecting additional (control) variables. 
First, subjects had to answer general demographic questions (i.e., field of study, gender, 
age, country of birth). I control for gender, as past research has shown women to generally 
exhibit stronger social preferences and lower scores on the dark triad (Eckel and 
Grossman, 1996; Jonason and Webster, 2010). The relationship between gender and 
entrepreneurial intentions is less clear (Díaz-García and Jiménez-Moreno, 2010). Finally, 
I also control for life satisfaction, as past research has linked social preferences (in 
particular in relation to distributional social preferences) to happiness measures (Charness 
and Grosskopf, 2001; Delhey and Dragolov, 2014; Oishi et al., 2011; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
and Ramos, 2014). Next, entrepreneurial intentions were elicited (Chen et al., 1998). 
Their scale consists of five items, higher scores represent higher levels of entrepreneurial 
intentions. Internal consistency was high, with Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (a) of 0.96. 
Then the dark triad and (un)productive entrepreneurial motives questionnaires were 
presented; both will be outlined in detail below. Thereafter, subjects had to answer 
questions in regards to trust and the world values survey (WVS), the former measure was 
taken directly from the German socio-economic panel (SOEP) questionnaire. Finally, 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy (based on Weitzel et al., 2010) was elicited111.  
5.3.2.3. The dark triad – the dirty dozen 
For the elicitation of the dark triad, students had to answer the dirty dozen (Paulhus 
and Williams, 2002) questionnaire. The survey consists of twelve questions in total, four 
items for each trait. The measure was developed with reference to the NPI (Raskin and 
Hall, 1979) in case of narcissism, the SRP-III (Williams et al. 2003) in relation to 
psychopathy, and finally the Mach-IV (Christie and Geis, 1970) in relation to 
Machiavellianism. Subjects have to answer on a 9-point Likert scale how much they 
(dis)agree with the given statements (1= strongly disagree; 9= strongly agree). Examples 
for statements include: “I tend to manipulate others to get my way“ (Machiavellianism). 
 
111 Note, the trust, WVS, and entrepreneurial self-efficacy measure will not be further evaluated in this 
paper. 
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“I tend to seek prestige or status” (narcissism). “I tend to lack remorse” (psychopathy). 
The measures’ internal consistency was high to acceptable, with Cronbach’s coefficient 
alpha (a) of 0.89 for narcissism, 0.68 for psychopathy and 0.73 for Machiavellianism.  
5.3.2.4. Productive and unproductive entrepreneurial motives 
Finally, subjects had to answer questions regarding their personal motivation to 
pursue both productive and unproductive entrepreneurial motives. This questionnaire was 
developed by Hmieleski and Lerner (2016), and is primarily based on Baumol’s (1990) 
theoretical considerations of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship. For each 
motive, subjects have to answer five items on a five-point Likert response scale (1= 
strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree). The question was stated in the following way “If I 
were to start a new venture, my motivation for the business would include wanting it 
to…”. Example item for unproductive entrepreneurial motive: “Achieve financial 
success, even if it is a little destructive to society.” Example item productive 
entrepreneurial motive: “Develop a culture in which its employees value their work.” 
Items were averaged, higher scores represent stronger motives, both for the variable of 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurial motives. The measure showed reasonable 
internal consistency, with Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (a) of 0.77 and 0.66 for 
unproductive and productive motives respectively. 
 
I will make use of this variable in two ways: First, I will examine - in the same 
manner as Hmieleski and Lerner (2016) - how (un)productive entrepreneurial motives are 
related to the dark triad and discuss the implications. Further, I will evaluate if and how 
the social preferences measured in our experimental design are related to productive and 
unproductive entrepreneurial motives. Investigating this relationship should give us better 
insights as to how to interpret the findings, from both of these measures, i.e., can 
productive entrepreneurial motives be interpreted with altruistic concepts? And vice 
versa, can we get an indication as to what altruistic or cooperative preferences exactly 
measure in an entrepreneurial motive concept. To give a specific example, is the 
productive entrepreneurial motive “to generate value for society” (item 8) linked to 
altruistic concepts as measured in the classic dictator game? Or are cooperative 
tendencies, as measured in the public good game, negatively related to unproductive 
motives such as wanting to “maximize profits, even at the cost of employees’ well-
being?” (item 2)?  
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5.4. Empirical Analysis 
Mainly, I use correlation and regression analysis to evaluate the outlined 
hypotheses. Hypotheses were analyzed with control variables (full model) and without 
(main effects model). When the addition of the control variables to the main effects model 
induced no change in the statistical significance of findings, I exclusively report the full 
model. All measures were standardized (µ=0; s=1).112 In the analysis investigating the 
relationship between the dark triad and (un)productive entrepreneurial motives, I follow 
Hmieleski’s and Lerner’s (2016) approach and select exclusively subjects with high 
entrepreneurial intentions.113 While I additionally report the findings in relation to the 
entire sample, it is certainly in particular relevant to look at the entrepreneurial motives 




112 Except in the Tobit regressions, where non-standardized variables were applied.  
113 Thereby, applying a median-split procedure for classification purposes.  
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Table 27 presents the variables’ respective means, standard deviations, the possible 
range for each construct based on the experimental design, its min-max range, and internal 
reliabilities, measured via Cronbach’s alpha, where applicable. Correlations, calculated 
between scores of the dark triad, entrepreneurial motives, social preferences, and the 




Table 27: Descriptive statistics 
 
While not a main hypothesis, independent sample t-tests report significant gender 
differences on the scale of psychopathy (t(60)=-3.21; p=0.002), and altruism 
(t(60)=2.5715; p=0.013). Males score higher on psychopathy and allocate less money in 
the dictator game, in line with past findings (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1998). Overall, 
there is no significant gender difference (two-sided) on the dirty dozen scale (t(60)=-
1.4684, p=0.1472), this is also observable from the correlations output in Table 28. 
 
Worth mentioning are some findings in regards to happiness. While no significant 
relationship between self-reported happiness and social preferences is observed (see e.g., 
Charness and Grosskopf, 2001), I find a significant negative relationship between self-
reported happiness and the dirty dozen measure (r=0.30; p<0.01). Hence, lower levels of 
life satisfaction correlate with higher values on the dark triad. Research analyzing the 
relationship of happiness and the dark triad has produced rather ambiguous results (see 
e.g., Jonason and Tome, 2019). 
 
Variable N Mean S.D.  Range Min Max ⍺ 
Social Preferences:               
1 
Altruism:  
Amount allocated to 
receiver 
62 1,04 1,14 〈0 - 5〉 0 4,90 - 
2 
Cooperation: 
Amount allocated to 
project 
62 2,71 1,84 〈0 - 5〉 0 5 - 
Dark Triad:               
3 Psychopathy 62 3,13 1,33 〈1 - 9〉 1 6,25 0,68 
4 Narcissism 62 4,68 1,90 〈1 - 9〉 1 8 0,89 
5 Machiavellianism 62 3,27 1,51 〈1 - 9〉 1 6,5 0,73 
6 Dirty Dozen 62 3,69 1,12 〈1 - 9〉 1,16 6 0,79 
                  
Entrepreneurial Motives:               
7 unproductive motives 62 2,24 0,81 〈1 - 5〉 1 4,8 0,77 
8 productive motives  62 4,08 0,61 〈1 - 5〉 2,2 5 0,66 
                  
Control variables:               




62 2,40 1,03 〈1-5〉 1 4,80 0,96 




Table 28: Intercorrelations of variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Social Preferences:                       
1 Altruism 1,00                     
2 Cooperation 0,17 1,00                   
Dark Triad:                       
3 Psychopathy -0,11 -0,20 1,00                 
4 Narcissism 0,08 0,05 0,10 1,00               
5 Machiavellianism -0,01 -0,30** 0,47*** 0,23* 1,00             
6 Dirty Dozen -0,01 -0,18 0,66*** 0,71*** 0.76*** 1,00           
Entrepreneurial Motives:                       
7 unproductive motives -0,12 -0,07 0,38*** 0,54*** 0,28** 0,58*** 1,00       
8 productive motives  0,001 0,11 -0,07 0,004 0,17 0,07 -0,14 1,00       
Control variables:                       
9 Male -0,33*** -0,04 0,38*** 0,04 0,03 0.19 0,06 -0,04 1,00     
10 Entrepreneurial Intentions 0,02 -0,04 -0,22* 0,05 0,06 0.03 -0,16 0,00 0,10 1,00   
11 Satisfied with Life -0,20 0,06 -0,19 -0,23* -0,216* -0,30*** -0,14 0,02 0,06 0,20 1,00 
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5.4.1. Findings in relation to altruism (Hypothesis 1) 
Starting the analysis for the variable of altruism, I find only the correlation of 
gender (as discussed above) to be significant (p=0.01) and, applying the guidelines by 
Cohen (1988) for the interpretation of correlation coefficients, of medium strength (r=-
0.33). None of the other control variables, and more importantly, the traits of the dark 
triad, or the dirty dozen overall, show strong or significant correlations.  
 
The same results can be obtained from the Tobit regressions presented in Table 
29, for the column ‘altruism’. Thereby, the dependent variable is the amount the dictator 
transferred to the receiver. I find none of the main effect variables (the dark triad) to be 
significantly related to the dependent variable of altruism. Only for the variable of gender 
do I observe significant findings: Males allocate significantly (p<0.01) less money to the 
receiver in the dictator game.114  
 
Consequently, the results do not support hypotheses 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c, which 
predicted (a) Machiavellianism, (b) psychopathy, and (c) narcissism to be negatively 
associated with the preference of altruism.  
5.4.2. Findings in relation to initial cooperation (Hypothesis 2) 
Next, I look at the second hypothesis, which made its predictions in relation to 
initial cooperation115 and the dark triad. Here, a significant (p=0.02) negative correlation 
(r=-0.3) between Machiavellianism and the amount allocated to the project in the first 
round is found (see Table 28).  
 
Again, the same finding can be obtained from the Tobit regression model in Table 
29. For the column of cooperation, I find a significant negative coefficient for the variable 
of Machiavellianism (b=-0.63, p<0.05), consequently finding support for hypothesis 2.a, 
 
114 Note, also when controlling for game order in the regression (as was done in Lauritzen et al. (2002)) 
results remain unchanged.  
115 Measured via the first-round play of the public good game.   
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which predicted a negative association between the trait of Machiavellianism and the 
initial willingness to cooperate in the public good game.  
 
Table 29: Tobit regression models for social preferences 
Dependent variable: Allocations (as % of endowment) 
  Altruism  Cooperation 
Variable Full Model   Full Model 
        
Control variables       
   Male -1.268**   -0.0309 
  (0.501)   (0.872) 
    Age 0.0995   0.0167 
  (0.0883)   (0.160) 
    Happiness -0.240   -0.0243 
  (0.153)   (0.281) 
        
Main effects       
    Psychopathy -0.00216   -0.199 
  (0.206)   (0.373) 
    Machiavellianism -0.0285   -0.632** 
  (0.169)   (0.312) 
    Narcissism 0.0541   0.223 
  (0.122)   (0.223) 
        
Constant 0.551   4.374 
  (2.517)   (4.582) 
Sigma 1.604   2.907 
  (0.210)   (0.404) 
Number of individuals  62   62 
Log Likelihood -88.37   -111.06 
LR χ2 10.68   7.21 
(Prob.>χ2) 0.099   0.206 
Obs. Censored at zero 27   11 
Obs. Censored at five 0   17 
        
Standard errors in parentheses              
*p<0.1; p**<0.05;***p<0.01;       
 
 
Looking at the other two traits of the dark triad, I find no support for psychopathy 
(hypothesis 2.b) (b=-0.2, p>0.1) and narcissism (hypothesis 2.c) (b=0.22, p>0.1) to be 
significantly associated with cooperative tendencies.  
5.4.3. Findings in relation to cooperation over time (Hypothesis 3) 
I next look at the association of the dark triad and cooperative behavior across the 
10 rounds of the public good game.  
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While our third hypothesis was specifically in relation to the trait of 
Machiavellianism and its connection to cooperative behavior in later rounds (over time) 
of the public good game, due to the trait’s prominence of strategic and reciprocal 
considerations, for completeness I also briefly discuss the other traits of the dark triad in 
this context. Graph 6 summarizes for each trait the allocation levels in Euro amounts 
(vertical axis) to the project per round (horizontal axis). The subject pool is thereby split 
by individuals scoring high vs. low on the respective trait, using a median split procedure. 
While consistently higher average contribution levels to the project across all rounds are 
observed for the high MACH sub-sample, the picture is less consistent for psychopathy 
and narcissism. Using Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests, for average contribution levels across 
all rounds, as well as for each individual round, I find exclusively for initial cooperation 
choices (round 1.) in regards to Machiavellianism significantly different behaviors 
(z=1.946; p=0.05) between high MACHs (M=3.18; S.D.=0.336) and low MACHs 
(M=2.27; S.D.=0.313). This was discussed in the previous section. No significant 
differences are found for any of the later rounds. 
 
Consequently, there is no support for hypothesis 3, which predicted that the 
willingness to cooperate in later rounds of the public good game would be significantly 
lower among high MACH individuals.  
 
This completes the analysis of investigating the relationship between social 
preferences and the dark triad. I proceed by analyzing the data in relation to dark 
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5.4.4. Entrepreneurial intent and the dark triad (Hypothesis 4) 
In this section I analyze the variables in relation to hypothesis 4, which predicted 
positive associations between entrepreneurial intentions and the traits of 
Machiavellianism (hypothesis 4.a), psychopathy (hypothesis 4.b), and narcissism 
(hypothesis 4.c). 
 
As can be seen from the regression output in Table 30, contrary to the predictions 
of hypothesis 4.b, a significant negative relationship between subjects who self-report 
intentions to start their own business and the trait of psychopathy (for the full model: b=-
0.404; p=0.012) can be observed. In relation to the trait of Machiavellianism, a positive 
relationship (for the full model b=0.26; p=0.07), which is marginally significant when 
control variables are added to the model, is obtained - hence finding marginal support for 
hypothesis 4.a. No evidence for a link between narcissism and entrepreneurial intentions 
(for the full model, b=0.04; p=0.735) is found in the data. 
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Table 30: OLS regression analysis - Hypotheses 4 a, b, c 
  
Dependent variable: Entrepreneurial intentions 
Variable Main Effects Full Model 
Control variables     
   Male - 0.247* 
    (0.136) 
    Age - -0.108 
    (0.126) 
    Happiness - 0.184 
    (0.130) 
Main effects     
    Psychopathy -0.324** -0.404** 
  (0.142) (0.155) 
    Machiavellianism 0.204 0.266* 
  (0.145) (0.144) 
    Narcissism 0.0337 0.0441 
  (0.129) (0.129) 
      
Observations 62 62 
F-Ratio 1.83 2.02 
R squared 0.09 0.18 
Standard errors in parentheses.   
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01;   
 
 
Table 31 below summarizes, split by high and low entrepreneurial intentions (EI) 
(median split), mean scores for each dark triad trait and the dirty dozen in general.  
 
Table 31: EI and the dark triad: Mean values (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
 
5.4.5. (Un)productive entrepreneurial motives (Hypotheses 5 & 6) 
In a next step, I analyze the data in relation to productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurial motives. As previously described, in order to better relate the findings to 
those of Hmieleski and Lerner (2016), I run the analysis with the sub-sample of students 
intending to start a business (N=32). Here, the focus is on (i.) how these types of 




2,70 4,80 3,34 3,615 




3,58 4,55 3,19 3,775 
(0,241) (0,349) (0,264)  (0,21) 
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entrepreneurial motives are related to the traits of the dark triad (hypotheses 5 and 6) and 
(ii.) how they are associated with the other-regarding preferences of altruism and 
cooperation.  
 
Table 32 summarizes the OLS regression output for both productive and 
unproductive entrepreneurial motives as dependent variables. As can be seen from the 
output column for productive entrepreneurial motives, no effect of the dark triad onto the 
dependent variable of productive entrepreneurial motives is observed, finding no support 
for hypothesis 5.   
 
Moving to unproductive entrepreneurial motives, a highly significant positive 
association for the trait of narcissism (b=0.511; p=0.003) and a marginally significant 
relationship for the trait of psychopathy (b=0.429; p=0.06) is found. No effect is found 
for the trait of Machiavellianism. I consequently find full support for hypothesis for 
hypothesis 6.c, marginal support for hypothesis 6.b, and no support for hypothesis 6.a. 
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Variable Full Model Full Model   
Control variables 
    
   Male -0.035 -0.150   
  (0.245) (0.201)   
    Age 0.308 0.0409   
  (0.181) (0.148)   
    Happiness -0.232 0.150   
  (0.192) (0.157)   
  
    
Main effects 
    
    Psychopathy -0.126 0.429*   
  (0.268) (0.220)   
    Machiavellianism -0.004 0.0405   
  (0.211) (0.173)   
    Narcissism 0.248 0.511***   
  (0.187) (0.154)   
  
    
Observations 32 32   
F-Ratio 1.11 3.68   
R squared 0.21 0.4687   
Standard errors in parentheses.      
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01;      
 
I argue that it is also relevant to investigate the relationship between (un)productive 
entrepreneurial motives for our entire sample of business and economics students. While 
some of these subjects might not intend to start an entrepreneurial venture upon the 
completion of their studies, most of them are likely to be involved in running a business, 
if not as an entrepreneur, then maybe as a manager or else, perhaps at an executive level, 
most likely at some team level. Maybe even in a start-up for which these motives are 
particularly relevant. Therefore, the above regression model is repeated for the entire 
sample (the results can be obtained from Table XXI in Appendix 6.4.). While there is no 
change in relation to productive entrepreneurial motives (all dark traits remain 
insignificant), a highly significant positive link between both narcissism (b=0.519, 
p=0.000) and psychopathy (b=0.382, p=0.005) in relation to unproductive 




Finally, I look at the relationship between (un)productive entrepreneurial motives 
and the social preferences of altruism and cooperation as captured by the data.116 As can 
be seen from Table 33, neither for the coefficient of altruism nor cooperation does the 
data report a significant relationship with productive and unproductive entrepreneurial 
motives.  
 







Variable Full Model Full Model 
      
Control variables     
   Male -0.0814 0.0572 
  (0.144) (0.142) 
    Age 0.166 -0.0886 
  (0.138) (0.136) 
    Happiness -0.0203 -0.115 
  (0.141) (0.139) 
Entrepreneurial intentions  0.0364 -0.153 
  (0.138) (0.136) 
      
Main effects     
    Altruism -0.0640 -0.104 
  (0.149) (0.146) 
    Cooperation 0.111 -0.0491 
  (0.135) (0.133) 
      
Observations 62 62 
F-Ratio 0.37 0.67 
R squared 0.0388 0.068 
Standard errors in parentheses.   
*p<0.1;**p <0.05;***p<0.01;   
 
In an additional step, I investigate whether the individual items of the 
entrepreneurial motives scale (Hmieleski and Lerner, 2016) are related to the social 
preferences of altruism and cooperation. Therefore, I run correlation analysis between 
each item of the entrepreneurial motives scale with respect to altruism and cooperation 
respectively. No significance is found on any item.  
 
116The independent variable of altruism is measured via the dictator’s allocations to the receiver; the 
exogenous variable reflecting cooperative tendencies is measured by the allocations to the public good in 
the first round.  
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5.5. Discussion, Limitations, Future Research 
5.5.1. The dark triad and social preferences 
5.5.1.1. The dark triad and altruism 
Starting the discussion of the findings in relation to the dark triad and social 
preferences, I find no significant relationship between Machiavellianism, psychopathy, 
and narcissism to the social preference of altruism (hypothesis 1 a, b, and c). As outlined 
in section 5.2.2, the only other study I am aware of, which investigates the dark triad and 
game behavior is by Berg et al. (2013). The authors found a significant negative 
relationship between all three traits and the amount the dictator allocated to the receiver. 
However, one needs to keep in mind, that both the receiver and the payout in their 
experimental design were hypothetical. Real incentives present one of the key elements 
of induced value theory and hence economic experiments, according to Vernon Smith 
(1976).117 As discussed in section 5.2, in particular in relation to social desirability, not 
providing real monetary incentives could have an idiosyncratic impact on findings. Social 
desirability bias in this case might influence both, the rating of the dark triad (i.e., by 
wanting to appear “nice” in terms of your personality structure, and hence scoring 
insincerely low on the dark triad questionnaire), as well as the behavior in the dictator 
game (i.e., by donating considerably high (but hypothetical!) amounts to the receiver in 
the dictator game). Dark traits might potentially even be a predictor for social desirability. 
The just described mechanism might drive the findings by Berg et al. (2013). In our 
experimental design, the desire to appear generous or altruistic is costly, as subjects 
actually “lose” the money they allocate to the receiver. Dark traits in an incentive 
compatible setting (measuring real behavior) appear to be a less good predictor.  
 
In this context, I also controlled whether the knowledge of game theory (i.e., by 
having taken a game theory or decision-making class) plays a role – as maybe personality 
plays less of a role in situations where one mathematically or theoretically understands 
 
117 See also Camerer and Hogarth (1999) for an interesting discussion of financial incentives in experiments. 
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the “optimal choice” outcome, or the theoretical interpretation thereof. Regression results 
show no significant relationship in this regard118. 
5.5.1.2. The dark triad and cooperation 
I next analyzed the dark triad in relation to cooperative tendencies and found a 
significant negative relationship between the trait of Machiavellianism and the initial 
willingness to cooperate in the public good game. This is in line with the findings by Berg 
et al. (2013). It appears that the strategic, rational cool attitude of high MACHs, in 
combination with their exploitative nature (e.g., Vecchio and Sussmann, 1991), and their 
disregard for social norms or pressures, do manifest in this context. However, as players 
in this game move simultaneously, I cannot be sure whether this effect is purely driven 
by selfish reasons, or whether higher levels of distrust in relation to the counterparty’s 
behavior also play a role in this context. No relationship was found between initial 
cooperation levels (as well as for cooperation levels in later rounds of the game) for the 
traits of narcissism and psychopathy.  
 
Also, no significantly different behaviors were found for high and low MACHs 
throughout the public good game (hypothesis 3). For this part of the discussion, it is 
important to remember that in the experimental design subjects did not know the exact 
number of rounds to be played in the public good game (see section 5.4.2.1.).119 As a 
consequence, it is considerably more difficult to establish a rational, game theoretic 
strategy. As high MACHS tend to be strongly driven by strategic considerations (i.e., to 
form the most advantageous strategy in terms of own payoffs), this design feature could 
potentially also be the reason why no significantly different behaviors were observed 
across high and low MACHS over time. While low MACHS allocate more money to the 
project across all rounds, statistical significance was found exclusively for the first round. 
It would be interesting to examine in future research, if and how behavior changes when 
the exact number of rounds to be played is known to subjects. Additionally, sample size 
might play a factor in this context. With regards to psychopathy and narcissism, it is hard 
 
118 In the demographic questionnaire, students were asked whether they had previously taken a game theory 
class. I then replicated the Tobit regression from Table 29 while additionally controlling for “game theory 
experience”. The coefficient is insignificant and findings remain unchanged. 
119In order to make the scenario more realistic from an entrepreneurial context perspective. 
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to determine whether this design feature played a role for the obtained results, even more 
so as these traits were insignificant for initial cooperation levels.  
 
Finishing the discussion in regards to dark traits and social preferences, I look at 
the argument by Smillie and Zhao (2015) regarding strong and weak situations (see also 
Brandts and Charness, 2000). The authors argue that in weak situations, such as the 
dictator game relative to the public good game, the role of personality is elevated (Smillie 
and Zhao, 2015). The data does not support this proposal in relation to the dark triad. The 
relationship appears to be more complex, maybe some personality traits play more of a 
role in certain contexts than in others. Machiavellianism for example, also based on its 
definition, seems to be in particular relevant in strategic contexts (i.e., to create a strategic 
advantage for oneself). Since there is no strategic component present in the dictator game, 
it is hence reasonable to expect a stronger association between Machiavellianism and the 
public good game, relative to the dictator game. I encourage future research to create 
experimental designs which analyze the relationship between dark traits and different 
economic games, in order to gain a better understanding. For example, as to how the 
relationship between a certain personality traits and various games hold up and whether 
systematic differences across games and personality traits might eventuate. 
5.5.2. The dark triad and entrepreneurial intentions 
Next, I discuss the findings in relation to entrepreneurial intentions and the dark 
triad (hypothesis 4). No systematic differences between students with high and low 
entrepreneurial intentions were found for the trait of narcissism. I hence cannot confirm 
the results by Mathieu and St-Jean (2013) and by Hmieleski and Lerner (2016), both 
reporting a significant positive association between narcissism and entrepreneurial 
intentions.  
 
Contrary to our predictions and the findings by Hmieleski and Lerner (2016), a 
significant negative association between entrepreneurial intentions and psychopathy was 
found. Economics and business students who do not report the intention to start up their 
own venture display higher levels of sub-clinical psychopathy. For the variables of 
Machiavellianism and entrepreneurial intentions a marginally significant positive 
association was found.  
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What are the implications of these findings? First of all, in relation to narcissism 
and in particular in relation to psychopathy, I deem these findings good news. The results 
suggest potential entrepreneurs to be less likely to hold psychopathic tendencies and to 
be no more, but also no less, inclined to hold narcissistic tendencies than other individuals. 
This is relevant, in particular for the direct stakeholders of the entrepreneurial firm, such 
as its employees, suppliers, and venture capitalists (or other credit providers), as they do 
not have to manage these personalities in order to secure their own (financial) well-being. 
For the case of narcissism, it has been well documented how wide ranging and serious 
the adverse effects of narcissistic leaders or managers are for organizations (Braun et al., 
2016; Campbell et al., 2011; Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 
2011), widely driven by the effect their negative behavior has on fellow workers and 
subordinates. Similarly, for the case of psychopathy, which has been related to 
aggression, counterproductive behaviors, and unethical organizational decision-making 
(see Smith and Lilienfeld, 2013). Hence, the finding implies decreased chances of having 
to manage entrepreneurs’ manipulative, impulsive and risk seeking aspect of 
psychopathy, reducing the need for e.g., extensive due diligence or long-term monitoring 
activities. Surely, also society at large is impacted by this finding – I discuss this aspect 
in more detail when reviewing the findings regarding the link between dark traits and 
(un)productive entrepreneurial motives – as these entrepreneurial motives are particularly 
related to societal outcomes.  
 
With regards to Machiavellianism, I find students with higher entrepreneurial 
intentions to score marginally higher on this trait. This finding could be driven by the 
aspect of high MACHs to follow their purpose and pursue their interests (O’Boyle, 2012). 
Hmieleski and Lerner (2016) did not find a significant relationship in this aspect. What 
are the implications here? In relation to Machiavellianism and job performance findings 
are diverse. On the one hand, scholars suggest a positive relationship in this context, based 
on the ability of high MACHs to secure their own interests, and by succeeding in social 
interactions (e.g., O’Boyle et al., 2012). They also have been shown to do well in 
networking situations and demonstrate a strong ability to effectively influence others, 
e.g., by changing their perception (Jonason and Webster, 2012; Kessler et al., 2010). I 
argue that this could in particular in the context of entrepreneurship play a crucial role. 
Based on the innovative character within entrepreneurship, the ability to, e.g., persuade 
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capital providers but also customers and other stakeholders could present a 
distinguishable asset. Of course, there are also negative aspects in this regard, such as the 
inability to establish long-term relationships based on the egoistic tendencies of these 
individuals (this was discussed in section 5.2.1.3). There clearly are implications in 
relation to the expression of this trait. Zettler and Solga (2013) discuss the possibility of 
an inverted, U-shaped relationship between Machiavellianism and job performance.120 
Hence, it would be interesting to examine in future research whether this slightly higher 
level of Machiavellianism observed in individuals with entrepreneurial intentions is rather 
beneficial or detrimental for job performance (or both, depending on the context).  
 
Our findings in this context are different to those of Hmieleski and Lerner (2016). 
One potential reason for this could be that of culture. While the majority of subjects in 
this study stem from Europe, Hmieleski and Lerner’s (2016) sample consists of business 
school students in the United States. The influence of culture in this context is very 
complex, and to cover it fully goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, there could 
be systematic differences in the US and European culture, which make individuals with 
a dark triad profile to be more suitable for an entrepreneurial environment in the USA 
than in Germany. Our findings (and those of Hmieleski and Lerner, 2016 as well), suggest 
an influence of the dark triad onto entrepreneurial motives (see also next section). 
Motivations to found a business differ between the US and Germany: The GEM report of 
2019/2020 collected data as to why individuals are motivated to found a business, and we 
see some clear differences in this context in relation to Germany and the USA. For 
example, while in the United States of America about 70 percent of entrepreneurs 
(strongly) agree with the statement “Motivation to build great wealth or very high 
income” in Germany this rate amounts to about 30 percent (Bosma et al., 2020). It could 
hence well be that due to the different entrepreneurial motives in these countries also the 
personality structure of entrepreneurs could be different.  
 
120 The authors find that some Machiavellianism leads to better job performance than low Machiavellianism. 
However, both levels perform significantly better than high levels of Machiavellianism (Zettler and Solga, 
2013).  
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5.5.3. Dark traits and productive and unproductive entrepreneurial motives 
Next, I discuss the findings in relation to the connection between productive and 
unproductive entrepreneurial motives and the traits of the dark triad. 
5.5.3.1. The dark triad and productive entrepreneurial motives 
No significant relationships between the dark triad and productive entrepreneurial 
motives is found. For comparison, Hmieleski and Lerner (2016) report also rather mixed 
results in this context. The authors report a significant positive relationship for narcissism, 
a significant negative relationship for psychopathy, and no relationship in regards to the 
variable of Machiavellianism.  
5.5.3.2. The dark triad and unproductive entrepreneurial motives 
The data shows a significantly positive relationship between both narcissism and 
psychopathy121 and unproductive entrepreneurial motives. No systematic connection is 
found for the trait of Machiavellianism. Relating these findings to those of Hmieleski and 
Lerner (2016), the authors found a significant positive relationship for both 
Machiavellianism and psychopathy, while narcissism was significant in only one of their 
two samples. The findings imply that the conclusions from the field of organizational 
behavior, which report negative effects of these dark traits onto a range of firm 
performance measures (Forsyth et al., 2012) can, in case of narcissism and psychopathy, 
also be observed for an entrepreneurial context. There appears to be a systematic 
relationship between the dark triad and the motivation to pursue unproductive 
entrepreneurial motives. This is an important finding as it suggests, that studying the 
personality traits of entrepreneurs - in particular dark traits - can provide us with valuable 
information regarding their potential motivations to operate their business. Dark traits 
appear to be a driver for unethical and environmentally unfriendly decision-making. 
Given the increasing environmental degradation on our planet, our society is in desperate 
need for a generation of entrepreneurs who are not only aware of the severe environmental 
issues, but who are committed to bring about change to the system, even at the cost of 
lower profits. Entrepreneurs who are willing to operate their ventures with sustainable 
decision-making, or who create innovations which offer solutions to problems, such as 
 
121 Marginally significant when looking at the sample of potential future entrepreneurs (N=32), highly 
significant for the sample of business and economics students (N=62). 
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greenhouse gas emissions, chemical use, and pollution in general. Given the findings, it 
is unlikely that entrepreneurs, who are more strongly characterized by the dark triad, are 
the ones who are willing to make these much-needed balanced choices, as they appear to 
be rather unwilling to make trade-offs that would reduce their own monetary benefit. 
These entrepreneurs might not even be aware of the potential problems their venture is 
creating for their community, as i.e., narcissistic individuals are characterized by a strong 
self-focus (Emmons 1987). Hence, in order to incentivize individuals, who are willing to 
make these trade-offs, into entrepreneurship, an understanding of personality structure 
can certainly be helpful.  
 
Now, combining these findings with those in relation to entrepreneurial intentions 
and the dark triad, there is some more good news: While exclusively for the trait of 
Machiavellianism a significantly positive connection to entrepreneurial intentions was 
observed, no link between Machiavellianism and unproductive entrepreneurial motives 
was found. This means that I do not find individuals with higher entrepreneurial intentions 
to be characterized by personality traits, which can be systematically linked to 
unproductive entrepreneurial motives. Rather on the contrary, for the trait of 
psychopathy, which is associated with a higher propensity to engage in unproductive 
entrepreneurial activities, I find a lower disposition in individuals with high 
entrepreneurial intentions. This means, ceteris paribus, for the likelihood of making social 
and sustainable decisions, I find better conditions in terms of personality structure within 
individuals who display high entrepreneurial intentions.122 
  
Finally, I discuss the rather surprising result concerning the missing link between 
(un)productive entrepreneurial motives and the social preferences of altruism and 
cooperation. 
5.5.4. Unproductive entrepreneurial motives and social preferences 
Understanding the reason for this seemingly divergent finding is important, not only 
in order to gain a better understanding for the findings of this paper, but also for the 
 
122 However, for obvious reasons it is also highly desirable to have business and economics students to 
make the right trade-off choices, as they will be the managers, team leaders, decision makers in medium to 
large corporations, whose ecological footprint is just as important (see Markman et al., 2016). 
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interpretation of papers studying i.e., altruistic preferences in an entrepreneurial context 
(e.g., Weitzel et al., 2010; Lauritzen et al., 2020) or research investigating sustainable or 
social entrepreneurial decision-making (e.g., Engel et al., 2019; Shepherd et al., 2013; 
Markman et al., 2016).  
 
In order to better understand this finding, I start by comparing our data to past 
research. To be more precise, I thereby want to establish how our sample scored (on 
average) on the measures of altruism and entrepreneurial motives in relation to past 
research. Do we observe rather low scores on altruism and high scores on productive 
entrepreneurial motives or vice versa? The interpretation depends on this. The scenario 
of subjects scoring low on productive entrepreneurial motives but allocating a large share 
of their endowment to the receiver in the dictator game leads to very different 
interpretations of the results than if subjects score high on productive entrepreneurial 
motives, but decide to allocate little or nothing to the receiver. Comparing the average 
contribution levels in the dictator game (M=20.74 percent) to those of Engel’s (2011) 
meta-study, where subjects allocated, depending on various factors, such as culture, 
between 27 to 38 percent, I find our subjects to rather allocate on average less than in 
other samples. At the same time, the results on the scale of productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurial motives are very similar to those by Hmieleski and Lerner (2016). 
Consequently, it appears that the finding is driven by rather low levels of altruism. 
Displaying low social preferences in an incentivized preference revealing context, while 
at the same time self-reporting strong motives in terms of productive entrepreneurial 
behavior could be interpreted as “cheap talk”. The potential problem of social desirability 
bias has already been discussed in some detail in section 5.5.1.1., but is certainly also 
relevant for this context. While the realization of this bias is costly for subjects in the 
incentivized games section of my experiment, it is payout independent in case of the self-
reported data, such as the entrepreneurial motives. This might be a relevant driver for 
finding no relationship between the measured social preferences and (un)productive 
entrepreneurial motives. Future research would need to establish whether we observe this 
missing link between altruistic and cooperative preferences and (un)productive 
entrepreneurial motives also for different subject pools. However, then it is of course 
debatable, how relevant entrepreneurial motives are for subjects not studying business 
and economics.  
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Also, interesting for the interpretation of this context is the stream of literature 
investigating the gap between stated and revealed preferences (i.e., Frey et al., 2017).  
 
While this study offers a range of contributions, it has its limitations, which I outline 
next.  
5.6. Limitations 
Concerning the analysis of personality traits and social preferences, I would like to 
raise the potential of reverse causality. I regressed economic preferences as a dependent 
variable on personality traits, presuming that these explain preferences. However, while 
this approach is very frequently observed in the literature (see section 5.2.2), exactly how 
these two constructs are linked is still unclear and certainly more research is needed to 
further identify a consistent relationship (see also Almlund et al. (2011) and Daly et al. 
(2009) for a valuable discussion on this.   
 
In comparison to Hmieleski and Lerner’s (2016) study, our sample is considerably 
smaller. However, experimental costs play a crucial role in this context, as we offer an 
incentive compatible elicitation framework in a controlled experimental setting. Based on 
Vernon Smith’s (1976) induced value theory this reflects the quality of our data. To 
increase the sample size in a future study would certainly be desirable, in order to control 
for the robustness of these findings. In this context, it needs to be raised that within the 
experimental design some self-reported variables were elicited (in the questionnaire 
section). Against the background that some of these variables hold rather negative 
connotations (as for example in case of the dark triad and unproductive entrepreneurial 
motives), I cannot exclude the possibility of subjects answering in these instances in a 
socially desirable, rather than authentic way. This has been discussed in the paper, but for 
completeness should be raised in this section again.  
 
The sequence of the experimental structure, specifically eliciting preferences first, 
followed by psychometric variables, might lead to internal validity concerns, based on 
ordering effects. That means that the answering of the psychometric variables could have 
been influenced by the elicitation of preferences. However, as has been described in detail 
in Lauritzen et al. (2020), there is no simple solution. The experimental structure was 
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consciously chosen, based on certain trade-offs, which frequently need to be made in 
experimental research. Here, an “uncontaminated” elicitation of the social preferences 
was prioritized. Similarly, since the measure of altruism was collected in two different 
stages of the experiment (e.g., dictator game (1), 2-player public good game, dictator 
game (2)), there could be concerns regarding ordering effects in this context. All relevant 
regressions were consequently also run with a dummy variable, controlling for game 
order (see Lauritzen et al. (2020) for a detailed explanation on this). Results remain 
unchanged. 
 
When using experimental studies, generalizability is something one should closely 
and critically consider. The debate of using economic and business students for decision-
making experiments in general (e.g., Levitt and List 2007, Schade 2005), but also for the 
application of entrepreneurship, certainly has its limitations. However, given the 
importance of social and sustainable decision-making, particularly in a business context 
– I deem the subject pool of business and economics students appropriate and relevant 
for the purpose of this paper. Replicating the study with actual entrepreneurs in the future 
is certainly desirable. 
 
For measuring the dark triad, the dirty dozen questionnaire by Jonason and Webster 
(2010) was chosen. As brevity is a strong feature of this measure, some critics (Lee et al., 
2013; Maples et al., 2014) have raised concerns in regards to internal validity, while 
others support its validity (see Furnham et al., 2013). The main discussion thereby 
revolves around the question, whether the three components of the dark triad are 
sufficiently distinct from another (discriminative validity). For our purpose, the shortness 
of this questionnaire was important as to keep attention levels of subjects sufficiently 
high, given that they had already performed other tasks for about 40 minutes. Further, the 
wording of this measure was preferred to others, which can at times be somewhat 
insensitive. However, given that Akhtar et al. (2013) and Osumi and Ohira (2010) find 
primary psychopathy to be in particular relevant in both the context of social preferences 
as well as the context of entrepreneurship, the use of longer personality questionnaires, 
which distinguish between primary and secondary psychopathy could prove beneficial 
and lead to more distinguishable findings.  
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Finally, while this study investigates the effect of personality traits onto 
entrepreneurial motivations, one needs to keep in mind that beyond personality, there are 
a wide range of factors, such as institutions and social norms impacting the entrepreneur’s 
role and her motivations and behavior (positive or negative) within society (see Baumol 
et al., 2006). The aim here was not to make, or claim to be able to make, a direct inference 
in relation to dark traits (in particular as we do not control for emotions in our 
experimental design). Yet, I do believe that this study can improve our understanding of 
entrepreneurial behavior and its relation to certain contexts.  
5.7. Conclusion 
Concluding, investigating the association of the dark triad and social preferences, 
exclusively for the trait of Machiavellianism a significant impact on cooperative 
tendencies was found. Investigating the dark triad in the context of occupational choice, 
I find the traits of psychopathy and Machiavellianism to significantly influence 
entrepreneurial intentions, albeit in opposite directions. The resulting implications were 
carefully discussed. The paper further determined a significant positive relationship of 
both psychopathic and narcissistic tendencies onto unproductive entrepreneurial motives. 
Combining the last two findings indicates that individuals with higher entrepreneurial 
intentions are generally not characterized by those dark personality traits, which can 
systematically be linked to unproductive entrepreneurial motives. Given the societal and 
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6.1. Additional Material Essay No. 1  
Experimental section for the description of the attributes 
You are now in the second part of this experiment. 
 
Your task is to imagine that you are the farmer in the respective scenario: with all 
his/her values and attitudes, with his/her farm and income expectations. This means, 
you imagine to have his/her income expectations in the respective situation, that you 
underlie the respective income fluctuations, that you have the same attitude towards 
the extent of the farm’s external effects on the eco-system and that you share the 
same attitude towards the preservation of the fertility of the soil.  
 
How much would you like to be in each specific scenario? Please place the scenario 
that you prefer most on rank 1. This is followed by the scenario that you prefer second 
most, et cetera. The scenario that you prefer least has to be placed on rank 8.  
 
Please click on ‘Continue’.  
 
 
In the following, we will describe the aspects that constitute the different situations 
in more detail:  
 
Aspect 1: Level of Income from agricultural activity 
 
In the respective scenario the farm either generates a net annual average income (after 
taxes) of €60.000 (high income) or the farm generates a net annual average income 
(after taxes) of €20.000 (low income).  
 
Aspect 2: Income Fluctuations 
 
In the respective situation the farmer’s income fluctuates either strongly or weakly.  
 
If it fluctuates strongly, it is either 30% higher than the income stated in aspect 1, or 
30% lower than the income stated in aspect 1.  
Thus, if you have a high net income (€60.000), your income will either amount to 
€78.000 or €42.000 in the case of high fluctuations. If you have a low income 
(€20.000), your income will either amount to €26.000 or to €14.000 in the case of 
high fluctuations.  
 
If it fluctuates weakly, it is either 10% higher than the income stated in aspect 1, or 
10% lower than the income stated in aspect 1.  
Thus, if you have a high net income (€60.000), your income will either amount to 
€66.000 or €54.000 in the case of low fluctuations. If you have a low income 
(€20.000), your income will either amount to €22.000 or to €18.000 in the case of 
 II 
low fluctuations. 
Note: Not all of the just mentioned combinations will be realized in the following 
scenario descriptions.  
 
Aspect 3: Extend of the external effects produced by the farm onto the eco-system  
 
Under externalities of the farm we understand its effects on e.g., ground water, air, 
etc. that are not compensated by the farmer in monetary (or any other) form (e.g., the 
farmer could pollute the ground water without fearing any consequences). Please 
note, that the external effects do not include the fertility of the own land. These 
consequences have to be borne by each farmer him/herself and will be covered in the 
next aspect (aspect 4).  
 
In the specific scenario, the farmer is either interested in this aspect to a lesser extent 
(“low interest”) or he/she shows a very high interest in this aspect.  
 
Aspect 4: Preservation of the fertility of the soil  
 
The fertility of the soil can be improved or destroyed by certain measures. We 
assume, in this aspect, that the farmer already has to bear the consequences of his/ 
her respective activities during his/her lifetime (that means not only the predecessors, 
who are naturally affected as well).  
 
In the specific scenario, the farmer is either interested in this aspect to a lesser extent 
(“low interest”) or he/she shows a very high interest in this aspect.  
 
After having explained the four aspects that constitute a specific scenario to you, we 
would like to ask you to imagine the 8 different scenarios, which you will have to 
bring into a preference order, in detail. Please carefully look at each scenario. On the 
next screen you will get an overview on the specific scenarios.  
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Table A I: Spectrum of social entrepreneurship (Peredo and McLean (2006)) 
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part to benefit entrepreneur and/or 
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Social goals are 
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Table A II: Independent samples t-test for commercial and social businesse 
 
 
Table A III: Std. deviation relative importance values of social & commercial business 
owners 
Attribute 





Income 28.13 19.68 
Sourcing 23.4 14.41 
Distribution 13.27 11.16 
Perception 12.66 9.92 
 
  
 Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Sourcing Equal variances assumed 
13.72
1 .001 .702 43 .487 
Equal variances not assumed   .695 34.653 .492 
Distribution Equal variances assumed 1.560 .218 1.691 43 .098 Equal variances not assumed   1.684 41.076 .100 
Perception Equal variances assumed .229 .634 -.672 43 .505 Equal variances not assumed   -.669 39.816 .508 
Income 
Equal variances assumed 10.834 .002 -1.101 43 .277 
Equal variances not assumed   -1.093 37.441 .282 
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Table A IV: Comparison of test statistics for business types and clusters 
 
 
Table A V: Descriptives of attributes by cluster 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
1 26 46,752808 15,1531811 2,9717833
2 19 20,587684 12,9045311 2,9605025
1 26 29,634231 10,6099940 2,0807910
2 19 12,788421 7,2206016 1,6565196
1 26 12,039192 9,2476881 1,8136209
2 19 11,022421 13,8212376 3,1708094
1 26 11,570346 8,9258235 1,7504980
2 19 55,601263 11,9454708 2,7404789







Entrepreneur (Cluster) Business Type 
Social (Cluster 1) Money-driven (Cluster 2) Social Commercial 
# of entrepreneurs 26 19 23 22 
thereof commercial business owner 11 (42%) 11 (58%)   
thereof social business owner 
 15 (58%) 8 (42%)   
Conjoint Results (Average relative 
importance values)     
Income 11,6 55,6 26,3 34,2 
Social Sourcing 46,8 20,6 37,7 33,6 
Ecological Distribution 29,6 12,8 25,5 19,4 
Perception 12,0 11,0 10,5 12,8 
Descriptive Statistics     
Mean Age 39 36 37 38 
Female ratio 42% 16% 35% 27% 
Religiosity 15% 26% 30% 9% 
Above-average social person (self-
estimation) 73% 42% 83% 36% 
I had a good business idea so I decided 
to found a business. 85% 58% 78% 68% 
I wanted to found a business so I 
looked for a good business idea. 15% 42% 22% 32% 
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Equal variances assumed ,684 ,413 6,081 43 ,000 26,1651235 4,3024270 17,4884526 34,8417944
Equal variances not assumed 6,238 41,912 ,000 26,1651235 4,1947671 17,6992127 34,6310343
Equal variances assumed ,870 ,356 5,975 43 ,000 16,8458097 2,8195795 11,1595857 22,5320338
Equal variances not assumed 6,334 42,834 ,000 16,8458097 2,6596520 11,4815103 22,2101092
Equal variances assumed ,884 ,352 ,296 43 ,769 1,0167713 3,4370696 -5,9147403 7,9482828
Equal variances not assumed ,278 29,436 ,783 1,0167713 3,6528417 -6,4493282 8,4828707
Equal variances assumed 4,247 ,045 -14,166 43 ,000 -44,0309170 3,1081582 -50,2991155 -37,7627185
Equal variances not assumed -13,540 31,865 ,000 -44,0309170 3,2518407 -50,6557969 -37,4060371
Std. Error 
Difference








Equality of t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference
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Figure A III: Online questionnaire - screen 1 
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Figure A IX: Online questionnaire - screen 7 
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6.3. Additional Material Essay No. 3 
Questionnaire – Supplementary material 
Table A VII: World values survey 
Subjects were asked to rate on 6 point Likert scale whether item's description is: 1 ('not at all like me') to 6 ('very much like me') 
Value WVS Item Defining Goal (Schwartz, 2012 (p.5)) 
Universalism  Looking after the environment is important to 
this person; to care for nature. 
Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and 
protection for the welfare of all people and for 
nature. 
Benevolence 
It is important to this person to help the 
people nearby; to care for their well-being. 
Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with 
whom one is in frequent personal contact (the ‘in-
group’). 
Conformity 
It is important to this person to always behave 
properly; to avoid doing anything people 
would say is wrong. 
Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses 
likely to upset or harm others and violate social 
expectations or norms. 
Tradition 
Tradition is important to this person; to 
follow the customs handed down by one's 
region or family. 
Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the 
customs and ideas that one's culture or religion 
provides. 
Security 
Living in secure surroundings is important to 
this person; to avoid anything that might be 
dangerous.  
Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of 
relationships, and of self. 
Power It is important to this person to be rich; to 
have a lot of money and expensive things. 
Social status and prestige, control or dominance 
over people and resources. 
Achievement  
Being very successful is important to this 
person; to have people recognize one's 
achievements. 
Personal success through demonstrating competence 
according to social standards 
Hedonism It is important to this person to have a good 
time; to "spoil" oneself.  
Pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself. 
Stimulation 
Adventure and taking risks are important to 
this person; to have an exciting life.  Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. 
Self-Direction 
It is important to this person to think up new 
ideas and be creative; to do things one's own 
way.  




Table A VIII: Entrepreneurial self-efficacy 
Subjects were asked to rate their abilities in comparison to their peers on 5-point likert scale for the given items (1 = a lot worse; 5 
= much better).  
Item description Source Factor and Variable Name 
solve problems Wilson et al. 2007 bt_solve_problems 
manage money Wilson et al. 2008 bt_manage_money 
be creative  Wilson et al. 2009 c_be_creative 
get people to agree with you Wilson et al. 2010 bt_people_agree 
be a leader Wilson et al. 2011 bt_leader 
make decisions Wilson et al. 2012 bt_dec_making 
successfully identify new business 
opportunities 
Zhao et al. 2005 bt_opp_recog 
create new products Zhao et al. 2006 bt_new_products 
think creatively Zhao et al. 2007 c_think_creative 
commercialize an idea or new development Zhao et al. 2008 bt_comm_idea 
raise funds for a new business Monsen / Weitzel et al. 2010) bt_raise_funds 
sell a new idea or service Monsen / Weitzel et al. 2010) bt_sell_products 
 
Table A IX: Trust (based on SOEP) 
Subjects were asked to rate the following statements. 
Item description 
Variable Name  
(based on Caliendo et al. 2010) 
Main items: 4 point Likert Scale (1 = totally agree ; 4 = totally disagree) 
On the whole one can trust people (reversed item) trustpeople 
Nowadays one can't rely on anyone canttrust 
If one is dealing with stranger, it is better to be careful before you trust them cautionstrangers 
Supplementary Items (1) : 0=no (trust) ; 1 = yes (trust) 
Do you believe that most people would exploit you if they had the opportunity (dfair=0), or 
would attempt to be fair toward you (dfair=1)?  
dfair 
Would you say that for most of the time, people attempt to be helpful (dhelpful=1)? Or only act in 
their own interests (dhelpful=0)?  
dhelpful 
Have you ever profited from the generosity of a person, who you had not previously met 
(dprofitfromstranger=1; otherwise =0)? 
dprofitfromstranger 
What would you say: how may close friends do you have?   (open scale question) numberfriends 
Supplementary Items (2): 5 point Likert Scale (1 = very often ; 5 = never) How often does it occur that… 
…that you lend your friends your personal belongings (i.e., CDs, books, car, bicycle)?  lendbelongings 
…that you lend your friends money?  lendmoney 




Table A X: High and low stakes in the dictator game 
Dictator Game 1 
Allocation (in % of endowment) of dictator to receiver.   
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 
Entrepreneur 35 38.31% 17.54% 0 0.6 
z=1.859; p=0.06 
Start-up ECI 25 31.60% 19.13% 0 0.75 
High stake treatment      
Entrepreneur 23 34.65% 17.95% 0 0.5 
z=0.6 ; p=0.54 
Start-up ECI 18 33.89% 18.28% 0 0.75 
Low stake treatment    
Entrepreneur 12 45.33% 15.00% 0 0.6 
z=2.154; p=0.03 
Start-up ECI 7 25.71% 21.49% 0 0.5 
Students 32 26.38% 24.72% 0 0.98   
Dictator Game 2 
Allocation (in % of endowment) of dictator to receiver.   
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 
Entrepreneur 42 35.05% 25.37% 0 1 
z=0.409; p=0.68 
Start-up ECI 18 42.28% 28.84% 0 1 
High stake treatment     
 
Entrepreneur 32 38.03% 25.51% 0 1 
z=0.148; p=0.88 
Start-up ECI 9 39.44% 33.11% 0 1 




Entrepreneur 10 25.50% 23.62% 0 0.5 
z=1.377; p=0.16 
Start-up ECI 9 45.11% 25.56% 0 1 




Table A XI: Regressions with the risk variable 




Entrepreneur vs. Students Non-entrepreneurs vs. Students Dummy group variable 
Entrepreneur 0.009 0.074 0.0822 0.313*** 0.289*** 0.288*** - - - - - - 
  (0.0700) (0.0710) (0.0721) (0.0678) (0.0701) (0.0692)             
Non-
entrepreneur 
- - - - - - 0.247*** 0.184** 0.148* -0.04855 -0.10913 -0.132* 
              (0.0782) (0.0844) (0.0845) (0.0738) (0.0788) (0.0792) 
Student - - - - - - - - - 0.285*** 0.280*** 0.277*** 
                    (0.0648) (0.0660) (0.0652) 
Male -0.011 -0.082 -0.0676 -0.192 -0.206 0.194*** -0.154 -0.207 0.196*** -0.134 -0.180 0.167*** 
  (0.0821) (0.0871) (0.0893) (0.0711) (0.0733) (0.0726) (0.0730) (0.0754) (0.0737) (0.0607) (0.0625) (0.0622) 
Risk - 0.004 0.0031 - -0.015 -0.0147 - -0.003 -0.0032 - -0.007 -0.00762 
    (0.0151) (0.0152)   (0.0128) (0.0127)   (0.0165) (0.0162)   (0.0119) (0.0118) 
Game 
Experience 
- - -0.0439 - - -0.0902 - - -0.131* - - -0.0882* 
      (0.0643)     (0.0580)     (0.0752)     (0.0531) 
Constant 0.347*** 0.304*** 0.313*** 0.205*** 0.299*** 0.340*** 0.180*** 0.222** 0.284** 0.465*** 0.525*** 0.565*** 
  (0.0712) (0.1159) (0.116) (0.0506) (0.0933) (0.0955) (0.0540) (0.1128) (0.115) (0.0683) (0.0979) (0.0999) 
Sigma 0.271 0.235 0.234 0.299 0.282 0.278 0.321 0.306 0.298*** 0.298 0.276 0.272*** 
  (0.0248) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0254) (0.0259) (0.0255) (0.0326) (0.0338) (0.0329) (0.0224) (-0.0227) (0.0225) 
Number of 
individuals 
82 65 65 118 103 103 90 78 78 145 123 123 
Log 
Likelihood 
-25.970 -12.358 -12.125 -50.214 -39.635 -38.436 -43.503 -34.801 -33.303 -60.855 -44.611 -43.241 
LR χ2 0.02 1.56 2.02 21.15 19.15 21.55 12.67 10.97 13.97 21.85 20.08 22.82 








2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses               
*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** 





Table A XII: Regression DG1 & DG2 - without interaction effect and game order 
 
Table A XIII: Impact of social business on allocation choices in dictator game 
 
  
DG1: Individual contributions (as % of endowment): 
Tobit regression 
DG2: Individual contributions (as % of 
endowment): Tobit regression 
Entrepreneurial crowd 0.151** Entrepreneurial crowd 0.401*** 
  (0.0653)   (0.0998) 
Male -0.102 Male -0.163 
  (0.0651)   (0.107) 
Constant 0.252*** Constant 0.0973 
  (0.0545)   (0.0829) 
Sigma 0.255*** Sigma 0.336*** 
  (0.0255)   (0.0385) 
Number of individuals 72 Number of individuals 72 
Log Likelihood -19.297 Log Likelihood -37.979 
LR χ2 6.23 LR χ2 15.81 
(Prob.>χ2) 0.0444 (Prob.>χ2) 0.0004 
Obs. censored at zero 16 Obs. censored at zero 24 
Obs. censored at one 0 Obs. censored at one 2 
Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 *p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
 XXI 
Table A XIV: Tobit regression dictator game - Psychometric variables for entrepreneurs only 
 
 






Table A XVI: Median Split: Entrepreneurial intent and initial cooperation 
 
 







Freerider (n) 6 9 17 32 
(expected frequency) 12.2 6 13.8 32 
Cooperator (n) 49 18 45 112 
(expected frequency) 42.8 21 48.2 112 
Total 55 27 62 144 
Pearson chi2(2) = 6.9702 p=0.031       
Fisher's exact p=0.027       
  
 XXIII 













Table A XIX: Psychometric variables in the cooperation game - initial cooperation. 
Variable Entrepreneurial crowd Students 
Male 0.399*** -0.0610 
  (0.132) (0.174) 
Entrepreneurial Intent - -0.0278 
    (0.0902) 
Creative Skills -0.0527 -0.0116 
  (0.0683) (0.111) 
Business Skills -0.0681 0.0641 
  (0.104) (0.161) 
constant 0.904** 0.513 
  (0.366) (0.511) 
Sigma 0.444 0.620 
  (0.0503) (0.0864) 
Number of individuals 82 62 
Log Likelihood -59.923 -59.805 
LR χ2 8.890 0.280 
(Prob.>χ2) 0.031 0.990 
Obs. censored at zero 4 11 
Obs. censored at one 29 17 











Table A XXI: Cooperation and psychometric variables 
Variable Entrepreneurial crowd Students 
Conditional Cooperation 0.467*** 0.783*** 
  (0.0668) (0.0932) 
Male -0.0409 0.0294 
  (0.149) (0.205) 
Entrepreneur 0.243* - 
  (0.128)   
Entrepreneurial Intent  - -0.0833 
    (0.106) 
Creative Skills 0.0347 0.157 
  (0.0695) (0.131) 
Business Skills -0.230** 0.0250 
  (0.107) (0.191) 
      
constant 0.929** -0.251 
  (0.388) (0.602) 
Number of individuals 82 62 
Number of observations 779 589 
Obs. censored at zero 155 206 
Obs. censored at one 232 178 
Log Likelihood -621.809 -284.434 
Wald χ2 59.9 73.51 
(Prob.>χ2) 0.000 0.000 
Error Components:     
  0.446 0.728 
  0.487 0.351 























































6.4. Additional Material Essay No. 4 
Additional analysis output 






entrepreneurial motives  
Variable Full Model Full Model 
      
Control variables     
   Male -0.0396 -0.106 
  (0.145) (0.115) 
    Age 0.189 -0.0344 
  (0.134) (0.106) 
    Happiness 0.0356 0.0694 
  (0.138) (0.110) 
      
Main effects     
    Psychopathy -0.0958 0.382*** 
  (0.164) (0.131) 
    Machiavellianism 0.0156 0.00218 
  (0.153) (0.122) 
    Narcissism 0.216 0.519*** 
 (0.137) (0.109) 
      
Observations 62 62 
F-Ratio  0.73 6.49 
R squared  0.0739 0.4143 
Standard errors in parentheses.   










  N=32 N=30 
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Dark Triad         
    Psychopathy 2,70 1,20 3,58 1,32 
    Narcissism 4,80 1,92 4,55 1,91 
    Machiavellianism 3,34 1,59 3,19 1,45 
Entrepreneurial Goals         
    Unproductive Goals 2,16 0,86 2,33 0,76 
    Productive Goals 4,15 0,65 4,01 0,56 
Social Preferences         
    Altruism 1,14 1,03 0,96 1,25 
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